In the immediate aftermath of the Mumbai attacks, India's response has been to look to the United States to lean on Pakistan, which it blames for spawning Islamist militancy across the region, rather than launching any military retaliation of its own. So after U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice's trip to India and Pakistan last week, have the Americans done enough for now?

According to Pakistan's Dawn newspaper, Rice told Pakistan there was "irrefutable evidence" that elements within the country were involved in the Mumbai attacks. And it quotes unnamed sources as saying that behind-the-scenes she “pushed the Pakistani leaders to take care of the perpetrators, otherwise the U.S. will act”.

India's Business Standard said the Indian government was pleased with the U.S. warning. "This is exactly what India wanted," the newspaper said.

The Times of India, however, fretted the U.S. action against Pakistan appeared to be "turning tepid", in public at least. It attributed the U.S. approach to the perceived need to avoid backing the civilian government led by President Asif Ali Zardari into a corner. (India has specifically not accused the Pakistan government of involvement in the Mumbai attacks, pointing instead to militant groups supported by Pakistan's powerful spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI.) It also said the United States was wary of destabilising a partner on which it depends crucially as a transit route for supplies to Afghanistan, while also being hobbled by the change of administration in Washington.

So which way is the pendulum swinging -- towards firm U.S. action that will allow Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to say he was right to put his faith in American diplomacy, or a lukewarm response that will either force India to act alone or leave its Congress-led government looking on in helpless frustration as it heads into a general election due by next May?

U.S. pressure has succeeded in pulling India and Pakistan back from the brink in the past.  When fighting erupted between the two newly declared nuclear-armed powers in the Kargil war in 1999, U.S. President Bill Clinton persuaded then Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to pull Pakistani troops back. (Sharif paid a high price. Later in the year he was overthrown by then General Pervez Musharraf, a lesson unlikely to be lost on the current civilian government which is seen as wary of making too many concessions to India for fear of alienating the powerful Pakistan Army.)

Then after an attack on India's parliament in December 2001 triggered the mobilisation of close to a million men along the two countries' borders, the United States dived into another round of frantic diplomacy to persuade Pakistan to crack down on Kashmiri militant groups and the Indians to stand down.  Much of that diplomacy went on behind-the-scenes, though for an interesting Pakistani view of how close the two countries came to war in 2002, here is a link to an article written in January that year by the current Pakistan High Commissioner to Britain.

So what are the prospects in the current crisis?

Unlike in previous years, the Americans have become much more forthright about the extent to which they are willing to support Indian assertions that the roots of Islamist militancy lie in Pakistan.  When the Indians blamed the ISI for bombing its embassy in Kabul in July -- a charge Pakistan denied -- the Americans delivered by leaking reports of ISI involvement to U.S. newspapers, as I discussed in an earlier post.

After the Mumbai attacks, the New York Times has brushed off Pakistani denials of involvement with an op-ed boldly headlined The Pakistan Connection.

Bruce Riedel at the Brookings Institution has argued that "the most dangerous terrorist menace (to India) comes from groups with intimate connections to the global jihadist network centered around Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda and its allies in the Pakistani jihadist culture."  Exploring links between the ISI and militant groups he says it nurtured to fight India in Kashmir, he says that Zardari's ability to get control of the ISI "is still very much in doubt."

At the other side of the world, The Australian has challenged what it calls "The dangerous illusion of independent terrorists" -- the misconceived notion, it says, that perpetrators of attacks are non-state actors operating beyond the control of governments. "The radical increase in the lethality, range, political consequence and strategic influence of terrorists comes not from their being non-state actors at all. Instead it comes from their being sponsored by states," it says.  Then in language that could have come straight from the Indian government, it says: "Pakistan has for many years been a significant state sponsor of terrorism."

All that sounds like the kind of response the Indian prime minister was looking for when he said that "We expect the world community to recognise that the territory of the neighbouring country has been used for perpetrating this crime."

But how will it play inside Pakistan, where a weak civilian government is delicately balanced against a powerful army that has run the country for much of its life, and which in turn is battling militants on its border with Afghanistan? And what too will it mean for the ordinary people of Pakistan, caught in the middle?

Wow, Thomas Friedman writing in the New York Times let fly with a zinger with his opinion piece “Calling all Pakistanis“, presumably aimed at stirring compassion in Pakistani hearts over last week’s horrifying attack in Mumbai.

Pakistanis were ready enough to take to the streets to vent their anger and indignation over cartoons in Denmark, why can’t they demonstrate a shared sense of outrage over the cold-blooded killing of 171 people in the country next door, asks Friedman.

