Before Darwin's discovery, the world was generally thought to have remained more or less the same since its creation. This belief, based on Biblical interpretations, was contested through fossil studies showing that species change over time.

Darwin's legendary round-the-world 1831-1836 voyage aboard the HMS Beagle generated his most significant observations and discoveries, inspiring his work on natural selection.

Although Darwin first used the term "natural selection" in a paper in 1842, it wasn't until 1859 that he published his controversial theory that all living beings share a common ancestry -- a discovery that remains vital to modern biology.

Author Nick Spencer, director of studies at Theos, a research organisation launched in 2006 with the support of the Archbishop of Canterbury, explained why the debate persists to this day.

"People are encountering evolution not so much as a science but as a philosophy," he told Reuters ahead of a Nov. 24 lecture at Westminster Abbey to mark the anniversary of the exact date on which Darwin's book was first published.

The Reuters Memorial Lecture commemorates journalists who have lost their lives in pursuit of their profession.

The lecture will be followed by a panel discussion chaired by John Lloyd, with Timothy Garton Ash and Paolo Mancini. Reuters correspondents will be live blogging throughout.

To join the discussion click on the 'make a comment' link at the top of the liveblog panel.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is in the United States for the first official state visit by any foreign leader since President Barack Obama took office this year. While the atmospherics are right, and the two leaders probably won't be looking as stilted as Obama and China's President Hu Jintao appeared to be during Obama's trip last week (for the Indians are rarely short on conversation), there is a sense of unease.

And much of it has to do with AFPAK - the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan which is very nearly at the top of Obama's foreign policy agenda and one that some fear may eventually consume the rest of his presidency. America's ally Pakistan worries about India's expanding assistance and links to Afghanistan, seeing it as part of a strategy to encircle it from the rear.  Ordinarily, Pakistani noises wouldn't bother India as much, but for signs that the Obama administration has begun to adopt those concerns as its own in its desperate search for a solution, as Fareed Zakaria writes in Newsweek.

And that is producing a "perverse view" of the region, he says adding it was a bit strange that India was being criticised for its influence in Afghanistan. India is the hegemon in South Asia, with a GDP 100 times that of Afghanistan and it was only natural that as Afghanistan opened itself up following the ouster of the Taliban in 2001, its cuisine, movies and money would flow into the country. The whole criticism about India,  Zakaria says, is a little bit like saying the United States has had growing influence  in Mexico over the last few decades and should be penalised for it.

But what about Pakistan's concerns, a country that was dismembered in the last full-scale war with India in 1971 with the creation of Bangladesh. The last thing it would want is a hostile regime in Afghanistan on its western flank on top of the Indian army, the world's third largest, massed on the eastern front, not to mention the Islamist militants whom it once nurtured turning on  the State itself.

Pakistan army chief General Ashfaq Kayani told the U.S. National Security Adviser General Jim Jones earlier his month that Indian presence in Kabul would hurt the war objectives.

And what about the Afghans themselves ? The India-Pakistan rivalry is probably a sideshow in the broader battle between a resurgent Taliban and the foreign forces, but perhaps one they can do without.

[Photographs of Afghan children and Indian and U.S. flags at the White House]

– This opinion piece was written by C.M. Sennot for GlobalPost. The views expressed are his own. It was originally published here on GlobalPost. –

The last time America had to borrow money to finance a war was during the Revolution and a cash-strapped Continental Congress took loans from France to fund a surge against the British.

That worked out pretty well.

But it’s hard to feel the spirit of 1776 in President Obama’s journey to China. He went as a representative of a borrowing nation to its primary lender amid a call for yet another costly military surge in the Long War that is escalating in Afghanistan even if it is hopefully winding down in Iraq.

As the president completes his journey to Asia, he returns to Washington to face what is the most consequential foreign policy decision of his presidency, a decision that this administration has not yet fully thought through.

That is whether to heed the counsel of his top commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, and call for a surge of 40,000 more troops in Afghanistan.

Obama is said to also be pondering a middle ground of calling up somewhere between 10,000 and 30,000 more troops.

Or, and this is shaping up as a long shot, he and his team of rivals in the Pentagon and the State Department could decide to rebuff McChrystal. In this scenario, Obama would refocus the mission but still hold to the general counterinsurgency plan that he originally spelled out in March and which increased U.S. troops by 21,000 to a total U.S. presence of 68,000 troops. That surge was just completed this fall.

