The Great Debate

Markets make prisoner of the Fed

John Kemp

Oct 22, 2010 13:59 EDT

“Market participants should not direct policy,” Kansas City Fed President Thomas Hoenig warned listeners at a town hall meeting in Lincoln, Nebraska, back in August. Unfortunately that is precisely what is now happening.

Hoenig noted that Wall Street’s clamour for cheap money was not disinterested: “Of course the market wants zero rates to continue indefinitely … they are earning a guaranteed return on free money from the Fed by lending it back to the government through securities purchases.”

Now the same pressure groups want the Fed to launch a second round of asset purchases so they can sell U.S. Treasury bonds to the central bank (in effect back to the federal government) at inflated prices.

A new round of securities purchases provides investors with an exit strategy from what might otherwise be a dangerous bubble in the bond market. Every bubble needs a “greater fool” prepared to pay a higher price for the asset to keep the bubble inflating. In this case, the guaranteed sucker is the Fed itself.

Meanwhile quantitative easing (QE) has pushed up the value of all the risk assets institutions and investors hold, giving the market a highly desirable insurance policy.

Set aside the question of whether the Fed should socialise investors’ risks and losses in this way. Set aside also the issue of moral hazard — whether by bailing out investors the Fed will encourage more excessive risk-taking behaviour in future. Most officials admit recent actions have increased moral hazard but believe it is a problem to be solved in the long term by appropriate supervision.

The immediate policy question is whether the prospective QE programme is contributing to stability in the financial markets and an environment likely to encourage more long-term investment by businesses and job creation. In other words, is QE succeeding in its own terms, meeting the objectives set by the central banks themselves? There are several reasons to be extremely doubtful.

Senate vote exposes Wall Street impotence

John Kemp

May 21, 2010 08:42 EDT

Wall Street’s diminished influence in Washington was made plain yesterday when the Senate voted to approve financial reform legislation by 59 votes to 39.

Industry lobbyists will point out the bill only just managed to scrape the required votes needed to end debate and forestall a filibuster. It fell far short of a lopsided bipartisan majority.

But the formal tally on HR 4173 (Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2009) as amended by S 3217 (Restoring American Financial Stability Act 2010) conceals a much wider bigger majority of 63-37 for enacting far-reaching reforms.

In the final vote on passage, the bill was backed by 53 Democrats, 2 Independents and 4 Republicans (Maine’s Susan Collins and Olympia Snowe, Iowa’s Charles Grassley and Massachusetts’ Scott Brown).

It was opposed by 37 Republicans and 2 Democrats (Maria Cantwell of Washington and Russ Feingold of Wisconsin). Two senators were not present (Democrats Robert Byrd of West Virginia and Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania).

But the two Democrats who voted “No” did so because they thought it did not go far enough and were registering a protest in a bid to get it toughened further. The two absent members were Democrats who had voted in favor of the legislation before.

All four votes should really be added to the “Yes” column to give an effective underlying majority of 63. By any measure that is a very high tally or a major piece of legislation.

The uncharted waters of government ownership

– Louis E. Lataif, a former president of Ford Motors of Europe, is dean of the Boston University School of Management. The views expressed are his own. —

Government ownership of General Motors (60% U.S. and 12% Canada) will be fraught with difficulties.

Given the large taxpayer stake in the company, it will be impossible for elected officials to stay out of the fray. Congress inevitably will interject itself in business decisions affecting employment, the kind of vehicles the company builds, or the company’s position on nationalizing health care – just as it is now asserting itself on the question of dealership closures.

Imagine the new General Motors (i.e., the government) attempting collective bargaining with the United Auto Workers’ union (on whose behalf the government stepped into the fray in the first place).

Consider the company lobbying Washington on an issue favored by the government (e.g., tax policy or the elimination of secret ballots for workers) but ill-suited for the company. And there there’s the matter of types of vehicles to be built.

With a strong environmental agenda, the government will understandably favor alternative fuel vehicles. Yet, there is no company in the world making any real money on such vehicles, given the current economics of alternative propulsion methods.

The government points to Toyota as a car company that has been responsive to the need for small, fuel-efficient cars, but Toyota reported a first quarter loss much worse than that of General Motors. That’s because the vehicles that keep these businesses viable — larger cars, SUV’s and trucks — are not selling in sufficient volume during this consumer credit crunch.

from The Great Debate UK:

Darling gambles with Britain’s credit

Neil Collins

Apr 23, 2009 05:49 EDT

-- Neil Collins is a Reuters columnist. Christopher Fildes is a guest columnist. The opinions expressed are their own --

