Ahead of a U.N. summit in Copenhagen next month, scepticism is growing that an agreement will be reached on a global climate treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocol, due to expire in 2012.

The protocol set targets aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions, which are believed to be responsible for the gradual rise in the Earth's average temperature. Many scientists say that reducing carbon dioxide emissions is key to preventing climate change.

But authors Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner argue in their new book SuperFreakonomics that humanity can take an alternative route to try and save the planet.

"If the goal is to stop warming then geo-engineering solutions are worth considering because they are far cheaper, probably much more do-able and easily reversible," Dubner told Reuters before a talk at the Royal Society for the encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce in London.

Related vlog: How to become a freakonomist

- John Kemp is a Reuters columnist. The views expressed are his own --

As hopes for reaching a binding agreement to cut greenhouse gas emissions at the Copenhagen summit die, climate negotiators could learn useful lessons on how to structure the negotiations from the multiple rounds of trade talks within the GATT/WTO framework.

Climate negotiations are about limiting carbon dioxide emissions, but the negotiators are also hammering out a complex economic instrument that will define the distribution of production, energy use and income in the next few decades. It is the agreement's profound economic effects that are making it so hard to reach a final deal.

While the stalled negotiations on the Doha Round might make it seem likely an unlikely role model, the GATT/WTO process has successfully created a legal framework for liberalising world trade through eight successive rounds of increasingly complex negotiations, as well as a dispute settlement system accepted by all major countries.

In the process, negotiators have already had to resolve many of the difficult issues bedevilling attempts to reach an emissions deal:

* How to obtain treaty commitments from a huge range of countries at different stages of economic development.

* How to handle negotiations with the United States, given the peculiar nature of that country's constitutional arrangements.

* How to ensure countries live up to their commitments and resolve subsequent disputes about treaty implementation.

Climate negotiators could usefully apply many of these lessons to their own agreement. As Copenhagen falters, they may need to rethink the "road map" for talks to improve the chance of bringing them to a successful conclusion.

FRAMEWORK AND DETAILED SCHEDULES

The 1947 General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) established a legal framework and general principles for trade liberalisation. But detailed tariff reductions as well as commitments on subsidies, dumping and technical barriers were left to a later series of trade rounds. These commitments were then turned into schedules of concessions for each member country and incorporated by reference into the central treaty.

Negotiations started with a series of limited tariff reductions that were gradually made more ambitious. Part IV of the GATT, added in 1966, guaranteed developing countries "special and differential treatment" to encourage them to become involved in the tariff-reduction process and make their own binding commitments.

For each round, political leaders set broad objectives at the outset, but the detailed exchange of "concessions" was handled by lower-level officials in a Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC).

Something similar is needed for the climate talks. President Barack Obama has already backed a "two-step" process. Political leaders would aim for an "operational agreement" at next month's summit while leaving a legally binding agreement until 2010 or later. [ID:nSP280582] The aim is to ensure agreement on the big issues is not held hostage to myriad disputes over the details.

It might make sense to separate an agreement on the broad framework (including establishment and review of targets, trading emissions allowances, technology transfer, funding, and dispute settlement) from the details (including specific reduction targets and how much developed countries pay their developing counterparts to help mitigate the costs of technology upgrades).

It might also make sense to agree fairly easy reductions in the first round, then hold further negotiations in coming years to make targets more ambitious, using salami-slicing tactics rather than a big-bang approach. This would also allow developing countries to adopt modest emissions cuts in round one, with the aim of toughening them further in subsequent talks.

But for a two-step process to work, political leaders must give clear instructions to lower-level officials responsible for detailed negotiations (including clear scope for eventual concessions). If not agreement will become bogged down over relatively small differences in percentage reductions, as the Doha Round has become stalled over farm subsidies and tariff cuts for developing countries.

THE PROBLEM OF SENATE RATIFICATION

Trade negotiators are already used to the idea that an agreement is subject to a "double lock." Deals require approval at international level and by the U.S. Congress (either by a two-thirds majority in the U.S. Senate if the deal is presented as a treaty, or a simple majority in both houses if the deal is presented as ordinary legislation).

The existence of this double lock confers an advantage on the United States since other countries have to negotiate twice -- once with the administration and then again with Congress. Having given one set of concessions to the president's officials to secure a deal, other countries may have to make even more concessions to get the deal approved by U.S. legislators.

