– This opinion piece was written by C.M. Sennot for GlobalPost. The views expressed are his own. It was originally published here on GlobalPost. –

The last time America had to borrow money to finance a war was during the Revolution and a cash-strapped Continental Congress took loans from France to fund a surge against the British.

That worked out pretty well.

But it’s hard to feel the spirit of 1776 in President Obama’s journey to China. He went as a representative of a borrowing nation to its primary lender amid a call for yet another costly military surge in the Long War that is escalating in Afghanistan even if it is hopefully winding down in Iraq.

As the president completes his journey to Asia, he returns to Washington to face what is the most consequential foreign policy decision of his presidency, a decision that this administration has not yet fully thought through.

That is whether to heed the counsel of his top commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, and call for a surge of 40,000 more troops in Afghanistan.

Obama is said to also be pondering a middle ground of calling up somewhere between 10,000 and 30,000 more troops.

Or, and this is shaping up as a long shot, he and his team of rivals in the Pentagon and the State Department could decide to rebuff McChrystal. In this scenario, Obama would refocus the mission but still hold to the general counterinsurgency plan that he originally spelled out in March and which increased U.S. troops by 21,000 to a total U.S. presence of 68,000 troops. That surge was just completed this fall.

From my experience talking with counterinsurgency experts and meeting with U.S. and coalition counterinsurgency leaders and trainers in Afghanistan over the summer, I am hoping Obama chooses to hold to the existing troops level. I am hoping he does that while refocusing his original plan to be more targeted on counterterrorism than the wider goal of classic counterinsurgency against the Taliban. He should stick to his guns and hold at the troop levels he has and make the troops who are there better and more effective and provided with better equipment and intelligence assets to get the job done. As I said in an earlier column, less is more right now in Afghanistan.

Every empire in history has regretted an escalation in Afghanistan and it is hard to see how America would be any different.

I do not envy the president and his team in making a very difficult and costly decision at a very hard time economically in America. Few presidents in history have had to face so many fateful decisions in their first year in the White House.

But despite all the pondering the president has given to whether to increase troops, it seems he has given far too little consideration to the overall cost of escalating the war and how it will undercut his ability to fund the ambitious domestic policy agenda he has set out from bank bailouts to health care reform.

With all the debt piling up, it seems to me there is a clear connection between his trip to China and these war costs in Afghanistan.

If you think about it, the hundreds of billions we borrow from China every year will go at least in part to fund the enormous cost of an escalation of troops in Afghanistan, a cost — in terms of lives and treasure.

The war in Iraq will end up costing this country more than 2 trillion dollars, according to the conservative projections of Linda Bilmes, an economist at the Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. The cost is higher still if you include interest on the debt, interest which will in a large measure be paid to China.

Bilmes has worked closely with the Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz to do the long math on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, to factor in not just the military budget and the interest on the debt but also the extraordinary high cost on every level of soldiers who are wounded physically and mentally by war.

Bilmes is credited with highlighting the failure of the administration of President George W. Bush to give an accurate cost assessment of a war that escalated several hundred times beyond the original projection of just $50 billion to $60 billion made by the Pentagon at the start of the war in 2003. She’s been proven right and she’s worried that the Obama administration may be fatefully making another miscalculation on the cost of war in Afghanistan.

And we’ve hit a profound turning point in Afghanistan. In this new budget year, which started Oct. 1, for the first time, the war in Afghanistan will cost Americans more than the war in Iraq.

And, as Bilmes points out, fighting in Afghanistan is more costly than it is in Iraq because of the terrain and the difficulty in supplying troops and evacuating the wounded. She estimates that Afghanistan is as much as 1.6 times more expensive per soldier than Iraq.

“While this administration has brought great military expertise to thinking this through, there needs to be a greater focus on the cost. How are we going to pay for this? People are still not looking at the long term costs,” said Bilmes.

And so as the president stares out the window of Air Force One pondering the dark skies in the long journey back to Washington, one can only hope that he has thought through the extraordinary cost — on every level — of calling for an escalation of troops in Afghanistan.

More on Afghanistan from GlobalPost:

America’s farmer-soldiers in Afghanistan

Afghanistan’s only pig quarantined? Must be bad

Afghanistan: Waiting for the dust to settle

Troops’ deaths shatter trust in Helmand

Pictured above: U.S. President Barack Obama tours the Great Wall of China at Badaling, November 18, 2009. REUTERS/Jason Reed

– Peter Morici is a Professor at the Smith School of Business, University of Maryland, and former chief economist at the United States International Trade Commission. The views expressed are his own. —

From Berlin to Bangkok, governments are screaming about the falling dollar, because they can no longer rely on reckless American consumers to power their economies.

