-- John Kemp is a Reuters columnist. The views expressed are his own --

LONDON, April 9 (Reuters) - The Bank of England's terse press statement announcing it will maintain overnight rates at 0.5 percent and continue the existing 75 billion pound quantitative easing (QE) programme gives no clue about whether the Bank intends to extend the programme when the first tranche of asset purchases are completed in June.
But officials will have to make a decision soon: unless they signal a commitment to extend QE, gilt yields will rise even further in anticipation that the major buyer in the market will withdraw.
The QE programme is dogged by ambiguity about its objectives (which a cynical observer might conclude is deliberate).
Officially, the aim is to prevent inflation falling below target by accelerating money supply growth, not manipulate the yield curve for government and corporate debt.
In this, the Bank's avowed strategy is more conventional than the Fed's ambitious efforts to determine the cost of credit for borrowers throughout the economy. It is a straightforward quantitative easing patterned on the Bank of Japan, rather than a credit easing patterned on the Fed.
If true, the measure of success is how much the money supply has been boosted at the end of the three month period; the Bank should be indifferent about whether ending QE causes yields and borrowing costs to rise.
So long as money supply has risen consistent with the inflation target, and the Bank can discern some green shoots of stabilisation if not recovery, officials can declare victory, end the programme, and keep the other 75 billion pounds of asset purchases authorised by the chancellor in reserve. Yields can be left to find their natural level.
But many suspect the Bank's real objective is yield control -- in which case it will have to announce another round of buy backs of gilts and corporate bonds in good time, well before the current programme is completed, to shape market expectations.
The results of the existing round have been unimpressive.
After falling initially, gilt yields are almost back up to the level they were at before the Bank's foray into unconventional monetary policy.
The snag is that if the Bank stops buying, other investors will struggle to absorb all the new government paper on offer without a major increase in yield -- pushing up borrowing costs for everyone, precisely what the Bank has sought to avoid.
The Bank's dilemma is whether to push on (heightening fears about inflation) or call a halt (risking a spike in yields all the same).
Either way, the Bank needs to give the market, as well as the Treasury and the Debt Management Office, plenty of warning about its intentions.
(Editing by Richard Hubbard)

– John Kemp is a Reuters columnist. The opinions expressed are his own –

Yields on long-term U.S. Treasury debt continued to surge higher yesterday as the market braced for a future upturn in inflation and a tidal wave of long-dated issues that will be needed to fund the bank rescues and the emerging stimulus package.

Yields on three-year notes are up by around 47 basis points from their mid-December low. But yields on ten-year paper have soared 82 points and rates on the 30-year long bond have surged 114 points. Long-bond rates have retraced more than half their decline since the autumn (https://customers.reuters.com/d/graphics/USTREAS.pdf).

Back-end yields would probably have risen even further were it not for persistent hints the Federal Reserve is thinking about buying longer-dated issues to cap them. But the market has started to call the Fed’s bluff.

MANIPULATING THE FRONT END

In the press statement accompanying its most recent interest rate decision, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) gave a clear commitment it will keep short-term rates at “exceptionally low levels for some time.” In practice, the Fed will probably hold rates close to zero for the next two to three years until a cyclical recovery is well underway. But thereafter rates will need to rise to more normal levels to contain inflationary pressures.

The steepening yield curve reflects an assumption the Fed’s zero-interest rate policy will dominate the whole yield on debt maturing in 2009-2011, but have a diminishing effect on securities which mature further in the future.

LENGTHENING THE DEBT PROFILE

Federal debt held by the public has surged almost 25 percent in the last nine months, from $4.64 trillion at the end of March 2008 to $5.78 trillion at the end of December. Net debt is scheduled to increase another $1.0-1.5 trillion over the next twelve months as a result of the cyclical downturn and the huge $700-900 billion stimulus package being considered by Congress.

So far, almost all the increase in debt has been funded by issuing short-term instruments. The proportion of debt maturing within one year has climbed from 38 percent at the end of March to 43 percent at the end of December, and will climb over 50 percent within the next twelve months unless the government’s issuing policy changes.

