Stop the pointless demonization of Putin
American media coverage of Vladimir Putin, who today began his third term as Russia’s president and 13th year as its leader, has so demonized him that the result may be to endanger U.S. national security.
For nearly 10 years, mainstream press reporting, editorials and op-ed articles have increasingly portrayed Putin as a czar-like “autocrat,” or alternatively a “KGB thug,” who imposed a “rollback of democratic reforms” under way in Russia when he succeeded Boris Yeltsin as president in 2000. He installed instead a “venal regime” that has permitted “corruptionism,” encouraged the assassination of a “growing number” of journalists and carried out the “killing of political opponents.” Not infrequently, Putin is compared to Saddam Hussein and even Stalin.
Well-informed opinions, in the West and in Russia, differ considerably as to the pluses and minuses of Putin’s leadership over the years – my own evaluation is somewhere in the middle – but there is no evidence that any of these allegations against him are true, or at least entirely true. Most seem to have originated with Putin’s personal enemies, particularly Yeltsin-era oligarchs who found themselves in foreign exile as a result of his policies – or, in the case of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, in prison. Nonetheless, U.S. media, with little investigation of their own, have woven the allegations into a near-consensus narrative of “Putin’s Russia.”
Even the epithet commonly applied to Putin is incorrect. The dictionary and political science definition of “autocrat” is a ruler with absolute power, and Putin has hardly been that. There are many examples of his need to mediate, sometimes unsuccessfully, among powerful groups in the ruling political establishment and of his policies being thwarted by Moscow and regional bureaucracies. Moreover, if Putin really were a “cold-blooded, ruthless” autocrat, tens of thousands of protesters would not have appeared in Moscow streets, not far from the Kremlin, following the December presidential election. Nor would they have been officially sanctioned – as were the thousands who gathered yesterday before a small group breached the sanctioned lines and violence ensued – or shown on state television.
But consider the largest, and historically most damning, accusation against Putin. Russian democratization began in Soviet Russia, under Mikhail Gorbachev, in 1989-91. “De-democratization,” as it is often called, began not under Putin but under Yeltsin, in the period from 1993 to 1996, when the first Russian president used armed force to destroy a popularly elected parliament; enacted a super-presidential constitution; “privatized” the former Soviet state’s richest assets on behalf of a small group of rapacious insiders; turned the national media over to that emerging financial oligarchy; launched a murderous war in the breakaway province of Chechnya; and rigged his own re-election. (On February 20, outgoing president Dmitri Medvedev shocked a small group of visitors by finally admitting that Yeltsin had not actually won that election against the Communist leader Gennadi Zyuganov.) Putin may have only moderated those fateful policies, but he certainly did not initiate them.
The catastrophic Yeltsin 1990s, which have been largely deleted from the U.S. media narrative, also put other anti-Putin allegations in a different perspective. The corruption rampant in Russia today, from seizures of major private investments to bribes demanded by officials, is a direct outgrowth of the violent and other illicit measures that accompanied “privatization” under Yeltsin. It was then that the “swindlers and thieves” denounced by today’s opposition actually emerged.
The shadowy practices of that still-only-partially reformed economic system, not Kremlin politics, has led to the assassination of so many Russian journalists, most of them investigative reporters. The numbers, rarely cited by era, are indicative. According to the American Committee to Protect Journalists, 77 Russian journalists have been murdered since 1992 – 41 during Yeltsin’s 8 years in power, 36 during Putin’s 12 years.
Was a Putin mentor poisoned?
Excerpted from The Man Without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin by Masha Gessen, by arrangement with Riverhead Books, a member of Penguin Group (USA), Inc. Copyright © 2012 by Masha Gessen.
Encouraged by his former deputy’s meteoric rise, former St. Petersburg mayor Anatoly Sobchak decided to end his Paris exile and go back to Russia in the summer of 1999. He returned full of hope and even more full of ambition. As Sobchak was leaving Paris, Arkady Vaksberg, a forensics specialist turned investigative reporter and author with whom Sobchak had become friendly during his years in France, asked him whether he hoped to return to Paris as an ambassador. “Higher than that,” replied Sobchak. Vaksberg was sure the former mayor was aiming for the foreign minister’s seat: the rumor in Moscow’s political circles was that Sobchak would head up the Constitutional Court, the most important court in the country.
