A year after the government's seizure of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and AIG , not to mention the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers that sent the global financial system into a tailspin, very little has changed to prevent debt from being sliced and diced, again and again.

This is a mistake. Although there were many factors contributing to the downfall of the global financial system, the repackaging of toxic debt into esoteric financial products was at the heart of the credit crisis when it erupted in 2007.

It's easy to forget, particularly when many are focused on anniversary tick-tock accounts of the last days of Lehman Brothers, how nasty CDOs -- or worse, CDO squareds -- became so incredibly popular in the first place.

Yet, after all the damage, the trillions of dollars lost and the biggest state intervention in financial markets since the Depression, there has been no movement to ban their creation.

Securitization in its broadest form -- taking underlying collateral, bundling it together and selling it as tradable debt -- is still hailed as an important 20th-century invention that has helped worthy borrowers get the credit they need to buy a home, car, or education that would otherwise be out of their reach.

Policymakers, understandably, are anxious to get it started again after the market snapped shut last year. Wall Street, and investors taking advantage of generous financing from the Federal Reserve, are happy enough to oblige.

And it has worked. As of last week, new bonds backed by consumer debt reached $100.5 billion for the year, according to Barclays Capital. While a fraction of the pre-crisis market, that deal volume represents a healthy revival of a near-dead business. Three-quarters of the new deals are eligible for Fed financing.

The problem is phase II -- when these securities are then repackaged into something else. At the margins, it's already under way. Banks are repackaging problematic bonds backed by residential mortgages and the current disaster zone, commercial real estate loans, so they can slice off a new piece that can be resold with better protection.

The amounts are still small, but it's a reminder of the temptation to shift around a problem asset so investors can feel better about risk.

Although securitization has been around for more than 30 years, the housing and credit boom combined with the computing power of the 21st century gave rise to the proliferation of these repackaged goods filled with bad home loans.

Home loans, though, were just the most bountiful fodder to be found. The next go-around could involve using, say, bonds backed by life insurance policies -- the resurfacing fad among Wall Street banks -- as the building blocks for a new product.

In the name of simplicity and transparency, the repackaging of securities should just be banned, as I've argued before. This will ensure that junky debt doesn't get cut into so many pieces that understaffed regulators, rating agencies, investors and bank executives lose track of just who is left holding the bag should things head south.

Much of the public outcry and regulatory fervor has been focused on the banks and their reluctance to give up big bonuses for a job well done, or done badly as the case may be.

This is understandable, given the hardship banks and their creations have caused, but this won't necessarily prevent creative innovation from running amok.

Keeping banks from creating new products out of old ones will go a long way to make sure we're not right back where we started when the next crisis unfolds.

The Year Since Lehman -- related columns:

A year after Lehman, the good news

Banking? Keep it simple, stupid

A year on, it's still a housing story

Don't blame global stock markets for being skittish. It is August, after all, a month that has spelled trouble in the past two years.

Recall that, a year ago, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac started wobbling at the precipice while AIG, desperate for cash, began paying junk-like yields in the corporate bond market. A month later, all hell broke loose.

In August 2007, a shutdown in short-term lending markets forced global policy makers to rush in with a flood of liquidity to keep the lifeblood of the financial system from clotting.

So it's only natural that, this year, sellers are trigger-happy at the slightest whiff of trouble.

Problems surfaced in the United States last week, when a double-whammy of soft retail sales followed by a drop in consumer sentiment reignited worries that for all the good cheer about an emerging recovery, the exhausted American shopper is still unfit to carry the economy.

These concerns carried over into Monday trading in Asia, where they mingled with homegrown worries. In China, a drop-off in direct foreign investment helped fuel a nearly 6 percent decline in the Shanghai stock index and concerns about the Japanese economy helped trim more than 3 percent from the Nikkei.

U.S. stock indices have followed suit, with the S&P 500 off 2.43 percent and the Dow Jones Industrial Average off 2 percent.

Monday was an ugly day, but investors should try to rein in their anxiety about what it means for such big-picture questions as what shape the economic recovery will take. That's because a battle between bulls and bears, which typically emerges at economic turning points, has taken hold of financial markets -- meaning today's worries about the global economy are likely to morph into tomorrow's worries about too much stimulus creating dangerous asset bubbles.

It's a constant tension and one that will continue to push and pull financial markets for some time to come.

