The Great Debate

Quantifying the damage of the rush to quantify

David Callahan

Feb 2, 2012 11:50 EST

It was unsurprising to hear, as we did Tuesday, that Claremont McKenna College had lied about its students’ SAT scores to boost its position in the U.S. News & World Report annual ranking of colleges. University officials are famously obsessed with these rankings, and this is not the first time that a school has admitted fudging data. Just last year, Villanova Law School said that it had given false information to U.S. News.

Today we quantify and rank the performance of people and institutions as never before – all in pursuit, supposedly, of better outcomes and greater efficiency. Yet this obsession with metrics, a hallmark of the free-market ideology, invariably creates more incentives to cheat.

University presidents fret endlessly about the U.S. News rankings because they can have dramatic effects on everything from the quality of student applicants to the ability of schools to attract faculty and raise money. In an earlier era, one free of U.S. News, schools would not have had much reason to lie about SAT scores or admission rates. But now, with these numbers seen as hugely important, you can understand the temptation to monkey around with the reported data.

It’s not just colleges. Metrics have also taken over our K-12 schools, and they’re worse off for it. The education world has been roiled by major scandals recently in which administrators and teachers have been found to have manipulated student scores on standardized tests. These have not been isolated incidents, with revelations of false reporting in Atlanta, Chicago, Washington, Birmingham, New York City and Los Angeles.

It’s no secret why so many teachers and administrators are fudging test numbers: The pressure surrounding high-stakes testing is evident enough in the phrase itself. Tests now determine how schools are funded and, in some places, which teachers get bonuses. Incentives to cheat are baked into this system, and those incentives will only grow if more localities link teacher performance to compensation.

Similar temptations are elsewhere, with more disastrous consequences. The ever-greater focus on quarterly earnings by public companies has partially led to a rising tempo of corporate scandals since the 1990s. Executives, fearing shareholder backlash, have cooked the books to prop up stock values – most sensationally in the gigantic Enron and WorldCom frauds. (The Japanese manufacturing company Olympus is now embroiled in a major accounting scandal of its own.)

Executives didn’t used to obsess much about quarterly earnings, according to former CEOs I interviewed for a book I wrote about the Harvard Business School class of 1949. Now these numbers dominate corporate culture and pervert both business decisions and the ethics of executives.

from David Cay Johnston:

A history of audit failures

David Cay Johnston

Nov 11, 2011 15:07 EST

The admission by Olympus Corp that it falsified financial reports for more than a decade should not shock anyone. The shock is that, for years, auditors failed to detect such massive fraud.

The failures of auditors to uncover cooked books, which run the gamut from Adelphia to Waste Management Inc, are a cancer on the accounting industry.

The failures go back years. How about Al Dunlap's manufactured numbers at Sunbeam in 1998? Or teenage con man Barry Minkow's ZZZZ Best, which turned out to be a Ponzi scheme and collapsed in 1987? Or Equity Funding, with its computer program to fabricate life insurance policies, in 1973? Or the National Student Marketing "pooling of interests" fraud in 1970, which gave birth to the Financial Accounting Standards Board? Or the 1938 McKesson & Robbins scandal, which gave us the first American audit standards? Or Ivar Kreuger's 20 percent dividends Ponzi scheme in 1932?

That is but a sampling of big frauds that auditors somehow failed to detect, sometimes over many years during which they were supposedly scrutinizing books and looking for verification of revenue and assets.

Olympus's major businesses include building endoscopes, which let surgeons peer inside the body. How ironic that Olympus's financial lies festered unseen for more than a decade.

Olympus removed KPMG AZSA as its group auditor in 2009 after a dispute over how to account for some controversial acquisitions, an internal document shows. Olympus told investors at the time that KPMG's audit contract had expired and it was hiring Ernst & Young.

HIDDEN LOSSES