By increasing the volume of debt that needs to be refunded regularly, the shortening profile is creating a dangerous new form of fragility within the system.

In effect, the federal government is now taking on the maturity-transformation role previously provided by commercial banks, corporations issuing commercial paper, and special investment vehicles (SIVs). Like them, it is borrowing short-term from the money markets to make long-term investments secured against tax revenues receivable over decades.

But like the private borrowers, the government will also face a liquidity crisis if at any point the market balks at rolling over the maturing short-term notes.

For the moment, a liquidity crisis is unlikely. The short-term ultra-safe instruments the Treasury is issuing are a good fit for the type of securities which investors want to hold.

But once conditions begin to normalize, investors are likely to want to withdraw some funds from the short-term Treasury market to deploy them more profitably in other assets. And overseas investors will eventually want to reduce their exposure to dollar-denominated assets.

At that point, short rates will have to jump to persuade investors to keep sufficient funds in the market to roll over all the maturity bills and notes.

This risks creating a highly unstable dynamic. Even the slightest sign of stabilization and recovery will trigger a sharp run up in short and medium term government bond yields, cascading across the rest of the bond market into higher borrowing costs on commercial paper and commercial loans.

With so much short-term debt needing constant refunding, the Fed would struggle to control the pace of future monetary tightening. Both the Fed and the Treasury therefore have a strong interest in lengthening the government debt profile.

A much higher proportion of forthcoming debt issues will be placed in the middle and at the back end of the yield curve, which is why debt prices at these maturities have been falling, and their yields rising fastest.

MANIPULATING THE BACK END

The Fed’s open market operations are normally restricted to short-term U.S. Treasury bills. But the central bank has already expanded them to include purchases of commercial paper and mortgage-backed securities issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. It will soon start funding third parties to buy securities issued by credit card companies, student lenders and motor manufacturers.

The FOMC has stated it is also “prepared to purchase longer-term Treasury securities if evolving circumstances indicate that such transactions would be particularly effective in improving conditions in private credit markets.”

In effect, the Fed has said it is prepared to enter the market as a “buyer of last resort” for longer-dated Treasury securities if their prices fall too much and yields rise too high. Fed officials have talked about buying longer-dated Treasuries for several months. But so far the Fed has hesitated to pull the trigger, because buying long-dated bonds is fraught with danger.

The principal purpose of open market operations is to provide liquidity by making an active two-way market when other banks and institutions fail to do so in sufficient volume. To the extent the volume of open market operations increases, and the total quantity of securities owned by the Fed rises over time, the central bank is also printing money.

When the Fed first started to expand its open market purchases in early autumn, the cost was covered by additional deposits of Treasury money into the central bank. The Treasury issued short term cash management bills, deposited the proceeds with the Fed, and the Fed used them to buy private-sector debts. In effect, the Fed and the Treasury substituted private borrowing from the money markets for public borrowing, so the impact on the total money and credit supply was neutral.

The Fed and Treasury have since run down the supplementary financing program and allowed the cash management bills to mature without replacing them. The increase in the Fed’s balance sheet has started to expand the money supply. But the increase is mostly showing up in a rise in the volume of excess bank reserves, rather than lending, so the impact on business activity and inflation is muted.

There is more inflationary risk in future once conditions normalize and demand for cash liquidity falls. But at that point the Treasury could issue more government debt, or the Fed could sell some of the government and other securities in its portfolio, absorbing excess cash from the banks. In principle, the Fed is still swapping private debt (now) for government debt (later).

But once the Fed begins to purchase long-dated Treasuries it will be unambiguously creating money. It would be turning on the printing press and monetizing the federal government’s deficit.

Since all the Fed’s operations are ultimately backstopped by the U.S. Treasury, the Fed would be using the government’s own money to buy the government’s own debt. The Fed would find itself bracketed with Germany’s interwar Reichsbank and the central bank of Zimbabwe. This is most definitely not a comparison the Fed wants drawn.

The market would almost certainly respond by labeling a long-term Treasury purchase program “deficit financing” and brace for even higher inflation. The market-clearing yield on long-dated Treasuries would rise further. If the Fed wanted to continue holding yields down below this level, it would be forced to buy a substantial proportion — in the limiting case all — of the new issues.