From my experience talking with counterinsurgency experts and meeting with U.S. and coalition counterinsurgency leaders and trainers in Afghanistan over the summer, I am hoping Obama chooses to hold to the existing troops level. I am hoping he does that while refocusing his original plan to be more targeted on counterterrorism than the wider goal of classic counterinsurgency against the Taliban. He should stick to his guns and hold at the troop levels he has and make the troops who are there better and more effective and provided with better equipment and intelligence assets to get the job done. As I said in an earlier column, less is more right now in Afghanistan.

Every empire in history has regretted an escalation in Afghanistan and it is hard to see how America would be any different.

I do not envy the president and his team in making a very difficult and costly decision at a very hard time economically in America. Few presidents in history have had to face so many fateful decisions in their first year in the White House.

But despite all the pondering the president has given to whether to increase troops, it seems he has given far too little consideration to the overall cost of escalating the war and how it will undercut his ability to fund the ambitious domestic policy agenda he has set out from bank bailouts to health care reform.

With all the debt piling up, it seems to me there is a clear connection between his trip to China and these war costs in Afghanistan.

If you think about it, the hundreds of billions we borrow from China every year will go at least in part to fund the enormous cost of an escalation of troops in Afghanistan, a cost — in terms of lives and treasure.

The war in Iraq will end up costing this country more than 2 trillion dollars, according to the conservative projections of Linda Bilmes, an economist at the Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. The cost is higher still if you include interest on the debt, interest which will in a large measure be paid to China.

Bilmes has worked closely with the Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz to do the long math on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, to factor in not just the military budget and the interest on the debt but also the extraordinary high cost on every level of soldiers who are wounded physically and mentally by war.

Bilmes is credited with highlighting the failure of the administration of President George W. Bush to give an accurate cost assessment of a war that escalated several hundred times beyond the original projection of just $50 billion to $60 billion made by the Pentagon at the start of the war in 2003. She’s been proven right and she’s worried that the Obama administration may be fatefully making another miscalculation on the cost of war in Afghanistan.

And we’ve hit a profound turning point in Afghanistan. In this new budget year, which started Oct. 1, for the first time, the war in Afghanistan will cost Americans more than the war in Iraq.

And, as Bilmes points out, fighting in Afghanistan is more costly than it is in Iraq because of the terrain and the difficulty in supplying troops and evacuating the wounded. She estimates that Afghanistan is as much as 1.6 times more expensive per soldier than Iraq.

“While this administration has brought great military expertise to thinking this through, there needs to be a greater focus on the cost. How are we going to pay for this? People are still not looking at the long term costs,” said Bilmes.

And so as the president stares out the window of Air Force One pondering the dark skies in the long journey back to Washington, one can only hope that he has thought through the extraordinary cost — on every level — of calling for an escalation of troops in Afghanistan.

More on Afghanistan from GlobalPost:

America’s farmer-soldiers in Afghanistan

Afghanistan’s only pig quarantined? Must be bad

Afghanistan: Waiting for the dust to settle

Troops’ deaths shatter trust in Helmand

Pictured above: U.S. President Barack Obama tours the Great Wall of China at Badaling, November 18, 2009. REUTERS/Jason Reed

Since the emergence of digital technology and global networks, forgetting has become an exception, Mayer-Schonberger writes in "Delete".

"Forgetting plays a central role in human decision-making," he argues. "It lets us act in time, cognizant of, but not shackled by, past events."

Mayer-Schonberger shared his theory on how to fight back against the digital panopticon with Reuters before giving a lecture at the Royal Society for the encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce in London.

Easy money in the United States, a falling dollar and growing flows of funds seeking better returns in emerging markets are touching off a new round of capital controls in hot emerging markets, a trend that could accelerate and will at the very least increase market volatility.

It shouldn’t be a surprise, really; loose money in the developed world is helping to spur investment into emerging markets, driving currencies up and making local exports less competitive for countries which, unlike China, aren’t hitching a free ride as the dollar declines.

Inflation may be a threat for many of these, but with the global economy still struggling, it certainly won’t feel that way to policy makers.

Russia on Wednesday joined the list of countries eyeing new measures to stem currency speculation and appreciation. Moscow was careful to say it would not impose actual capital controls, which seek to regulate flows of funds into or out of an economy, but the measures they are considering would have exactly that effect, making it tougher or more expensive for money borrowed abroad to be brought into Russia.

Kazakhstan, which has been intervening actively to slow the ascent of its tenge currency, has introduced legislation allowing capital controls, but so far has not used them.

Indonesia said this week it will consider curbs on foreign holdings of short-term official debt, sending its rupiah into a brief swoon until central banker Hartadi Sarwono damped things down by saying currency moves based on such flows were so far manageable.