From the late 1980s to 2007, the global economy enjoyed The Great Moderation-low inflation and sustained growth interrupted by brief recessions. Driving global growth was an eight fold increase in the U.S. trade deficit, facilitated by a doubling of the value of the dollar against other currencies from 1989 to 2002.

Deregulation and new technologies powered U.S. growth, and Americans flush with success bought whatever the world had to sell. However, when imports substantially exceed exports, Americans must consume more than they earn producing good and services, or demand for what they make is inadequate, inventories pile up, and layoffs and recession follow.

From 2003 to 2007, the U.S. trade deficit averaged $665 billion, and Americans massively borrowed from abroad to keep the U.S. economy going. They posted as collateral overvalued homes financed on shaky mortgages. When mortgages failed, banks failed, home prices dropped, and retail sales tanked. The U.S. economy was thrust into the worst recession in 70 years and pulled the rest of the world into crisis.

Imports of oil and consumer goods from China account for the lion share of the U.S. trade deficit. Americans drive big cars powered by thirsty engines. They sit on vast untapped deposits of natural gas but burn too much heating oil in the winter. Simply, conservatives in Congress are unwilling to submit to genuine energy conservation, and liberals teach developing domestic fossil fuels resources is evil.

For nearly two decades, China has maintained an undervalued currency. The Chinese government tightly regulates private trading in the yuan, and each year, purchases more than 400 billion U.S. dollars with newly printed currency to keep the yuan artificially cheap against the dollar. That is 10 percent of China’s GDP and 20 percent of exports to make Chinese goods artificially inexpensive on U.S. store shelves and juice Chinese exports.

China amasses huge trade surpluses that power its impressive growth, and the rest of the world suffers slower growth to compensate. An economic miracle sold to the world as policy genius but really built on currency mercantilism and beggar-thy-neighbor protectionism.

Japan has propped up its economy by purchasing dollars and permitting private investors to borrow yen at near zero interest rates and trade those for dollars-denominated Treasury securities. Now, Tokyo signals it will not let the yen drop much below 90 per dollar when a market equilibrium value would be closer to 80.

Other Asian export powerhouses have practiced variants of the Chinese and Japanese currency model too. It is no wonder the dollar was so strong for so long.

In recent years, private investors have grown wary of massive American borrowing. They have turned to the best substitutes available for the dollar-the euro, yen and gold-and driven up their values and pushed the dollar down against every major currency but the Beijing regulated yuan.

Now, with Americans no longer able to borrow madly to prop up global growth, protests are shouted around the world about a “cheap U.S. dollar.”

The hard facts are the dollar became overvalued earlier in this decade, in no small measure thanks to the currency policies of China and other Asian governments. Now, as private traders flee the dollar, its average value has fallen near the middle of its trading range for the 1990s.

The dollar has fallen too much against the euro and some other currencies, because China, Japan and other Asian exporters have been unwilling, in varying measures, to abandon currency mercantilism and let their currencies rise in value as free markets would require.

If China and others ceased subverting currency markets, the yuan would rise at least 40 percent, other Asian currencies would appreciate too, the U.S. trade deficit would shrink dramatically, and the new demand for American goods would rocket the U.S. economy.

With higher incomes, Americans would need to borrow less, and the global economy could go forward, embracing free trade in goods and currency.

– Nancy Birdsall is the president of the Center for Global Development. Arvind Subramanian is a senior fellow at the Center and at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and a regular columnist for the Business Standard, India’s leading business newspaper. The views expressed are their own. –

Efforts to cut emissions of the heat-trapping gases are gridlocked over a misunderstanding about what is fair. This misunderstanding is hindering climate change legislation in Congress and threatens to torpedo international negotiations in Copenhagen next month.

We propose a new way of thinking about climate fairness that focuses not on emissions cuts but on meeting developing countries’ energy needs in a climate-friendly manner. This simple narrative can provide a framework for U.S. legislation and open the way for international collaborative efforts to avert climate catastrophe.

At present, many people in the United States focus on the large and growing emissions of the developing world, especially China, which in absolute terms is now the world’s largest source of greenhouse gases, and India, which is growing fast and like China relies heavily on coal. They argue that it would be unfair to force emissions cuts at home without similar cuts in developing countries. A recent poll found that 60% of Americans believe that in any climate agreement China should cut its emissions the most.

It is true that developing countries already account for roughly half of all greenhouse gas emissions, and that their large populations and rapid economic growth are boosting emissions fast enough to create a planetary crisis by 2050-even if today’s rich countries had never existed.