LONDON, April 22 (Reuters) - The Treasury is the UK government's finance ministry. There are many other government departments, but in the years since 1997, all have been turned into subsidiaries of the Treasury, the power base of Prime Minister Gordon Brown when he was chancellor. His ambition was to micro-manage in every one of them. Today we saw the true cost of this disastrous experiment. All major countries have serious problems with their government deficits, but the most entrenched of Britain's are home-made. Britain's public finances, which had been deteriorating for years, are wrecked. Even on his successor's rose-tinted projections, they will not return to a balanced Budget for at least the next nine years. Given that no Treasury projection for more than three or four years out bears any resemblance to reality, and given the there will have been at least two elections between now and then, this is a post-dated cheque drawn on the Bank of Fantasy. Alistair Darling has learned at the feet of the master of obfuscation, double counting and footling detail. So we heard all about the green recovery, from a government that sees no contradiction between raising the cost of fuel and granting tax concessions to North Sea explorers. There may be more oil there, but for the state, this is now a dry well. The Chancellor did not dare say what he and his advisers really think about the green-tinted scheme wished on them by Peter Mandelson, the Trade Secretary, to scrap your old banger for 2,000 pounds towards a new one. At least they managed to limit the damage to a single year. If your car is not 10 years old by next March, it will be junked in the ordinary way. Junk is what the last Treasury forecast has now become. It's barely five months since Darling's last emergency package. It looked like a work of fiction then, and now there's no doubt. In his Budget a year ago, he was expecting to borrow 43 billion pounds in 2008/09, crowing that the previous peak was much higher, at 7.8 percent of gross national product. The sum would come down after that. By November, there was no crowing. The projected borrowing requirement was 78 billion pounds, and was going up, to 118 billion in the following year, not down. Even those horrible figures have now been left far behind. Last year he needed 90 billion pounds, and in 2009/10, he says, it will be 175 billion pounds, or 12.4 percent of GNP. The forecast is then for a fall, although not by much. In 2010/11 he - or his successor - will still be 173 billion pounds short of balancing the books. So in three years the government will have borrowed 5,600 pounds for every man, woman and child in the country. That's over 20,000 pounds for what the prime minister routinely calls the average hard-working family. In any business, from a corner shop to a multi-national, this arithmetic would be immediately fatal to those who had put it forward. Their credit would be ruined, and the business's credit could not be restored while they were still in charge. Britain's credit is ultimately expressed in the external value of sterling, as Brown himself has said. The pound has already been devalued informally by a greater amount than the two previous formal devaluations in 1967 and 1992. The short-term effects have been mostly benign, but the possibility of a flight from the currency is always there. This Budget makes it a little more likely. In this context, everything else is detail. The biggest detail is the attack on what Darling describes as "those who gained the most". This is a sop to his fractious party in parliament. From next April anyone earning over 150,000 pounds a year will be paying 51.5 percent on every extra pound earned, the highest rate in Britain for 21 years. They will also lose their tax-free allowances and half the tax relief on their pension contributions. The small print betrays that the government is relying on these measures to bring in 7 billion a year, sometime in the middle distance. This looks as unconvincing a forecast as any in Darling's portfolio. Well-paid labour is highly mobile nowadays, and will go where the prospects are high and the taxes low. Nothing else in the 250 pages of the Budget Report is worth a row of green beans. Even the Treasury can't put a price on the measure to reduce VAT on children's car seat bases. Despite its name, "enhanced capital allowances" will actually raise more money -- 10 million pounds, or enough to run the government machine for about eight minutes. Thrashing around for something cheerful to say, Darling kept telling us how much worse off other people were. To assert that "we and other countries have been battling against a succession of shocks which have hit the world economy" suggests that our luckless planet had crossed orbits with a large economic meteorite. The former chancellor, now prime minister, assumed the sun would shine forever, and that he had somehow managed to suspend the usual rules of economics -- or as he himself put it, "no more boom and bust." In recent years, he produced growth by borrowing, pouring the money into the public services for ever-decreasing returns. Each time he borrowed more than he had forecast. Now the bill has arrived, and it's plain that neither he nor his successor has the slightest idea of what to do. Marc Ostwald of Monument Securities summed it up within minutes: "a Budget of tinkering with the public sector financial sector meltdown, with no substance or obvious strategy whatsoever." One day the Treasury will remember how to mind its own business, under a chancellor who grasps that until the public finances are put in order, nothing else will go right. The longer the wait, the worse will be the reckoning.

Goldman’s TARP out: give up ALL state aid

– Jonathan Ford is a Reuters columnist. The views expressed are his own –

Goldman Sachs wants to do its duty by the American people and give them their TARP money back. Some spoilsports have urged the government simply to say no because allowing the investment bank to repay the cash would make other banks look bad.

But this seems rather un-American. Why shouldn’t taxpayers get their money back if Goldman really doesn’t need it? The point to insist upon is that they get all of it back — and on commercial terms.

To be clear, that means not just the $10 billion of TARP-related preference shares the government subscribed for last autumn, but also the rest of the Federal assistance Goldman has received.

That includes the $29 billion of FDIC backed bonds that Goldman has issued at low coupons, without which — as Jon Unia observes in a snappy letter to the Financial Times on April 22 — it might have posted a first-quarter loss rather than a profit. Goldman has, as it points out, issued bonds without a guarantee since last autumn, so it’s not impossible. The full $29 billion would need to be refinanced on commercial terms. After all, either you’re a private sector player or you’re not.