To encourage countries to make meaningful concessions without fear the final deal will be re-opened, U.S. presidents have often been required to obtain "fast-track" negotiating authority binding Congress to a straight up-or-down vote within a set time on the results of a trade round.

Negotiations are usually structured as a "single undertaking" in which every commitment or concession is part of a whole and indivisible package and cannot be agreed separately: "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed."

In terms of sequencing, trade negotiators have usually sought to reach an international agreement first and then presented the deal for congressional approval.

Until now, the climate negotiations have been using the opposite approach. The Obama administration has sought to obtain an ambitious climate bill including cap-and-trade from Congress (HR 2454, S 1733) and then use this to persuade developing countries such as China to offer significant emissions reductions at the international level.

But experience with trade negotiations suggests that an international deal precedes U.S. action, and does not come after it. It is unlikely Congress will agree to stringent targets without some assurance other countries will follow suit, including large future emitters such as China and India. So the international track may need to move first, or at least in parallel.

The Obama administration needs to harvest a number of provisional commitments from its international partners to have any hope of getting a climate bill through the Senate. If it is structured as a single undertaking, the various parties would offer tentative commitments. Once a deal is done, it would be taken back to the Senate to be incorporated into U.S. law.

The only question is whether the president would need to obtain some sort of fast-track authority. This is probably not necessary as long as the president's Democratic Party controls both houses of Congress with comfortable majorities.

But it does set a deadline for a deal. Negotiators would need to reach agreement by next summer, well ahead of the 2010 mid-term elections, unless the Democratic Party appears on course to retain comfortable majorities, in which case negotiations could take longer and still reach a successful conclusion.

DISPUTES, NULLIFICATION, IMPAIRMENT

U.S. lawmakers are already suspicious that other countries will not adopt meaningful targets or will cheat on those they do agree. So any climate deal will need a mechanism for settling disputes. If not, countries are likely to retaliate unilaterally against partners they believe are not living up to their commitments, which could unravel the whole system.

From the beginning, GATT Article XXIII allowed a country to request formal consultations with another treaty member if it believed expected benefits under the agreement were being "nullified or impaired," and this has been worked up into an increasingly formal and effective dispute settlement system.

If emission targets and aid packages are structured as part of a mutual exchange of concessions among treaty signatories, so one country's targets are conditioned on other countries meeting their own, the climate treaty will need a similar dispute mechanism.

Rather than attempt to create one from scratch, it would probably be better to use the WTO system as a template and modify it to take account of the climate accord's unique characteristics.

– John Kemp is a Reuters columnist. The views expressed are his own –

Resounding defeats for Democratic Party gubernatorial candidates in Virginia and New Jersey on November 3 have killed any lingering hope Congress will enact climate change legislation this year, and may doom the prospect of passing a cap-and-trade bill this side of the 2010 mid-term elections.

Prospects for eventually passing legislation may now depend on winning Republican support with nuclear loan guarantees and more offshore drilling.

While the president remains personally popular, with high approval ratings, and does not need to face the voters again for another three years, 16 Democratic senators and 256 Democratic members of the House of Representatives will be on the ballot in November 2010.

The Virginia and New Jersey off-cycle elections are often idiosyncratic. But crushing defeats for Democrats at the top of the ticket in both states are already sparking a bout of soul-searching over the lessons that need to be learned if the party is to retain firm control of both houses of Congress next year.

What worries many Democrats is that turnout among the young voters who helped propel them to victory last year fell away sharply, self-identified independents broke heavily for the Republican candidates; and voters overwhelmingly cited the economy and jobs rather than healthcare or climate change as their major concern in exit polls.

Democrats face the classic dilemma for any party after a defeat — press ahead trying to enact a difficult agenda or pull back, re-focus on simpler and less controversial measures.

The White House insists both defeats were due to local factors (a poor candidate in Virginia, a souring economy in New Jersey) and will not change the president’s determination to press ahead with an ambitious domestic agenda centered on healthcare reform and climate change.

But the party’s congressional wing is divided. Liberals (mostly from safe seats at little risk next year) argue the administration and party should press ahead; voters will rally behind a record of accomplishment next year. Moderates and conservatives (mostly from swing seats or those carried by John McCain in 2008 or George W Bush in 2004) as well as those from heavy industrial states are pressing to scale-back and refocus on cutting unemployment.

In this context, it seems unlikely the administration can find the 60 predominantly Democratic votes it needs to pass a climate bill on the floor of the Senate; hammer out a compromise between the differing House and Senate versions in conference; then secure simple majorities in both houses to pass the agreed bill into law.