Elsewhere all across developing Asia central banks have been intervening to cap gains in the value of their currencies, with Taiwan going so far as to ban foreign funds from investing in local time deposits.

Brazil last month announced a 2 percent tax on foreign investment in stocks and fixed-income securities to limit the strengthening of the real.

International Monetary Fund chief Dominique Strauss-Kahn gave the fund’s standard line to the Financial Times: “The IMF would not recommend them as a standard prescription … as they carried costs and were usually ineffective”.

FIGHTING OVER SCRAPS

Ineffective over the long run they may be, but tempting they are in the short term. The very fact that India and China have emerged relatively well from the crisis and have resumed growth in strong fashion gives courage to those considering their own measures. And really, the very idea of an orthodox allegiance to free flowing markets ensuring the best outcome for all now looks pretty 1999. Malaysia attracted a firestorm of criticism when it imposed controls in the wake of the Asian crisis in the 1990s. There was much talk of how investors would go away and not come back, how development would be retarded and Malaysia ultimately would rue the day. None of that has come to pass, and those same investors proved quite willing to come back if the returns looked good enough, as indeed they did.

But Malaysia, along with Chile, were outliers when they imposed capital controls. What will it mean if it becomes not a tool of desperation but a standard policy when hot money flows? There must be a risk that capital controls become part of an escalating series of beggar-thy-neighbor steps taken by countries fighting over the scraps of a diminished U.S. and European appetite for imported goods.

If, in other words, these controls are a temporary phase to ease the transition to stronger currencies, the risks might not be that high. I’d worry that developed market interest rates are going to stay low for a very long time. That means that the grand emerging markets carry trade of borrowing in dollar to speculate for appreciation elsewhere will, as it did in Japan, build and build.

At the same time you have to look at why interest rates will stay so low for so long. My bet is that it is because consumption in the developed world will be under structural pressure as debts are repaid. So the money flows into emerging markets and drives up currencies, but unless domestic consumption in China and India really takes off there will not be a very good market for exports. That will make newly strong emerging market currencies all the harder for those countries to tolerate, economically and politically. If China does not do its part and allow its currency to appreciate, the argument will be all the more stark.

It may or may not be a good idea, but one thing I would not count on is coordinated and globally sanctioned capital controls, as espoused by Arvind Subramanian, a senior fellow of the Peterson Institute.

The U.S. simply won’t wear it.

Look then for more unilateral controls and more volatility as speculation of all kinds grows.

(At the time of publication James Saft did not own any direct investments in securities mentioned in this article. He may be an owner indirectly as an investor in a fund.)

The protocol set targets aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions, which are believed to be responsible for the gradual rise in the Earth's average temperature. Many scientists say that reducing carbon dioxide emissions is key to preventing climate change.

But authors Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner argue in their new book SuperFreakonomics that humanity can take an alternative route to try and save the planet.

"If the goal is to stop warming then geo-engineering solutions are worth considering because they are far cheaper, probably much more do-able and easily reversible," Dubner told Reuters before a talk at the Royal Society for the encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce in London.

Related vlog: How to become a freakonomist

Are we now getting blasé about the latest crisis? Not so long ago, perfectly respectable economists and financial analysts were talking about a new Great Depression. The world was on the brink, it was said. Now, though, consensus appears to be that it is all over bar the shouting. The world is safe.

Wealth managers at Barclays have gone as far as telling their clients to get over it.

Move past the crisis .... The past year's events were deeply traumatic for most investors, but now is the time to move on, and take a more "business as usual" approach ...."

Such bullishness may not be comforting to the record numbers of jobless in parts of the world, but it is bordering on consensus. It is left to the likes of perma-bears such as  Nouriel Roubini to try to burst the bubble of optimism on which many are floating. The economist began one of his latest articles bluntly:

Think the worst is over? Wrong.

Roubini's main point is that unemployment is likely to get worse rather than better and that many U.S. jobs that have been lost will not come back.

Now, there can obviously be a disconnect between markets and economics, but the former tends to be based on assumptions about the latter. So which is right? Are we out of the woods? Or should Supertramp be firing up their keyboards again?

With just a few short weeks until the end of the year, look for many fund managers to take on more risk in an effort to salvage their annual return figures.

This is not about fundamentals, this is about something far more important: career risk.

Hedge Fund Research’s Global Hedge Fund index, which is broadly representative of the industry, is up just 11.9 percent year to date, while its Equity Hedge index is scarcely doing better, up 12.6 percent. The HFR Macro Fund index is actually down 8 percent, indicating the best paid minds in the business did not see the astounding emerging markets rally and dollar fall coming.