But meanwhile a quarter of humanity — including millions in China and India — live without any electricity, and one-in-three people on the planet rely on straw, brush, charcoal and animal dung for their cooking needs. The resulting indoor air pollution kills 1.5 million people a year — about 4,000 per day — mostly children. Power for small businesses, irrigation networks, clinics and schools is sorely lacking.

Developing countries point to these unmet energy needs and to large disparities in per capita emissions to argue that the rich world must move first. They note that the 20 tons of CO2 that Americans emit annually is five times the world average, well above both China (5 tons per capita) and India (below 2 tons per capita).

They see emissions as inseparable from economic growth and argue for the developing world’s “right to pollute.” Some argue that because most of the extra heat-trapping gasses in the atmosphere were put there by the United States, Europe, and other industrialized countries, wealthy nations should pay “reparations” for the damage inflicted on poor countries.

Rarely in history have we seen constructive solutions come out of such blame games.

We believe that both sides should shift their focus from negotiated emissions cuts to a joint effort to find ways to rapidly meet the developing world’s legitimate energy needs at low cost in a carbon-constrained world. How can we change to this mindset, adopt a story line that would lead ordinary people in rich and poor countries, and the politicians and negotiators who do their bidding, to do the right thing?

Wealthy nations, starting with the United States, should affirm that, for any given income, people in developing countries have the same rights to energy-based services as those in the rich world-and then offer to help them obtain those energy-based services at the lowest possible cost and with the lowest possible CO2 emissions.

This should apply not only to existing technology, but to a war-footing approach to the development and deployment, at home and abroad, of new emissions-reducing and efficiency-enhancing technologies — solar, wind, tides, algae-based biofuels, smart grids and buildings — similar to the technology push of World War II.

The long-overdue climate speech by President Obama, explaining why action is urgently needed and why the U.S. must lead, would be a good place to start, and could help to open the way for progress in Congress and in Copenhagen.

For their part, developing countries should stop talking about a “right” to emit CO2, emissions are after all merely a waste product. Instead, they should insist on their right to energy-based services appropriate to their level of development — to light, and heat, and refrigeration, for starters, and then, as per capita incomes rise, to elevators, climate-controlled homes and workplaces, computers and, yes, flat-screen TVs.

To make this level of energy services possible without destroying the planet, developing countries should press the rich world for massive public funding of green energy research, and for full and rapid access to all resulting new technologies.

Framed this way — in terms of a U.S.-led push for equality of energy opportunity — it’s hard to see how Americans and others in the rich world could fairly object. We think they would agree, because it’s the fair thing to do and because it’s in their own best interest.

- Phelim Kine is an Asia researcher for Human Rights Watch. The opinions expressed are her own. -

When 15-year-old Wang Xiaomei made the long trip from Gansu province to Beijing last year, she hoped to find justice for her family. Instead, she met with abuse.

First, Wang was abducted by plainclothes Gansu officials, who imprisoned her incommunicado for two months in a “black jail”—an illegal detention facility.

Two days before her September 13, 2008 release, Wang’s captors beat her so badly they knocked out one of her teeth. Wang’s victimizers have never been brought to justice.

Worse still, Wang’s experience—which stands in stark contrast to the Chinese government’s claims of fealty to the rule of law—is not unique. A new Human Rights Watch report released today, “An Alleyway in Hell: China’s Abusive ‘Black Jails',” exposes the routine and severe human rights abuses perpetrated against detainees in these secret facilities.

Our research shows that Wang is just one of estimated thousands of people abducted off the streets of Chinese cities and held incommunicado for weeks or months. Inside these unlawful, secret detention facilities detainees are beaten, sexually abused, deprived of food, sleep and medical care, and subject to theft, extortion and intimidation at the hands of their guards.

And, as Wang’s case shows, children aren’t spared the dangers and indignities of black jail detention. These facilities exist outside of China’s official prison system, and are often located in state-owned hotels, nursing homes and psychiatric hospitals.

The former black jail detainees we interviewed were petitioners--people from mainly rural areas who come to Beijing and other cities in search of legal redress for violations including illegal land seizures and police torture. The petitioning system, which exists in parallel to formal judicial structures, is entirely legal, and explicitly permits people to take their grievances to the highest levels of government.

So why are petitioners being treated this way? Black jails emerged in 2003 after the Chinese government abolished laws permitting the arbitrary detention of any “undesirables.” But that progress was undercut by the introduction at the local level of guidelines that limit local officials’ prospects for promotions or raises if petitioners from their areas carried on their efforts to find justice in larger cities.