Even before this week’s election results, the prospects for passing climate change legislation this year were dimming rapidly. But the arithmetic, already challenging, has now become very tricky as the administration loses momentum.

60-VOTE DOUBT IN SENATE

In the Senate, only two Democrats are up for re-election in Republican-leaning states carried by John McCain (North Dakota’s Byron Dorgan and Arkansas’s Blanche Lincoln).

Both have already taken a cautious approach to climate legislation. Both broke ranks with the majority of their colleagues earlier this year to vote for a Republican amendment preventing the budget reconciliation process being used to push through cap-and-trade on a 51-vote straight majority rather than the 60-vote super-majority normally needed to end a filibuster.

But the party remains ambivalent over cap-and-trade, split between liberals from coastal states who want a commitment to tough emissions reduction objectives, and senators representing industrial areas or conservative states anxious about supporting anything that could be portrayed as a costly, job-killing energy tax by their opponents at election time.

In theory, the Democratic Party (together with its independent allies) has the 60 votes needed to push a climate bill through despite almost uniform Republican opposition. In practice, the party broke 26-31 in favor of the Republican amendment to the budget resolution earlier this year, in what many saw as a straw poll on cap-and-trade.

Some Democrats have fallen into line since then, and the administration may be able to pick up one or two Republican votes such as South Carolina’s Lindsey Graham with the promise of loan guarantees and other government help for the nuclear power industry.

With several Democrats harbouring concerns, though, there are not yet 60 votes for an ambitious climate bill.

The bill will not be openly defeated on the Senate floor. If it dies or gets delayed it will be in the cloakroom. Majority Leader Harry Reid will not bring it up for a vote unless and until 60 firm votes are in his pocket. So Democrats with doubts will be able to delay the bill indefinitely by holding out and asking for more concessions, without having to come out explicitly against it.

RISK OF REVERSAL IN HOUSE

The arithmetic looks as daunting in the House of Representatives. While the lower chamber has already approved its own climate bill (HR 2454) legislators will have to vote again to pass the consolidated version if and when it is agreed in conference.

There is nothing to stop congressmen changing their minds. As the election draws closer and the already bitter partisanship in the chamber intensifies, some of the bill’s earlier supporters may withdraw.

The original bill passed only by the narrowest of margins (219-212), with 44 Democrats voting “No.”

A total of 84 Democrats represent Republican-leaning districts carried by John McCain or George W Bush in 2004. It will take only a handful of further defections to sink the measure if it returns from conference.

If the consolidated bill has been toughened in line with the Senate version (S 1733), congressmen will have a ready-made excuse to claim it has gone too far.

Parties controlling the White House usually lose seats at the mid-term elections, so pressure on Democrats in Republican-leaning areas will be immense.

The party’s heavy losses in Virginia and New Jersey this week will make them very cautious.

CROWDED AGENDA, LOSING MOMENTUM

Arguably, the president has tried to push through too many ambitious reform proposals and stretched his political capital too thinly.

At the best of times, it would be difficult to get either healthcare reform or climate change through Congress when the president’s majority is an uneasy coalition of liberals and centrists. But when the president is having to deal with a recession, financial regulation, and whether to increase the military commitment to Afghanistan, it has proved impossible to rally support for them both at the same time.

Hopes that healthcare and climate change legislation could be rammed through early in the year, long before the mid-term elections, while the Republican Party was still consumed by infighting after losing heavily in 2008, have evaporated.

Climate change has become a second-order priority. The political capital needed to assemble winning coalitions for a bill in both chambers is being deployed elsewhere.

The best option for the administration may be seeking to broaden its coalition, buying more Republican support through a combination of nuclear financing guarantees and greater access to offshore drilling.

But if an agreed climate bill does not go through before the year end, its prospects next year, when legislators will be fixated on the looming elections, are no better.

Even if a deal is reached among political delegates at the upcoming United Nations Climate Conference in Copenhagen, it is unlikely to set out specific emission targets, says Mike Hulme, author of "Why We Disagree About Climate Change" and a professor at the University of East Anglia in Norwich.

"What we've done with climate change is to attach so many pressing environmental concerns to the climate change agenda that trying to secure a negotiated multilateral agreement between 190 nations is actually beyond the reach of what we can achieve," he argues.

Hulme, who will take part in a debate hosted by the Institute of Economic Affairs in November about carbon emission policies and economic activity before he heads to the Copenhagen conference, discussed his views with Reuters.