Given that global emerging markets are up something on the order of 60 percent this year, that all global shares are up 30 percent and even the S&P 500 is up 22 percent, we can conclude that a lot of managers are heading into the year-end reporting season with a lot of ground to make up.

There are also lifeboats full of institutional fund managers and mutual fund managers in the same position.

What all who have missed the rally have in common is not a common failure of analysis — there are lots of different ways to get it wrong — but a collective vulnerability to finding themselves waving their clients goodbye. Letters detailing 2009 performance will have to be posted, ranking lists of funds will be published and there will be consequences.

It must be hugely tempting for managers who are behind — and remember a lot of these people are not committed bears — to pile in and hope the momentum trade can bring their returns back to respectability.

It all adds up to a supportive background for risky assets through the new year. There can be no assurances that fundamentals, which are pretty poor, won’t reassert themselves. There is no telling too that policy makers might put a foot wrong and scare the markets, though I doubt it. They have a very large interest in a merry year end. Even if they didn’t, inflation is not an issue and unemployment is, so don’t look for any telegraphs from Washington, London or Frankfurt bearing tidings of rising rates.

COME BACK CHUCK PRINCE, ALL IS FORGIVEN
Individual investors who missed the rally are less likely to pile in right now. Their temptation will be to pass over the business headlines and go straight to sports. And besides, the holidays provide distractions of their own and you are highly unlikely to be fired by yourself as your own investment manager, now matter how richly you deserve the boot.

Professionals however are usually not so lucky as to be related to the client.

Of course, there must be many managers who are ahead of the market. Why won’t they trim their sails and protect their gains? I don’t know the answer to that but in my experience it just doesn’t work that way. People tend to think of gifts as entitlements and it’s a rare, and valuable, manager who having been aggressive when most were timid now gives up the habits of a lifetime.

It is all very reminiscent of good old Charles Prince, the former Citigroup chief who said about the leveraged buyout market, “As long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance,” just as the world began to unravel. Prince wasn’t a fool, he was expressing a core truth. If you are head of a bank or a mutual fund and you sit out a boom which you see as too risky you are taking on another, perhaps more persuasive risk; that the very clients you seek to protect will call you a stick-in-the-mud and take their business elsewhere.

This is not a specious argument about “cash on the sidelines” or money market funds. Numbers showing huge cash in money market funds are misleading; most of it will never end up in equity markets. This is simply about the self-fulfilling psychology and mechanics of rallies, especially rallies with official support.

The authorities, in their wisdom, have broken the circuit of a crash by flooding the market with enough money to drive up asset prices. This is intended to bring money out from under mattresses and force people to take risks again, to make them dance even if they feel like a fool.

That is unlikely to last forever or to work forever, but a reversal is less likely before January 1 than after.

(At the time of publication James Saft did not own any direct investments in securities mentioned in this article. He may be an owner indirectly as an investor in a fund.)

(Editing by James Dalgleish)

- John Kemp is a Reuters columnist. The views expressed are his own --

As hopes for reaching a binding agreement to cut greenhouse gas emissions at the Copenhagen summit die, climate negotiators could learn useful lessons on how to structure the negotiations from the multiple rounds of trade talks within the GATT/WTO framework.

Climate negotiations are about limiting carbon dioxide emissions, but the negotiators are also hammering out a complex economic instrument that will define the distribution of production, energy use and income in the next few decades. It is the agreement's profound economic effects that are making it so hard to reach a final deal.

While the stalled negotiations on the Doha Round might make it seem likely an unlikely role model, the GATT/WTO process has successfully created a legal framework for liberalising world trade through eight successive rounds of increasingly complex negotiations, as well as a dispute settlement system accepted by all major countries.

In the process, negotiators have already had to resolve many of the difficult issues bedevilling attempts to reach an emissions deal:

* How to obtain treaty commitments from a huge range of countries at different stages of economic development.

* How to handle negotiations with the United States, given the peculiar nature of that country's constitutional arrangements.

* How to ensure countries live up to their commitments and resolve subsequent disputes about treaty implementation.

Climate negotiators could usefully apply many of these lessons to their own agreement. As Copenhagen falters, they may need to rethink the "road map" for talks to improve the chance of bringing them to a successful conclusion.

FRAMEWORK AND DETAILED SCHEDULES

The 1947 General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) established a legal framework and general principles for trade liberalisation. But detailed tariff reductions as well as commitments on subsidies, dumping and technical barriers were left to a later series of trade rounds. These commitments were then turned into schedules of concessions for each member country and incorporated by reference into the central treaty.