Unia also observes that if Goldman wants to prepay the prefs, it should be charged by the taxpayer for the temporary loan of the Federal balance sheet. This, after all, is what a commercial lender like Goldman would do if the boot was on the other foot.

There is even a mechanism for it to happen. As part of any pref repayment, Goldman could be obliged to buy out the warrants it issued to the Treasury at the same time as the prefs at a price negotiated between the two. This payment could be the prepayment premium.

Geithner’s naked subsidy redefines toxic

J Saft

Mar 25, 2009 04:17 EDT

– James Saft is a Reuters columnist. The opinions expressed are his own

Treasury Secretary Geithner is all but admitting that U.S. banks are suffering not from market failure but self-inflicted collateral damage.

The U.S. Treasury on Monday detailed an up to $1 trillion plan to buy up assets from banks in partnership with private investors, using financing bankrolled by the government, financing that is only secured by the value of the doubtful assets the fund buys.

One portion will be dedicated to buying complex securities from banks employing capital contributed by private investors and the government topped up with funds borrowed from the Federal Reserve. A second portion will buy older securities that are, or were, rated AAA, using, you guessed it, more non-recourse funding.

But most interesting of all is a plan to buy whole loans, dubbed “legacy loans”, from banks but this time the private-public subsidized vehicle will get its leverage courtesy of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation-guaranteed debt.

Notice that the ground has shifted subtly and the government is now talking not just about “toxic” assets but “legacy” ones. A legacy asset is, more or less, everything real estate related now on bank balance sheets.

These loans are not marked to market they are held to maturity, so no blaming the market here. They are nothing more than doubtful loans in the process of going bad as the economy implodes and the real estate they are collateralized with drops in value.

A show trial for AIG?

– Diana Furchtgott-Roth, former chief economist at the U.S. Department of Labor, is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. —

Republicans and Democrats in Congress, along with President Obama and Treasury Secretary Geithner, have been raking AIG over the coals in hearings and speeches for paying employees bonuses totaling $165 million. But today’s Los Angeles Times reports that the Treasury Department specifically agreed to the bonuses in a 586-page agreement signed on November 25. The deal allows AIG to pay out bonuses for the 2009 year that equal bonuses paid for 2007.

It stands to reason that the contracts to pay bonuses would have been known to Treasury officials a half-year ago, when they reviewed AIG’s financial position before funneling $85 billion into the firm to prevent its collapse. Basic due-diligence scrutiny of the firm’s books would have revealed the contractual obligations to make bonus payments to retain talented staff. What is puzzling is why the administration pretends not to know.

According to documents from AIG, the bonuses are compensation owed to employees under Connecticut law. Under the Connecticut Wage Act, the company said, if the bonuses are not paid, AIG becomes liable for legal costs of employees who try to collect, as well as penalties that could equal twice the bonuses owed. AIG might also leave itself liable to shareholder suits.

Despite the show trial in Congress and the sense of public outrage, it would be unwise for the government to go back on the contracts and sue to recover the money, especially when they agreed to it in November. This could make America resemble Russia, where trumped-up charges are used to prosecute companies that fall out of favor with the ruling elite.

Members of Congress are also discussing emergency legislation to tax away part or all of the bonus. This would set a precedent—corrupting if not unlawful—of using the IRS and the tax code as weapons of the state to go after individuals whom the administration and Congress want to punish. Such sanctions might amount to ex post facto punishment, legislation that makes unlawful behavior that was lawful when it occurred. The Constitution prohibits such legislation. Even President Nixon, who had an enemies list, never dreamed of this.

The wave of public sentiment against the AIG bonuses presents the government with a choice. It can try to run companies that receive bailout funding in a way calculated to win public approval, micromanaging every detail. This is impossible, because the government cannot even manage its own federal agencies efficiently, with episodes of wasted resources surfacing regularly.

First 100 Days: Fix the banks

– Peter Morici is a professor at the University of Maryland School of Business and former Chief Economist at the U.S. International Trade Commission. The views expressed are his own. —

For every new president, campaign promises and inaugural idealism must give way to the hard choices that measure the mettle of their leadership.

Now Barack Obama must act pragmatically to fix the banks or the economy will sink under their weight.

Banks continue to suffer losses on bonds backed by failing mortgages, credit cards and auto loans, and questionable corporate debt. To assist, the Treasury has used TARP funds to purchase capital in healthy and deeply troubled banks alike; however, no one can calibrate how high bank losses will go, because no one knows how far housing prices will drop and how many loans will ultimately fail.

The Obama Treasury could put a floor under bank losses, through government guarantees on their bonds, or by creating an aggregator bank that purchases those securities from banks altogether.

Guarantees would give the banks profits on bonds whose underlying loans are mostly repaid, and shift to taxpayers losses from those bonds whose loans are mostly not repaid. That would require additional large subsidies from taxpayer to the banks.

An aggregator bank, however, could turn a profit. It could purchase all the commercial banks’ potentially questionable securities, at their current mark to market values, with its own common stock and funds provided by the TARP. Then the aggregator bank could balance profits on those securities whose loans pan out against losses on securities whose loans fail.