With characteristic overconfidence, Sobchak immediately ran for parliament — and suffered an embarrassing loss. But once Putin launched his election campaign, he appointed his former boss his “empowered representative” — a job that basically entitled Sobchak to campaign for Putin (candidates may have dozens and even hundreds of “empowered representatives”). Campaign Sobchak did, seeming to forget that his political reputation had once rested on his democratic credentials. He called Putin “the new Stalin,” promising potential voters not so much mass murder as an iron hand — “the only way to make the Russian people work,” Sobchak said.
But Sobchak didn’t stop at the rhetoric. He talked too much, as had always been his way. Just as Putin was dictating his new official life story to three journalists, Sobchak was reminiscing, in response to questions asked by other journalists, and recounting key episodes of Putin’s career in ways that contradicted the story told by his old protégé.
On February 17, Putin asked Sobchak to travel to Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave wedged between Poland and Lithuania, to campaign for him. The request was urgent: Sobchak had to fly out that day, frustrating his wife, who did not like to see him travel on his own. She claimed she had to watch that he took his medicine. Most acquaintances believed the squeaky-voiced peroxide blonde simply did not trust her husband out of her sight. It is also possible that she feared for his safety. But she was in parliament in Moscow that day, and could not join her husband on his emergency campaign jaunt. The former mayor traveled with two male assistants who doubled as bodyguards. On February 20, Sobchak died at a private hotel in a resort town outside Kaliningrad.
Local journalists soon picked up on some odd circumstances surrounding Sobchak’s death. Chief among them was the fact that two different autopsies had been performed on the body — one in Kaliningrad and one in St. Petersburg, at the military hospital run by Yuri Shevchenko, the same doctor who had helped engineer Sobchak’s escape to Paris; he was now Russia’s minister of health, but he had not given up his post at the hospital. The official cause of death was a massive but natural heart attack.
Still, ten weeks following Sobchak’s death, the prosecutor’s office in Kaliningrad opened an investigation into a possible case of “premeditated murder with aggravating circumstances.” Three months later, the investigation was closed without a finding.
from Ian Bremmer:
Prokhorov’s presidential chances are not the point
By Ian Bremmer The opinions expressed are his own.
After a week full of anti-government and pro-government protests, Russians woke up on Monday to big news. Mikhail Prokhorov, a political novice with billions of dollars—and the New Jersey Nets— to his name, announced his Presidential bid. Alexei Kudrin, a longtime bureaucratic infighter, also declared his plans to re-enter the political arena. These developments were even more significant considering both were ousted in rather public quarrels with the powers that be just months ago. Kudrin said he would support and aid a pro-reform liberal party that would stand as a counterweight to the incumbent United Russia. Prokhorov intends to challenge Putin for the presidency in March 2012 on a platform that would appeal to Russia’s “disenchanted middle class.”
No matter what Kudrin and Prokhorov say in public, they both represent the same thing to Russia and the world: Vladimir Putin’s iron grip on power. As I’ve written before, Putin is the most powerful individual on the planet. To think that either man would risk his freedom or his fortune to oppose Putin’s Kremlin, no matter what their stated reasons are, is just wrong. That said, there are reasons to watch this “race” as it will give some insight into Putin’s inevitable third term as president.
Putin has had to deal with a growing sense of dissatisfaction in Russia as of late. Growth and living standards are stagnating, while economic inequality persists. It is unclear whose pockets are being lined with the wealth generated by Russia’s massive natural resources. The lack of freedom of the press, centralized control over economic opportunity, and pervasive corruption that makes a mockery of the justice and security systems and other institutions, are Putin’s levers of power-- and also the focal points for protesters. The protestors’ complaints crystallized last week over United Russia, Putin’s party, winning a smaller but still strong majority in the parliamentary elections. Accusations of election fraud were widespread and tens of thousands took to the streets in protest over the course of last week. Putin has not been in a position to crack down on these protests -- they’re too visible and too widespread -- but be sure that the oligarchs and ruling classes in Russia are on Putin’s side. While his tactics for retaining power have had to change, the outcome is the same.