Negotiations started with a series of limited tariff reductions that were gradually made more ambitious. Part IV of the GATT, added in 1966, guaranteed developing countries "special and differential treatment" to encourage them to become involved in the tariff-reduction process and make their own binding commitments.

For each round, political leaders set broad objectives at the outset, but the detailed exchange of "concessions" was handled by lower-level officials in a Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC).

Something similar is needed for the climate talks. President Barack Obama has already backed a "two-step" process. Political leaders would aim for an "operational agreement" at next month's summit while leaving a legally binding agreement until 2010 or later. [ID:nSP280582] The aim is to ensure agreement on the big issues is not held hostage to myriad disputes over the details.

It might make sense to separate an agreement on the broad framework (including establishment and review of targets, trading emissions allowances, technology transfer, funding, and dispute settlement) from the details (including specific reduction targets and how much developed countries pay their developing counterparts to help mitigate the costs of technology upgrades).

It might also make sense to agree fairly easy reductions in the first round, then hold further negotiations in coming years to make targets more ambitious, using salami-slicing tactics rather than a big-bang approach. This would also allow developing countries to adopt modest emissions cuts in round one, with the aim of toughening them further in subsequent talks.

But for a two-step process to work, political leaders must give clear instructions to lower-level officials responsible for detailed negotiations (including clear scope for eventual concessions). If not agreement will become bogged down over relatively small differences in percentage reductions, as the Doha Round has become stalled over farm subsidies and tariff cuts for developing countries.

THE PROBLEM OF SENATE RATIFICATION

Trade negotiators are already used to the idea that an agreement is subject to a "double lock." Deals require approval at international level and by the U.S. Congress (either by a two-thirds majority in the U.S. Senate if the deal is presented as a treaty, or a simple majority in both houses if the deal is presented as ordinary legislation).

The existence of this double lock confers an advantage on the United States since other countries have to negotiate twice -- once with the administration and then again with Congress. Having given one set of concessions to the president's officials to secure a deal, other countries may have to make even more concessions to get the deal approved by U.S. legislators.

To encourage countries to make meaningful concessions without fear the final deal will be re-opened, U.S. presidents have often been required to obtain "fast-track" negotiating authority binding Congress to a straight up-or-down vote within a set time on the results of a trade round.

Negotiations are usually structured as a "single undertaking" in which every commitment or concession is part of a whole and indivisible package and cannot be agreed separately: "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed."

In terms of sequencing, trade negotiators have usually sought to reach an international agreement first and then presented the deal for congressional approval.

Until now, the climate negotiations have been using the opposite approach. The Obama administration has sought to obtain an ambitious climate bill including cap-and-trade from Congress (HR 2454, S 1733) and then use this to persuade developing countries such as China to offer significant emissions reductions at the international level.

But experience with trade negotiations suggests that an international deal precedes U.S. action, and does not come after it. It is unlikely Congress will agree to stringent targets without some assurance other countries will follow suit, including large future emitters such as China and India. So the international track may need to move first, or at least in parallel.

The Obama administration needs to harvest a number of provisional commitments from its international partners to have any hope of getting a climate bill through the Senate. If it is structured as a single undertaking, the various parties would offer tentative commitments. Once a deal is done, it would be taken back to the Senate to be incorporated into U.S. law.

The only question is whether the president would need to obtain some sort of fast-track authority. This is probably not necessary as long as the president's Democratic Party controls both houses of Congress with comfortable majorities.

But it does set a deadline for a deal. Negotiators would need to reach agreement by next summer, well ahead of the 2010 mid-term elections, unless the Democratic Party appears on course to retain comfortable majorities, in which case negotiations could take longer and still reach a successful conclusion.

DISPUTES, NULLIFICATION, IMPAIRMENT

U.S. lawmakers are already suspicious that other countries will not adopt meaningful targets or will cheat on those they do agree. So any climate deal will need a mechanism for settling disputes. If not, countries are likely to retaliate unilaterally against partners they believe are not living up to their commitments, which could unravel the whole system.

From the beginning, GATT Article XXIII allowed a country to request formal consultations with another treaty member if it believed expected benefits under the agreement were being "nullified or impaired," and this has been worked up into an increasingly formal and effective dispute settlement system.

If emission targets and aid packages are structured as part of a mutual exchange of concessions among treaty signatories, so one country's targets are conditioned on other countries meeting their own, the climate treaty will need a similar dispute mechanism.

Rather than attempt to create one from scratch, it would probably be better to use the WTO system as a template and modify it to take account of the climate accord's unique characteristics.