What might have been intended as an incentive to make local officials deal with local grievances became an incentive for those officials to keep petitioners off the streets and invest considerable resources in achieving that goal. Plainclothes thugs commonly known as retrievers, or jiefang renyuan, locate and abduct petitioners in Beijing and other cities for bounties as high as $250 per person. Operators of black jail facilities reap daily cash payments from local governments of up to $29 per detainee, helping to perpetuate black jail abuses.

Rather than crack down on these facilities, the central Chinese government denies that they even exist. In an April 2009 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs press conference, a MOFA official responded to a foreign correspondent’s query about black jails by insisting, “Things like this do not exist in China.”

In June 2009, the Chinese government asserted in the Outcome Report of the United Nations’ Human Rights Commission’s Universal Periodic Review of China’s human rights record that, “There are no black jails in the country.”

Such denials make a mockery of the commitment in the first-ever National Human Rights Action Plan that, “The Chinese government unswervingly pushes forward the cause of human rights in China.” The Chinese government’s credibility would be considerably enhanced by acknowledging that black jails do indeed exist, shutting them down, liberating detainees, and bringing the perpetrators to justice.

External actors also have a role to play. Many governments and international organizations fund Chinese legal reform projects, and they too should demand that the Chinese government put an end to these abuses and that their victims be fairly compensated.

No less a civil rights and legal aid luminary than U.S. President Barack Obama, who will make his first trip as President to China on November 16-18, has a golden opportunity to raise the cases of black jail detainees and explain that an independent judicial system in China is of significant consequence to U.S.-China relations.

He should also repeat to his Chinese hosts–and the Chinese people—his September 2009 message to the United Nations General Assembly: “True leadership will not be measured by the ability to muzzle dissent, or to intimidate and harass political opponents at home.”

– Wei Gu is a Reuters columnist. The opinions expressed are her own –

Everyone agrees that China’s economy must be rebalanced, but few have bothered to delve into the costs. Japan’s experience has shown that even well-meant changes could sow the seeds for a bubble.

China cannot stay with its current economic model forever. But as the economy has become extremely unbalanced, to some extent even more so than Japan’s in the 1980s, rocking the boat too much risks tipping it over. Instead of rushing into changes, it would be better to make reforms gradually.

Most observers believe an extremely loose monetary policy was the root cause of Japan’s bubble. But Tomo Kinoshita, an economist at Nomura, reckons that efforts to liberalise the economy, such as sharply revaluing the yen, developing a deeper bond market and deregulating interest rates were among the fundamental reasons behind the bubble.

The challenges facing China’s economy are similar to those seen in Japan in the 1980s. Foreigners are calling for a currency revaluation because the undervalued yuan gives China’s exports an extra boost. Capital markets need to play a bigger role because investment has been directed mostly by state-owned banks.

True, property price increases appear to be milder than in the Japan of the 1980s. Household loans only account for 30 percent of disposable incomes in China, versus about 90 percent in Japan in 1989, according to Nomura. But there are warning signs. New mortgages recently hit a record. And ratings agency Fitch has cited China’s property market as a cause for concern.

The Chinese stock market also looks less overvalued than Japan’s did. The ratio of Chinese stock prices to earnings is only a third of the peak levels reached in Japan. Stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP is 62 percent, much lower than Japan’s 150 percent at end of 1989. But China is catching up fast, and the ChiNext market, China’s long-awaited Nasdaq-style market, debuted last week with a speculative surge.

Moreover, China has been more aggressive in terms of monetary easing as it tries to prop up the economy while waiting for exports to return. The broad money supply in China has been rising at almost 30 percent this year, twice as much as in Japan back in the 1980s. So if there is a bubble, it could grow bigger than the one in Japan.

Even much-needed efforts to liberalise and rebalance the economy may lead to asset price inflation. Similar to China, Japan’s banks were too big and small companies had trouble getting financing. So developing a corporate bond market and encouraging banks to lend more to small firms was seen as a healthy change.

But policymakers underestimated the negative impact on banks. After Japan developed a liquid corporate bond market, large corporations issued cheap equity-linked bonds to repay bank loans. Because Japanese financial institutions lacked other revenue sources, they targeted smaller corporations and consumers. Total bank loans made to small- and medium-sized companies and individuals rose to 71 percent of total loans in the late 1990s from 47 percent in the late 1980s.

Due to a lack of information on their new clients, the banks’ bad loans started to rise. Their lending standards deteriorated as they scrambled to make up for lost business. This could very well happen in China as the country encourages consumers to take on more debt to stimulate domestic demand.