Of course, anyone would like to see spontaneous public displays of grief and empathy for the people of Mumbai. Can it happen in Pakistan, a country that has fought three wars against India? The army doesn’t trust India and the people have been fed an anti-India diet by governments and media since 1947.

I think we can understand why it won’t happen in Peshawar, or faraway Quetta — cities where conservative, religious forces have a lot of influence.

But why not Karachi, Mumbai’s twin across the Arabian Sea, or Lahore, Pakistan’s cultural capital? After all they host the most progressive, liberal sections of Pakistan’s deeply fissured society. A few bravehearts from that tiny minority might risk some candle-lit vigils.

The trouble is that they also have a strong Islamist presence, which is why thousands of people turned out to protest against the cartoons in both cities.

Even remembering the genuine warmth that was shown to Indian visitors during the heady days of cricket diplomacy in spring of 2004, expecting a sudden, collective outpouring of sympathy from ordinary Pakistanis is probably expecting too much.

What people looking from a distance don’t understand, and I’ll risk including faraway news editors in this, is that reactions in Pakistan are often politically engineered, and delayed rather than spontaneous.

It probably has something to do with the fatalism of people who’ve seen generals overthrow their governments, who’ve been brutalised by bombs and suicide attacks in their own towns, who are so confused by their own powerlessness that they readily believe the most outlandish conspiracy theories.

Look at those cartoon protests in 2006. Yes they were big.

Indeed the protest in Lahore, to the shock of most Lahoris, turned violent and destructive along the city’s famous Mall road.

But it took weeks for the Islamist parties, some say egged on by rogue anti-Musharraf agent provocateurs in the agencies, to mobilise their cadres in Karachi and Lahore.

The demonstrations in Pakistan were bigger than elsewhere in the Islamic world, but came far later and appeared contrived.

In contrast, the displays of public support in 2007 for the Supreme Court Chief Justice who Musharraf dismissed were genuinely impressive as he criss-crossed the country addressing bar associations.

Yes, the lawyers and Sharif’s party, and to some extent Bhutto’s People’s Party, organised these too.

But they generated a groundswell of public support in a way that cartoon issue never really did — look how Islamist parties were wiped out in February’s election.

So Pakistanis clearly respond to injustice, if someone gets them going.

Which political party is going to risk filling them with compassion for Mumbai, given India’s suspicions that the killers were trained by the Pakistani military.

Remember the politicians are in the middle of a transition from military rule, that the army chief has himself supported.

Still, perhaps the politicians should risk getting people involved. After all, it would fit nicely into the government’s avowed campaign to turn people against militancy and religious extremism.

Perhaps that was Friedman’s purpose.

Because otherwise an article that only a few well-read people in Karachi and Lahore are likely to see could simply play to the anti-Pakistan gallery, and harden attitudes of ordinary good-hearted Pakistanis who feel outsiders take cheap shots to malign them.

Let’s see, maybe the President Zardari’s Pakistan People’s Party will recognise this is an opportunity to reach out to India in a common war against jihadis who’d like to take over Pakistan and break up the Indian federation.

Maybe Kayani could lay a wreath.

Maybe that would give people confidence to show their true feelings of horror an sympathy for what happened in Mumbai.

Maybe, maybe, maybe.

PHOTO: Peace activists hold placards as they demonstrate for peace between Pakistan and India in Lahore December 5, 2008. REUTERS/Mohsin Raza (PAKISTAN)

An attack of the scale and sophistication unleashed on Mumbai would not be possible without months of planning, and yet it completely went below India's intelligence radar.

Indeed, so unaware were the security agencies that even when the attacks began, the first reaction was these were probably gangland shootings that India's financial capital is known for.   So if the agencies have been so clueless about an attack so mammoth in its sweep, the question experts are beginning to ask is how safe are India's vital assets?

The nuclear facilities for instance ? A chilling thought but one that must be answered, says B. Raman, a former top officer at India's Research and Analysis Wing. "I shiver and sweat at the thought of what is waiting to happen tomorrow and where. The mind boggles as one tries to think and figure out how the terrorists could have planned and carried out terrorist strikes of such magnitude, territorial spread and ferocity without our intelligence and police having been able to get scent of it," Raman, one of India's foremost intelligence experts, wrote. "I could not sleep the whole of last night. One question, which kept bothering me again and again was : how safe are our nuclear establishments and material?"