Monday, a pro-United Russia rally in Moscow had the distinct air of a made-for-media event, with the college kids in attendance complaining their classes had been cancelled in order to compel them to turn out to show their “support” for the current regime. But the numbers, even if not to the extent that the state television claims, were there. Though Prokhorov and Kudrin will deny it endlessly, their candidacies are without a doubt sanctioned by the Kremlin. Just this year, Prokhorov was the leader of a pro-business liberal party that was created by and quite obviously aligned with the Kremlin. He quit because of a falling out with one of Putin’s Kremlin advisors -- but it was not a falling out so great that Prokhorov became persona non grata. Quite the opposite, Prokhorov’s political resurrection may prove too useful for either Putin or the Kremlin middlemen to pass up.
Prokhorov has not forgotten that he owes his fortune and therefore his allegiance to Putin. As he already stated in his press conference, he doesn’t plan to dwell on attacking Putin (no more than 10% of his platform will be anti-Putin), but rather would like to talk about his plans for Russia. Kudrin has all but ignored Putin in laying out his case for a new party. Imagine if Newt Gingrich or Mitt Romney came out tomorrow and said they were done attacking President Obama and wanted to focus solely on their plans for the U.S. Both Kudrin and Prokhorov represent ‘acceptable opposition’ to Moscow. That’s a recipe for a gracious but certain defeat. Kudrin owes his allegiance to Putin for slightly different reasons, but the result is the same: both candidates exist to draw off votes and appease the intellectual classes who are disenchanted with Putin’s leadership. But they will do nothing to keep Putin from a third term as President.
Putin “the most powerful” individual on the planet – are you also running in the elections, Dr. Bremmer?
Autocrats rule, democrats flounder
By John Lloyd The opinions expressed are his own.
Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister of Russia, claimed the Presidency, the supreme leadership of his country, once more last week with – at least in public – an assurance which amounted to nonchalance. The man whom he had made current President of Russia, Dmitri Medvedev, proposed to the party he had created, United Russia, that he be its candidate for the next presidential elections, to be held next year.
He told the party congress that, should he be elected, he would appoint Mr. Medvedev as Prime Minister. A straight switch, requiring only the imprimatur of the people – who, grateful for stability, rising prices and an increase in the status of their country – are expected to give it.
For a country which has been turbulent for a quarter of a century, this promises the smoothest of transitions. Mr. Putin was president – succeeding Boris Yeltsin – for two terms, from 2000 to 2008. Mr. Medvedev kept the seat warm for a further four years: and if re-elected, Mr. Putin can expect two more presidential terms, till 2020 (when he will be 68) – a longer tenure of power than any other major elected leader since the war. This, of course, assumes he remains popular: but while both his own and his party’s ratings have fallen, both easily outstrip every other individual or party in the state.
The proposed transition points to a jagged fact: most authoritarian leaders are presently both more successful and (much) more popular than most democratic ones. The rulers of China, secure in the former Imperial pleasure garden compound of Zhongnanhai next to Beijing’s Forbidden City, continue to balance carrots and sticks in their successful quest for relative stability and absolute growth. Fears of a contagion from the Arab spring has translated into a harsher tone to Chinese rule – but so far, Tienanmen has not been transformed into Tahrir Square. Dissidence and protests there are, aplenty: but the steady expansion of living standards, consumption and (managed) liberties ensure a majority quiescent, or supportive.
In the democratic world? Uneasy lies the head of every elected leader of a major state. Contemporary politics offers no swifter descent from the stellar to the cellar than that of President Barack Obama, whose main crime in the eyes of both his opponents and his supporters has been to make the (fully democratic) transition from aspirant to occupant. The leader of the world’s biggest democracy, Manmohan Singh of India, is said by The Diplomat, the current affairs magazine for the Asia Pacific region, to be “seen by many as ineffective, insufficiently driven and, worse, just plain uninspiring”.