Moreover, Kinoshita argues that in Japan interest rate deregulation “put a cat amongst the banking pigeons” because banks were forced to lend out more when their margins became compressed due to more competition. Pressure from the United States played a role, and the Japanese authorities were eager to internationalize the yen anyway. Letting banks set deposit and lending rates was one of the requirements for the yen’s internationalization.

The policy lesson for China is that when Beijing takes business away from banks, it needs to balance things out by allowing them to take on new business, such as securities underwriting and broking.

But that leads to the question of how to compensate securities firms for their lost business and prevent them from engaging in reckless behavior. This just underscores the complexity of China’s problems.

Most of the world believes that China risks moving too slowly, not too fast. President Barack Obama might give Chinese leaders another ear bashing during his upcoming trip to China. But without the right systems in place, big bang reforms could be disastrous. It is important that China, as well as the rest of the world, learns from Japan’s mistakes.

– Wei Gu is a Reuters columnist. The opinions expressed are her own —

China has finally given a green light for Disneyland to build a theme park in Shanghai. Negotiations that started when Bill Clinton was in the White House have concluded just before President Barack Obama is due to visit. The approval looks like a coup for Walt Disney Co, but it will take all of Mickey’s magic to prevent the park from becoming another government-financed loss maker.

Disney’s last theme park in the region was anything but a hit. Hong Kong Disneyland was created in 2005 in an effort to boost employment in the epidemic-stricken region, but attendance numbers have fallen short of target. This hits the Hong Kong government harder than Disney, because the former not only took an initial 57 percent equity stake in the venture, but also spent $1.75 billion building related infrastructure like a metro line and ferry piers.

Shanghai Disneyland is likely to be financed in the same way. Estimates for the park’s price tag are around $4 billion. The government and a group of Chinese companies will contribute about 60 percent of equity, with Disney paying for the rest. The Shanghai government is also likely to pay for the roads leading to the park.

The Hong Kong park has been a disappointment for a number of reasons, some of which might equally be relevant in Shanghai. It is the smallest Disneyland in the world, so it is crowded and not worth visiting for a second day. Culturally, locals identify more with the Ocean Park, which features pandas and sharks and is cheaper. Hong Kong Disneyland’s public image has also taken a hit from a bout of food poisoning and accusations that it has exaggerated visitor numbers.

The Shanghai park will be 3-4 times bigger than the one in Hong Kong, making space for more visitors. But this will also increase the cost of relocating current residents. Some locals are busy adding a second floor to their homes so they can demand more compensation when they move out.

Shanghai has twice Hong Kong’s population, but average income is only about a quarter that of its wealthier neighbour, so it’s far from clear how many visitors will be able to afford a ticket that will cost the equivalent of two days of earnings for a college graduate. Then there is the possibility that the Shanghai park will divert visitors from Hong Kong.

There is also a risk of a culture backlash. Chinese children are less familiar with Disney characters than their counterparts in, say, Japan, home to Disney’s most successful overseas theme park. That said, the Chinese have so far appeared to be receptive to the American cultural icon: Mickey Mouse Clubhouse appears on national TVs and Disney has opened a chain of language schools in Shanghai.

China’s decision to relent after ten years says a lot about its changed priorities. Before, the government was concerned about the economy overheating, but now growth has become the top priority. While it is probably better to build a theme park than more empty highways, a second Disneyland might prove to be one too many.

– At the time of publication Wei Gu did not own any direct investments in securities mentioned in this article. She may be an owner indirectly as an investor in a fund. —

– Wei Gu is a Reuters columnist. The opinions expressed are her own —

If current trends continue, China might swing to a trade deficit in the not-too-distant future. Given that China has enjoyed more than a decade of strong exports, this may sound a bit far-fetched. But even if it happens, this would not necessarily be something for the world to worry about.

Some economists have recently sounded alarm bells about the possibility of a Chinese trade deficit. They argue that if the Chinese current account surplus shrinks, it would leave Beijing with less spare cash to buy U.S. Treasury bonds. Then who would fund the U.S. budget deficit — and, by implication, U.S. consumers?

Those worries are largely misplaced. First, it is unlikely to happen any time soon. In order for China to have a trade deficit next year, imports would have to outgrow — or shrink less than — exports by at least 23 percentage points.

In August, exports fell 23.4 percent while imports fell 17 percent. So while the trade surplus is diminishing, a deficit is not around the corner.

If China’s trade surplus shrinks, it will most likely be caused by a contracting U.S. deficit, in which case Americans will be saving more and the U.S. will be less dependent on overseas investors to finance its government debt. That would be a sign that the long-overdue rebalancing of the global economy was beginning to take place.