As in the currency market, limited intervention risks backfiring, while large-scale intervention would stoke fears about inflation. So this is a policy the Fed must hope to hold in reserve, and never have to use.

— James Saft is a Reuters columnist. The opinions expressed are his own –

Some crises bring partners closer together. Some, as investors in the euro zone are likely to discover this year, drive them further apart.

Look for rising tensions about fiscal and monetary policy among the bloc’s 16 member nations, and for a bigger penalty to be imposed on the euro and some euro zone assets against the possibility of a breakup or a secession from the currency group.

The liquidity crisis of last year left smaller members of the euro thanking their lucky stars they were inside a big warm tent with a major currency and critically, a powerful central bank that could help banks and maintain order in financial markets.

Ireland and Greece, to name but two, could look at the disaster in Iceland, which suffered a banking and currency collapse, and see the real tangible benefits of membership.

But now that the crisis has morphed into one in the real economy, with exports plunging and employment hit, things will be less cohesive within the euro zone, with one currency having to do duty for different countries with different economies and levels of competitiveness.

European governments vary widely in their ability to withstand the fiscal squeeze from falling tax receipts, as well as having varying ability to credibly take on programs of stimulative deficit spending. That of course is about all that euro countries have open to them when it comes to unilateral action, being forced as a condition of membership to live with a common currency and interest rate policy.

The ECB is widely expected to cut rates by a half a percentage point on Thursday, to 2.0 percent, a level considerably higher than the ideal for many hard hit smaller economies.

The implication is weakness for the euro, as investors impose a breakup premia, and more weakness for the bonds of smaller peripheral countries.

Standard & Poor’s on Wednesday cut Greece’s sovereign debt rating, citing falling competitiveness and a rising fiscal deficit. S&P has also threatened the credit ratings of Ireland, Portugal and Spain on concerns about deteriorating public finances.

The extra interest Greece must pay to borrow money for 10 years as compared with Germany stands at 246 basis points, while for Ireland the figure hit 180 basis points, also a record, and spreads have widened too for Spain and Portugal. Coming at a time of low interest rates, with German 10-year debt yielding just over 3 percent, these are whopping premiums for debt that theoretically should be very tightly related.

CHEER UP, IT MIGHT NEVER HAPPEN
To be clear, the chances of a country leaving the euro zone currency project are still extremely small, though it now rates as a possibility for discussion in polite company.

For one thing there is no escape hatch, no plan as to how a national currency might be reborn. For another, there is the matter that while a bit of a weak currency and an accommodative interest rate might seem attractive at first blush, the reality would include much higher interest rates and the real risk of a Latin-American style inflation and currency crisis.

“Put very simply if either Greece or Italy, for example, left, the sort of spreads they are trading on at the moment would have to treble,” said Marc Ostwald, strategist at brokerage Monument Securities in London.

“There would be colossal inflation in both countries as a result.”

It would also be extremely tricky to pull out without very seriously impairing your national banking system, though that impairment may come of its own momentum anyway, conceivably as the flash point for a break-up. But just because something is a dumb idea doesn’t mean it won’t be advanced as reasonable.

There are other issues causing problems for countries with smaller bond markets. Investors are generally showing an almost unprecedented preference for stuff that is easy to sell, and German bonds are just a lot more liquid.

You can also argue that the kinds of very narrow spreads we saw before the crisis were simply one more manifestation of the headlong search for yield, and that some but not all of the re-pricing is warranted as a reflection of the new reality.

There are a couple of bitter ironies here for the euro zone. The world has probably never needed an alternative reserve currency more, with natural demand likely to rise for liquid, safe non-dollar assets given U.S. imbalances and monetary policy experiments.

It is also a bit raw that the downturn that will test the euro zone is not of its making. Its consumers by and large didn’t gorge at the debt feast and savings rates remained on the whole higher.

But that is cold comfort and no assurance the price of the risks of euro disintegration won’t rise further.

– At the time of publication James Saft did not own any direct investments in securities mentioned in this article. He may be an owner indirectly as an investor in a fund.