Angela Merkel of Germany on whose shoulders the Euro crisis mainly falls – and who scored a rare success this week in getting the Bundestag to ratify a large hike in German financial aid to Greece – has an unruly coalition, opposition parties taking regional bastions of centre-right power by the month and an electorate sullenly grudging of every Euro pledged to lazy, spendthrift southern states. Her partner in the salvation of the European currency, and the European Union, President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, has had a descent in popularity only a little less precipitous than Obama’s, one which his beautiful wife, Carla Bruni, has tended to hasten rather than halt (a late autumn baby may help).
“This, of course, assumes he remains popular: but while both his own and his party’s ratings have fallen, both easily outstrip every other individual or party in the state.”
Your statement here assumes that his popularity is tracked by an honest and anonymous poll, which it is not. It also assumes that all other individuals and parties have equal access to the Russian people, which they do not. First, eliminate all the Kremlin-sanctioned opposition parties, which believe in the same old ideas and then fail to get elected because they are the same old ideas. Now, if you look at a leader like Prokhorov, who has modern ideas and would be supported by 40% of middle class, Russian intellectuals, you will see that his once “sanctioned” candidacy was eliminated as soon as he proposed ideas that were different from United Russia. Saying that the world needs more autocracy is like saying that the world once again needs slavery.
from Ian Bremmer:
The Kremlin has castled and Putin is still king
By Ian Bremmer The opinions expressed are his own.
Long live the king? You can't hold it against the Russian people for wondering just how long Vladimir Putin intends to remain in power with the recent announcement that he plans to return himself to the presidency and swap his partner Dmitri Medvedev into the prime minister slot. The electoral game Putin is playing is being compared to "castling" in chess-- a rook and a king swapping places, in order to shore up the defense.
There might be defense at the heart of the strategy, but Putin's ruling party, United Russia, despite some recent murmurings, is still the only game in Moscow. Which is to say that Vladimir Putin is by all reckoning the most powerful man in the world. What other leader, leaving aside third-world strongmen, has so completely consolidated his rule over a country, as Putin has? His success is all the more venerable when one considers that Putin is leader of a country of nearly 150 million people -- and at the helm of the one of the world's most important economies. Attention must be paid to him. Sure, other leaders around the world may have more people or even larger economies, but they don't have as full a grip on the reins of power as Putin. (And few have ever been reverently photographed riding horseback shirtless, petting a tiger, or playing piano in tux and tails.)
Even with this switcheroo, little will change about Russia's, which is to say Putin's, stance on foreign or domestic affairs. Despite years of inspired reformist speechifying from President Medvedev, little has changed in the ossified Russian bureaucracy. That speaks to his true, limited, authority. The civil service system he declaims remain inefficient and antiquated, and presents ample opportunity for the kind of low-level corruption that greases the wheels of local politics across the world. Medvedev has been a friendly face for the Western world, someone who says the right things on its grand stages; but he has had little influence, as president, over the country's true direction. As the prime minister in waiting, look for that trend to continue.
It's hard to believe the public pronouncements that the decision to castle was made years ago, as Putin has told the press. Medvedev's recent statements simply don't bear that out. Nor does the sudden ouster of Finance minister Alexei Kudrin. Kudrin was upset because he wasn't given advance warning of the decision. That speaks volumes about who is important at the Kremlin -- power there is controlled by Putin's tiny circle and those on the periphery, titles aside, are kept completely in the dark.
Having said all this, one reason Putin's not afraid to pull such a brazen act is that the swap will have little to no impact on foreign investment or the Russian domestic economy. A recent move towards an improved investment climate in Russia's strategic sectors (facilitating, among other things, ExxonMobil's recent mammoth joint venture with Rosneft) is the natural outcome of lower oil prices and limited inbound investment. Again, some of the signals coming out of Russia may change -- Putin as president may once again show something like disinterested contempt towards the West and its demands of his regime in terms of human rights or international conventions, but as in his previous terms, such talk will be just that. The Kremlin has strategically opened itself up to smart money in foreign direct investment and will continue to let Western money in on its own terms. That won't change.