It would not be so bad for the Chinese economy either, because China is a lot less dependent on exports than many people assume. Although exports have accounted for a whopping 50 percent of the economy in the past few years, the contribution of net exports to economic growth is actually much smaller, because a lot of what China sells abroad is low value-added assembly work.

In the same way, one cannot just look at China’s large imports number and jump to the conclusion that China is a big end-user of the world’s goods. China’s imports accounted for a third of its gross domestic product last year, versus about 17 percent in the U.S. during the same period. But this is because a lot of what China imports, such as computer parts, eventually finds its way abroad.

On average, net exports contributed 1.4 percentage points to annual GDP growth between 1979 and 2007, according to the Statistics Bureau, much less than the contribution from the other two drivers — consumption and investment.

The transition to a more balanced trade account will take time. In particular, it will need a push from foreign exchange reforms, as the currently undervalued yuan encourages exports and discourages imports. China allowed the yuan to rise gradually for a few years after 2005, but has re-pegged it to the dollar since the start of the credit crisis.

It will take time before Beijing is confident enough to remove some of the export incentives, or at least not pile them up as it has done in response to the crisis. A more equalised trade account will probably not hurt China’s overall growth that much, but will help in making the world economy more balanced.

– At the time of publication Wei Gu did not own any direct investments in securities mentioned in this article. She may be an owner indirectly as an investor in a fund —

– Wei Gu is a Reuters columnist. The opinions expressed are her own —

It is hard to be very optimistic about China’s proposed stock market for start-up companies. After all, similar attempts in other countries have a decidedly mixed track record. Why would China, where small private companies face an uphill battle against state-owned firms, be any exception?

Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that the start-up market, set to debut in October, offers better potential than previous efforts in Singapore, Germany and Hong Kong.

The country has a big reservoir of fast-growing small companies with real profits. In the past, they have opted for listing on foreign exchanges such as the Nasdaq. Though they were attracted by the prestige of a foreign listing, they also faced a home market that favors size over quality.

Indeed, China, home of internet stars such as Baidu and Sina, is the second-largest foreign supplier of companies to the Nasdaq.

But the exodus has almost ground to a halt. Beijing has tightened its grip on foreign listings because it wants to keep the best growth companies at home. Only companies which already have overseas structures can list their shares abroad, but even then they have to jump through a lot of regulatory hoops.

Obtaining a domestic listing will become much easier, as Beijing has ambitious plans to float hundreds of companies on the new market each year. Maintenance fees are lower and disclosure requirements are less stringent when listing at home.

And companies will not necessarily need to compromise on valuations, since Chinese equities routinely trade at a premium to their foreign counterparts because there is a lot of liquidity chasing a limited pool of stocks.

Although institutional participation is likely to be limited because the small size of most start-up companies, the new market is expected to draw in a large amount of retail investors who favor more volatile small-caps.

No wonder that about 150 companies have already lined up to list on the new market. With a potential universe of 50,000 private companies nationwide, there will be no shortage of new supply in the next few years.

Chinese stock market regulators are wary of the lack of success by Western countries in creating markets capable of funding early-stage companies. Easdaq, Europe’s answer to the Nasdaq, rumbled along for years before finally disappearing. Germany’s Neuer Markt, launched during the dot-com boom, soared and then collapsed along with the rest of the stock market bubble.

In an effort to make a good start, the regulator has picked companies with the best track record of sales and profit growth for the first batch of listings. Most of them already qualify to list on the market for small-and medium-size companies, which is also part of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.

The first 13 companies to go public almost look a bit too old-fashioned, with leading positions in markets such as railway transport electricity systems, lithium batteries, and medical devices. However, being boring is actually better than being too adventurous at this stage.

China has set the standards for listing on the new market much higher than Hong Kong’s growth enterprise market to avoid overly speculative companies. Like the Nasdaq, China requires companies to have a three-year operating record and a history of profitability.

Yet while it is good to set the bar high, it is even more important to keep it there by de-listing companies promptly if they fail to comply with listing rules.

One of the major reasons that the mainland market has a lot of moribund companies is because the regulator does not force de-listing. American exchanges de-list hundreds of companies a year.

Beijing has finally given the green light to the market for start-up companies after 10 years in preparation because it understands that small private companies, the most vibrant sector of the economy, will be the drivers of China’s next stage of growth. It also does not want to wait until the market gets too hot as then will be more speculative behavior.

Most of these markets suffer because they cannot attract a sufficient number of long-term institutional investors, so they end up as either illiquid or relying on much more speculative retail investors. This will be an even bigger problem in the retail-driven Chinese market.