"The markets have very selectively reacted to economic data," says Stephen Stanley, chief economist at RBS. Little more than a week ago, for example, the S&P 500 hit a 10-month high after the U.S. reported "only" 247,000 workers were dropped from payrolls in July.

Given the big run up in risky assets like stocks and corporate debt since March, and last week's data, it's not surprising that investors are now worried that the rosier outlooks failed to take into account the growing fixation of the U.S. consumer on savings.

Take price-earnings ratios. Bespoke Investment Group noted last week that the P/E ratio of companies in the S&P 500 climbed to its highest peak since 2004, as earnings failed to keep pace with the optimism that fueled a 50 percent jump in the S&P 500 stock index since March. For earnings to catch up, the consumer will have to shake off worries about high unemployment rates and pitch in with good old-fashioned shopping. So far, that's looking like a stretch.

So, chalk up the stock declines to correcting what had become overbought conditions and get ready for more choppiness ahead.

This is the messy reality of turning points, not necessarily the foreshadowing of something truly ugly to come. Even if it is August.

– Peter Morici is a professor at the University of Maryland School of Business and former Chief Economist at the U.S. International Trade Commission. The views expressed are his own. —

For every new president, campaign promises and inaugural idealism must give way to the hard choices that measure the mettle of their leadership.

Now Barack Obama must act pragmatically to fix the banks or the economy will sink under their weight.

Banks continue to suffer losses on bonds backed by failing mortgages, credit cards and auto loans, and questionable corporate debt. To assist, the Treasury has used TARP funds to purchase capital in healthy and deeply troubled banks alike; however, no one can calibrate how high bank losses will go, because no one knows how far housing prices will drop and how many loans will ultimately fail.

The Obama Treasury could put a floor under bank losses, through government guarantees on their bonds, or by creating an aggregator bank that purchases those securities from banks altogether.

Guarantees would give the banks profits on bonds whose underlying loans are mostly repaid, and shift to taxpayers losses from those bonds whose loans are mostly not repaid. That would require additional large subsidies from taxpayer to the banks.

An aggregator bank, however, could turn a profit. It could purchase all the commercial banks’ potentially questionable securities, at their current mark to market values, with its own common stock and funds provided by the TARP. Then the aggregator bank could balance profits on those securities whose loans pan out against losses on securities whose loans fail.

An aggregator bank could perform triage on mortgages. It could work out those whose homes can be saved with some adjustments in their loan balances, interest rates and repayment periods; foreclose on mortgages for homeowners who could not meet payments with reasonably concessions; and leave other loans alone.

Commercial banks acting alone cannot accomplish triage as effectively, because individually they can have little effect on how much housing values will fall. In contrast an aggregator bank, holding so many mortgages and working in cooperation with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, could have a salutary impact on housing values. It could put some breaks on falling home prices.

Beyond toxic securities, policymakers need to fix what got banks into this mess. The 1999 repeal of Glass-Steagall permitted the creation of financial supermarkets, like Citigroup, that combined commercial banks with investment banks, brokerages, and the bizarre universe of hedge and private equity funds.

Those nonbank financial firms are run by salesmen and financial engineers that don’t understand long-term commitments as bankers to borrowers with solid incomes and sound business plans.

Investment bankers, securities dealers and fund managers, essentially, get paid commissions on sales and for betting other peoples’ money on arbitrage opportunities. They put together people that have money with those that need money, and those people that can’t bear risk with those that can.

In contrast, commercial bankers, historically, had skin in the game—bank capital and a fiduciary responsibility to depositors. They were paid salaries, not commissions on the volume of loans they wrote or bought from mortgage brokers to package into bonds. They expected to be fired if their loans prove imprudent.

To investment bankers and securities dealers, it does not matter how risky a loan is, because they can always bundle it into a bond to sell it off or insure it with a swap. That’s nonsense, as we have learned. Adopting that thinking commercial banks got stuck with too many loan-backed bonds and buying swaps that were not backed by adequate assets.

Commercial banks need to be separate and more highly regulated. The ongoing process of breaking up Citigroup and placing its banking activities into a separate entity should be replicated at other Wall Street and large regional banks.

Freed from toxic assets and the complications of affiliations with financial institutions having other agendas, commercial banks could raise new private capital and make new prudent loans as President Obama’s stimulus package lifts consumer spending and business prospects.

Such approaches would disappoint those who champion unbridled free markets but Wall Street’s financiers have abused the opportunities offered them by deregulation to the peril of the nation.

President Obama needs to craft solutions that address the world as he finds it not as intellectuals tell him it should be.