There's not much more else to see here from a policy perspective, or a political one. The parliamentary "elections" after all, will be between Putin's United Russia, the ever-weakening Communist Party, and an "opposition" party that is actually financed by the Kremlin. When Putin eventually leaves the scene, which might not be for decades, the extraordinary centralization of power in his Kremlin and weakness of the bureaucracy will be a profound mess for whoever tries to succeed him. But, until that time, for any pretenders to the Russian throne, it's checkmate.
The Russian people will have the opportunity to apply their opinion through a ballot. What I think you are missing is the key development in post-Soviet politics – this is the first time a Russian elite actually figured out how to consolidate and stay in power without changing the rules of the game
from MacroScope:
Emerging markets: Soft patch or recession?
Could the dreaded R word come back to haunt the developing world? A study by Goldman Sachs shows how differently financial markets and surveys are assessing the possibility of a recession in emerging markets. One part of the Goldman study comprising survey-based leading indicators saw the probability of recession as very low across central and eastern Europe, Middle East and Africa. These give a picture of where each economy currently stands in the cycle. This model found risks to be highest in Turkey and South Africa, with a 38-40 percent possibility of recession in these countries. On the other hand, financial markets, which have sold off sharply over the past month, signalled a more pessimistic outcome. Goldman says these indicators forecast a 67 percent probability of recession in the Czech Republic and 58 percent in Israel, followed by Poland and Turkey. Unlike the survey, financial data were more positive on South Africa than the others, seeing a relatively low 32 percent recession risk. Goldman analysts say the recession probabilities signalled by the survey-based indicator jell with its own forecasts of a soft patch followed by a broad sustained recovery for CEEMEA economies. "The slowdown signalled by the financial indicators appears to go beyond the ‘soft patch’ that we are currently forecasting," Goldman says, adding: "The key question now is whether or not the market has gone too far in pricing in a more serious economic downturn."
Why is Obama giving Libya to the Russians?
By John Bolton The opinions expressed are his own.
With President Obama’s Libya policy staggering from one embarrassment to another, last week he and Secretary of State Clinton outdid themselves. They publicly welcomed Russia’s effort to insert itself as a mediator, an act of such strategic myopia that it must leave even Moscow’s leadership speechless.
Permanent Security Council members Russia and China abstained on the initial resolution authorizing force to create a Libya no-fly zone and to protect innocent civilians. By not casting a veto, Russia thereby tacitly allowed military action to proceed. As they did, Russia repeatedly second-guessed and harshly criticized NATO’s operations. Now, as a mediator, Russia will, in effect, have the chance to rewrite the Council’s resolution according to its own lights.
Given the uncertain trumpet sounded by both Obama and NATO, and the still-inconclusive outcome of the “kinetic military action,” the reputation and credibility of U.S. and NATO, militarily and politically, have been gravely impaired. The President likely doesn’t appreciate these wounds as he leans over backwards not to be seen as the regime-changing unilateralist he imagined his predecessor to be.
We should hope that Russia fails. Mediation was never the correct answer here. NATO, once committed, must prevail by force of arms, as it still could with a modest demonstration of American leadership. Make no mistake: Welcoming Russian intercession between NATO and a military opponent like Libya is nothing less than a massive humiliation for the Western alliance. If the Obama Administration’s misguided worldview favors mediation, whatever happened to the likes of Sweden and Switzerland?
Not only does Russia now have the possibility of reshaping the Libyan morass to its own ends, it is also well-positioned for a dominant role in post-conflict Libya. From the outset, U.S. critics of the intervention raised legitimate questions about the bona fides of the Libyan opposition, embodied in the Transitional National Council (“TNC”), now recognized by over three dozen countries. Last Friday, the United States joined the crowd, while also unfreezing Libyan assets to make them available to the TNC.
mheld45 are you aware of the News Corporation scandal? The chief of the Wall Street Journal(a Murdoch holding) and president of the Dow just resigned. The FBI(incompetent) and the Justice Department(corrupt) are investigating News Corp.’s activities in the States. Corporate America and government is a Swiss Cheese of conflict of interests and loop holes. Swiss cheese smells and tastes a whole lot better.
