Opinion

The Great Debate

Broaden the peace process with Iran

 

High-level Geneva talks with Iran adjourned November 11 without reaching an agreement. Lower-level talks are to scheduled to reconvene Wednesday. The Western objective is a pause in Iran’s nuclear program — stopping the clock and allowing more time to reach a permanent agreement.

Is stopping the clock a good idea? It was done once before. In 2004-5, Iran stopped enrichment temporarily. President Hassan Rouhani was then secretary of the Iranian National Security Council and negotiated the pause. A permanent agreement proved impossible at that time. So Iran started enrichment again and has now expanded its capacity.

That could happen again. But a pause that provides time for negotiation of a more permanent agreement is necessary. If Tehran goes much farther in enlarging its enrichment capacity and beginning production of plutonium, it will be a very short step from obtaining all the material it needs for nuclear weapons.

Failing to stop the clock now would put us on the road to either war or containment. Neither option is preferable to a solid negotiated agreement that would prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons or getting everything it needs to “break out” quickly without detection.

A meaningful pause now would require that Iran cease production of 20 percent enriched uranium, make its existing enriched stockpile inaccessible, put its plutonium-producing reactor on hold and postpone installing additional centrifuges for enrichment. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would need to verify that Iran has met all the terms of the agreement.

An Iran nuclear deal is a win for U.S.

For the first time in decades, there is momentum in the nuclear talks with Iran. A deal looks within reach.

In the recent round of negotiations in Geneva, six world powers and Iran made significant progress on an agreement that will verifiably limit Tehran’s nuclear program. But maintaining this progress and reaching an agreement is by no means a sure thing. In Washington, hawkish members of Congress, both Republicans and Democrats, could sabotage a deal by demanding Iran make concessions that are unrealistic.

The deal discussed in Geneva is a good first step toward addressing the international community’s concerns over Iran’s nuclear activities. This agreement between Iran and the P5+1 — the five permanent United Nations Security Council members (the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China) plus Germany — would limit Iran’s most dangerous nuclear activities and lead to a transparent, verifiable compact that would guard against a nuclear Iran. It would also be a good deal for U.S. national security interests, solving the Iran nuclear standoff without resorting to military action that would likely provoke another costly conflict in the Middle East.

Too many cooks in the Iran nuclear kitchen

Last weekend, after years of failed negotiations, the “P5+1” nations — the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China) plus Germany — finally appeared to be on the verge of a deal with Iran regarding curbs on its nuclear program.

All except France were ready to sign a stopgap agreement that would offer Iran limited sanctions relief in return for a freeze in its nuclear program. But Paris torpedoed the arrangement at the last moment — denigrating it as “a sucker’s deal.”

France’s torpedoing of the agreement appears less related to genuine nuclear proliferation concerns than with trying to curry favor with anti-Iranian countries — like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – who commission and buy expensive French military, satellite and nuclear hardware.  The lesson in this latest failure is there ought to be a single point of contact with Iran endowed with executive authority over resolving the nuclear issue.

Looking to diplomacy with Iran

President Barack Obama has decided to test whether Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s “charm offensive” is a legitimate effort to reach an agreement on a more constricted and transparent Iranian nuclear program. With this decision, he embarks on the most transformative and important diplomatic initiative of his presidency.

The closest historical analogy is President Richard M. Nixon’s opening to China in 1971. Nixon had recognized a major adversary’s new willingness to change course and he seized the opportunity to further vital U.S. national security interests.

This China analogy, however, has some flaws. Most important, Nixon and his national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger began their quest in secrecy to avoid a divisive public debate that could have scuttled the initiative. Obama’s public commitment to test an opening to Iran, though, will be subjected to fierce scrutiny by domestic and foreign opponents.

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