Of course nuclear installations are far more heavily guarded than a public place such as a hotel, hospital or a railway station and Raman probably means to rouse what he thinks is an establishment gone into deep slumber. But after the attacks on Mumbai, no longer can Indian experts be be going around saying Pakistan is unique in not having a grip on the militant threat. After repeated attacks beginning in Varanasi last year to Jaipur, Bangalore, Ahmedabad, Delhi twice this year and finally Mumbai, and still no wiser as to who is behind them,  New Delhi looks as much at sea as its counterpart in Islamabad.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has blamed a group with "external linkages" for coordinated attacks which killed more than 100 people in Mumbai. The language was reminiscent of the darker days of India-Pakistan relations when India always saw a Pakistan hand in militant attacks, blaming groups it said were set up by Pakistan's spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI, to seek revenge for Pakistan's defeat by India in the 1971 war.

An attack on India's parliament in December 2001 triggered a mass mobilisation along the two countries' borders and brought them close to a fourth war.  That attack was blamed by India on the Pakistan-based Kashmiri militant groups Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed - hardline Islamist groups with links to al Qaeda.  Both have been associated with the kind of "fedayeen" attacks -- in which the attackers, while not necessarily suicide bombers, are willing to fight to the death -- seen in Mumbai.

So does the assault on Mumbai spell the death-knell for what had been gradually warming ties between Pakistan and India?

Pakistan has condemned the attack, just as it did when gunmen attacked the Indian parliament in 2001. And the Pakistani context today is quite different from that of 2001. Then a military ruler, former president Pervez Musharraf was in power, whereas Pakistan is now run by a new civilian president, Asif Ali Zardari, who has made clear he wants peace with India over Kashmir.

But Singh's comments, made in a televised address to the nation, were remarkably strong for the usually mild-mannered prime minister:

“It is evident that the group which carried out these attacks, based outside the country, had come with single-minded determination to create havoc in the commercial capital of the country," he said. “We will take the strongest possible measures to ensure that there is no repetition of such terrorist acts. We are determined to take whatever measures are necessary to ensure the safety and security of our citizens."

The strength of the language may have been fuelled by the scale of the Mumbai attacks, and could refer to either Pakistan or Bangladesh, which has also been accused by India of harbouring militant groups. But it sounded similar in tone to that of Singh's  predecessor, Atal Behari Vajpayee, who following the 2001 parliament attack warned Pakistan that India's patience was wearing thin. And they also contrasted with India's reaction to bombings which killed at least 63 people in the western city of Jaipur earlier this year, when the Indian government notably refrained from pointing a finger at Pakistan.

So was this a deliberate attempt to undermine India-Pakistan relations?  And if so, what will that mean for Pakistan's fragile civilian democracy? Zardari has staked his reputation on making peace with India to improve trade and help lift Pakistan's struggling economy.

Much will depend on how Singh, under pressure to show a firm hand ahead of a national election due in India by May 2009, reacts.

(Rueters photo of Taj Mahal hotel in Mumbai/Punit Paranjpe)

Will Israel and India -- the first the United States' closest ally and the second fast becoming one of the closest -- emerge as the trickiest adversaries in any attempt by the United States to seek a regional solution to Afghanistan?

The Washington Post reported earlier this week that the incoming administration of President-elect Barack Obama plans to explore a more regional strategy to the war in Afghanistan — including possible talks with Iran.

The idea has been fashionable among foreign policy analysts for a while, as I have discussed in previous posts here and here. The aim would be to capitalise on Shi'ite Iran's traditional hostility to the hardline brand of Sunni Islam espoused by the Taliban and al Qaeda to seek its help in neighbouring Afghanistan. At the same time India would be encouraged to make peace with Pakistan over Kashmir to end a cause of tension that has underpinned the rise of Islamist militancy in Pakistan and left both countries vying for influence in Afghanistan.

But Israel has already cautioned Obama against talking to Iran, which it said would be a seen as a sign of weakness in efforts to persuade Tehran to curb its nuclear programme. And Obama's suggestion that the United States should try to help resolve the Kashmir dispute has raised hackles in India, which resents any outside interference in what it sees as a bilateral dispute. That could make the two countries important allies in combating -- or at least reshaping -- any attempt to remould U.S. strategy. 

India and Israel have already built close defence ties, as underlined by this Times of India article.  And according to this Asia Times article by former Indian diplomat M K Bhadrakumar, India's growing relationship with Israel, combined with U.S. pressure, is pushing Delhi to break off what was once a strategic partnership with Tehran. "At the root of it lies unprecedented US-Israeli interference in India's Iran policy," he writes.

Are we going to see more signs of Israel and India working together -- if necessary to resist rather than support U.S. policy? And in an increasingly multi-polar world, will Obama discover that he needs to watch the United States' friends as closely as its enemies to drive through his plans for change?