What it’s like to be on Russia’s journalist hit list
By Masha Gessen The author is a guest contributor to Reuters.com. The views expressed are her own and not those of Thomson Reuters.
“Are you scared?” someone asked me during a talk in New York last Friday night.
I always get that question. I am a journalist working in Russia, where 19 murders of journalists remain unsolved. Russia ranks eighth in the Impunity Index compiled by the Committee to Protect Journalists — the only European country on the list, it is wedged between Nepal and Mexico.
People may be forgiven that being scared is an occupational hazard for me.
So I gave my stock answer: “No, I am not scared,” I said. “I have been at times, but right now I don’t seem to be doing anything particularly dangerous.” This is true.
Recently I have grown so cavalier as to stop asking my partner to meet me outside when I get home after dark — a precaution I started taking after I was last threatened a couple of years ago.
“They have no identifiable ideology aside from their allegiance to the regime, their nominal leaders are uncharismatic functionaries, but they are lavishly funded by the Kremlin” – that’s criticism right there!
Italy: land of the rich Russian
The following article by Silvia Marchetti first appeared in GlobalPost.
ROME, Italy — Ischia and Capri, two tiny islands in the Gulf of Naples, are fighting over big money. That is, Russian money.
Ischia, a thermal baths and spa destination, complains that its Russian clients prefer shopping on the neighboring isle because it has a wider choice of luxury boutiques. On both islands, nearly all hotels and restaurants have menus written in Cyrillic and employ waiters whose mother tongue is Russian, while shops display price-tags in both euros and dollars.
It’s indeed worth the trouble. Luring tourists from Russia is a lucrative pursuit in Italy. Many of the most breathtaking and expensive locations have been virtually colonized by them.
They’re the former Soviet Union’s new nobility — billionaire businessmen, bankers and investors who travel across the peninsula in limousines, yachts and helicopters (for 2,000 euros an hour), picking the most romantic scenery for the purchase of dreamlike castles and sea manors.
The wonderful world of force majeure
Russia’s decision to ban grain exports will be welcomed by some physical grain traders because it allows them to declare “force majeure”, walking away from wheat supply contracts that had become increasingly uneconomic to perform.
Force majeure was originally developed as a doctrine under civil law systems. There is no automatic or general right to invoke force majeure in the common laws of England and New York that govern most international commodity supply contracts.
The common law equivalent is “frustration”. Lawyers have spent many happy and profitable hours arguing what does and does not constitute frustration. It is a narrower definition than force majeure — and much harder to prove.
But something similar to force majeure can be incorporated into a contract by the specific agreement of the parties. Lawyers advising commodity traders will always ensure that a carefully worded force majeure (FM) clause is included in every commodity supply agreement to enable the supplier to walk away if the contract becomes too onerous to perform.
The first step is to define the goods to be supplied very carefully. Assume Trader A has contracted to supply wheat to Country B that it intends to source from Country C. If the contract is merely for the supply of “wheat” meeting certain quality standards, an export ban would not enable an FM clause to be invoked.
If Trader A can no longer obtain the wheat as planned from Country C because of an export ban, the court would hold it to the requirement to deliver the wheat, even if that means sourcing from another country D at greater expense, incurring losses, or pay compensation for the failure to perform.
But if the contract defines the goods as “wheat from Country C”, then an export ban renders it impossible to fulfil. Wheat from Country D is no longer an effective substitute for the wheat from County C no longer available.
“Russia takes 67th place in the Human Development Index (for comparison: United States – 4, United Kingdom – 28).” Though I would like Putin to go, I am neither an American nor a Nazi (same thing) and I don’t believe in phony propagandist indexes either of human intelligence, racial advancement or human development. I liv ed in the USA as well as in Austria, France, Russia and Far East, so whether Putin is bad or good is totally irrelevant to the fact that propagandist indexes are worthless. As far as Human Development Index is concerned, I would agree that Russia should be around 67th but the USA does certainly not belong to the first 100.