Although the start-up market is necessary to provide some much-needed funding for small enterprises, Beijing should avoid getting too ambitious. There were initial talks about bringing as many as 500 companies public a year. But at that speed, disclosure and approval standards will inevitably be compromised.

The low success rate of markets for start-up companies has underscored the importance of not getting carried away. Early investors will walk away at the first sign of disappointment, and the markets are rarely granted a second chance. China should concentrate on getting off to a good start and build it up its new market slowly.

– At the time of publication Wei Gu did not own any direct investments in securities mentioned in this article. She may be an owner indirectly as an investor in a fund —

(Editing by David Evans)

– Neal Kimberley is an FX market analyst for Reuters. The opinions expressed are his own –

Twenty-four years ago, major nations called for depreciation of the dollar to rebalance the global economy. Now, as another effort at rebalancing looms, the dollar will again bear the brunt — though officials will try to ensure its fall is less dramatic this time.

That’s the implication of President Barack Obama’s announcement this week that he will push world leaders for a new global “framework” in which the United States would cut its huge trade and budget deficits.

Agreeing on this framework would be politically difficult, since it would require policy changes by many countries — China, for example, would probably have to rein in its explosive export-led growth.

But as the euro’s climb to a new one-year high versus the dollar this morning shows, markets are starting to think the rebalancing process may start as soon as this week’s Pittsburgh summit of leaders from the Group of 20 nations.

The Plaza Accord of 1985 called for “orderly appreciation of the main non-dollar currencies against the dollar”; it was followed by central banks’ coordinated intervention to ensure that happened.

This time, with the world shakily emerging from a financial crisis, policymakers are likely to try to manage the dollar’s drop in a more low-key fashion.

They are unlikely to issue an explicit call for the dollar to fall. In fact, the U.S. Treasury may continue proclaiming its “strong dollar policy” in an attempt to keep the markets calm.

No one in the G20 wants to risk a freefall of the dollar that could disrupt global trade as it recovers from recession. And in contrast to the 1980s, developing nations such as China are now challenging the dollar’s long-term role as the world’s top reserve currency.

The dollar’s premier status helps the United States to obtain foreign capital and in order to keep that access, Washington is likely to encourage central banks around the world to continue holding dollars. This would require slow depreciation of the currency rather than a panicky slide.

So unless policymakers completely lose control of the forex markets — which cannot entirely be ruled out — the dollar’s slide is likely to be slower and smaller than it was after the Plaza Accord, when the currency sank about 50 percent versus the yen between Sept. 22, 1985 and the end of 1987.

The overall direction of the dollar does not look in doubt, however. Top presidential adviser Lawrence Summers has said he wants a U.S. economy that is “more export-oriented and less consumption-oriented”.

A lower dollar is a logical tool to achieve that goal, and letting the currency weaken would probably be faster and easier than most other big policy steps to reshape the U.S. economy, such as tax changes and health reform.

The International Monetary Fund, which is advising G20 nations on economy policy, is hinting heavily at the need for currency realignment.

In a report released this week, it said “current policies and the assumed constellation of exchange rates may not be sufficient for the needed rebalancing of demand.”

It added that policy reforms by the world’s big economies to restore growth “would be more effective if accompanied by a real effective renminbi appreciation, offset by euro and dollar depreciation”.

An international understanding on dollar depreciation may well not be reached in Pittsburgh. A French official said last Friday that Pittsburgh would merely set the stage for future talks on foreign exchange rates.

“At this stage there will not be currency discussions, but the framework that we hope to put in place…is a way of discussing later the question of exchange rates,” said the official, who declined to be named.

But giving China and other developing countries more power in the IMF and the World Bank could be part of an informal quid pro quo in which China quietly undertook to resume appreciating the yuan against the dollar.

The rise of the euro as high as $1.4821, breaking the December 2008 peak of $1.4719, is a technical signal that the market thinks the dollar is increasingly vulnerable.

For many traders, the break suggests a good chance of a rise to at least the psychologically important level of $1.50 in coming weeks or months.

The European Central Bank might seek to limit speculation against the dollar by expressing concern about such a move. But the market does not appear to worry that the ECB could actually intervene to support the dollar.

When the European Union’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner Joaquin Almunia said last week that excessive appreciation of the euro could hurt Europe’s economy, the euro fell back only marginally and briefly.

The market knows that even at levels just above $1.5000, the euro would remain well below its all-time high against the dollar of $1.6038, hit in July 2008.

And any rise of the euro against the dollar in the current circumstances would probably be seen by policymakers as the result of general dollar weakness, not excessive euro strength. When euro/dollar reached its July 2008 peak, euro/yen hit a similar high; now, euro/yen is a full 35 yen lower.

The Japanese may also be willing to see their currency strengthen. Before new Finance Minister Hirohisa Fujii took office this month, he said a strong yen was generally good as it boosted the purchasing power of Japanese.

Fujii subsequently backed away from that comment, but speculation will remain that after sweeping to power last month, the Democratic Party of Japan may try to shift the country away from its reliance on exports and its opposition to yen strength.

In the context of a G20 drive to rebalance the global economy, this could easily cause the market to think the yen should be trading stronger than 90 to the dollar.

(James Saft is a Reuters columnist. The opinions expressed are his own)

The simplest way to end the imbalances in the world’s economy is also sadly perhaps the most likely: for the Chinese to stop buying U.S. debt.

This is not going to happen anytime soon, for one thing deleveraging in the U.S. will for a time make U.S. Treasuries look good value, but a buyer’s strike is a heck of a lot more likely than the orchestrated rebalancing the U.S. will push at this week’s G-20 meeting of leading nations.

The U.S. plans to advance a plan at the Pittsburgh summit to fundamentally change the balance of the global economy, which over the past 15 years or so has been characterized by over-borrowing and consumption in the West provided and financed by savers and workers in Asia.

That state of play kept going, as is the way of these things, until it stopped, or rather until one of its wheels fell off. It wasn’t that Asians stopped saving or buying U.S. debt but that speculators, usually in Europe, stopped buying securities, often minted in London, which were being created to front run the flow of capital from Asia to the west.

That popped the asset price bubble and the flow of finance to consumers in the U.S. who, with much gnashing of teeth, began to save again and consume more guardedly.

But the debt bubble hasn’t really popped, it has only shifted shape. Before we had private debts which only could be repaid if assets, mostly real estate, continued to go up in value. Now, a new wave of public borrowing is cushioning the downturn. Asians buy some of the debt and some of the money raised buys goods from Asia.

Theoretically, China and other investors in U.S.  Treasuries buy them because they believe that the U.S. will ultimately tax more, spend less and make good. In reality, it is more vendor financing and a good money after bad attempt to protect earlier investments.

The U.S. points out, in a letter to its G20 partners, that if the savings rises in the deficit countries persist and there is no rise in consumption in the savings-bloc, global economic growth will be poor. The idea, it seems, is for IMF-led international coordination to, on the one hand, jawbone the borrowers so they remain credible while at the same time somehow inducing the savers to allow their currencies to appreciate and induce their citizens to spend.

WILL SOVEREIGNS BE THE NEW SUBPRIME?

A new study of global imbalances by economists at the Bank of England points out that Asian savers will only carry on buying western debt so long as they believe it to be high quality.

“In the short run, increased supply of government bonds resulting from the expansionary fiscal policies pursued in deficit countries has provided an ongoing source of asset supply to meet the investment demand from surplus countries,” according to the Bank of England.

“However, to the extent that savers in surplus countries may become more reluctant over time to invest funds in deficit-country government bonds this would tend to raise the cost of borrowing in deficit countries. This shift in the relative cost of borrowing could be an important part of the process by which a rebalancing of demand from deficit to surplus countries is achieved over the medium term.”

In other words, if Asian savers lose faith in Treasuries or gilts, they will stop buying, causing interest rates to spike. This would cause demand to be rebalanced, all right, but mostly by suppressing it in the U.S. and other highly indebted countries like Britain.

This kind of loss of faith in markets can be very sudden. You could draw a parallel to the way in which investors in securitized debt lost faith in the value of a AAA rating, except this time the loss of faith will be in sovereign borrowers and we really will not be able to blame the ratings agencies as enablers.

China and other exporters of course have good reason to want to avoid this. They are stuck with trillions of dollars in Treasuries and they certainly don’t want to kill the U.S. goose while it is still more profitable to sell it goose food.

There may also come a time when the world’s savers calculate that they can earn more by investing at home.

Essentially much of what a controlled rebalancing would do - weaken the dollar and build opportunity for domestic-oriented investment in Asia - creates incentives for a rapid reallocation out of Treasuries.

Ultimately the rebalanceing must happen. The U.S. for very good reasons wants this to happen little by little, but it does not have to happen that way. Past attempts at a controlled rebalancing have failed and it is hard to see what will make this one different.

(At the time of publication James Saft did not own any direct investments in securities mentioned in this article. He may be an owner indirectly as an investor in a fund.)