Opinion

Hugo Dixon

Cyprus bank “resolution” a bad joke

Hugo Dixon
Apr 3, 2013 09:03 UTC

The “resolution” of Cyprus’ banks is a bad joke. Resolution is one of the new buzzwords in financial regulation. The practice is supposed to stop taxpayers having to bail out banks, while imposing pain fairly on shareholders and creditors.

In Cyprus, Greek deposits and favoured groups at home are exempt from haircuts, while other groups of depositor are hammered even harder. It’s anything but fair.

The resolution of Cyprus’ banks doesn’t matter just for those directly affected. It is one of the most ambitious cases of cross-border resolution since the financial crisis began. So a bad result here is hardly a good advertisement for the technique.

The Financial Stability Board (FSB), which coordinates financial regulation on an international level, published a document in 2011 setting out how resolution should work. Important principles are that the hierarchy of claims should be respected and that creditors of the same class should be treated equally.

The basic idea is that shareholders should take the first hit. Only after they are wiped out should the next line of defence, junior debt-holders, come into the line of fire. Only if they too are destroyed should the senior creditors, such as other bondholders and uninsured deposits, get haircuts. Insured deposits should be protected.

Cyprus leaves banking union up in air

Hugo Dixon
Apr 1, 2013 21:08 UTC

The Cypriot catastrophe shows just how far away the euro zone is from creating its much-touted “banking union”. There was no euro zone supervision of Cyprus’ big banks, no transnational approach to put them into controlled bankruptcy, no common deposit insurance and no flow of bank rescue funds from abroad.

Instead, there was weak supervision by the Central Bank of Cyprus and a mad scramble to carve up the banks’ assets on national lines. Nicosia was left to shoulder the whole cost of protecting small depositors and the euro zone said that none of its bailout cash could be injected into the troubled banks.

Optimists hope the fiasco will provide the euro zone with the impetus to complete its banking union. But it is equally possible that core countries such as Germany, Finland and the Netherlands will become even more reluctant to absorb the liabilities of bust peripheral banks.

Cyprus controls an “omnishambles”

Hugo Dixon
Mar 28, 2013 10:40 UTC

Cyprus’ capital controls are an “omnishambles”. If the Argentine-style “corralito” really can be lifted in seven days, the damage could be contained. But that doesn’t seem credible. Extended controls could spawn bribery, sap confidence, further crush the economy, spread contagion and ultimately lead to the country’s exit from the euro.

The lesson of capital controls elsewhere is that, once they are imposed, they are hard to remove. Iceland’s curbs are still in place five years after they started. In Argentina, they lasted a year.

There’s little reason to suppose it will be much different in Nicosia. After all, the restrictions – which limit both the amount of money people can take from their banks and the amount they can transfer abroad – have been imposed because the lenders do not have enough access to ready funds. If there’s not sufficient liquidity today, why should anybody believe there will be enough in a week, a month or even a year?

Cyprus deal best of a very bad job

Hugo Dixon
Mar 25, 2013 10:27 UTC

Cyprus’ economy is going to suffer terribly in the next few years. Some of that is inevitable given how bloated the banking system had become. But the disastrous handling of the crisis, especially in the past week, will make things much worse.

That said, the bailout deal that Cyprus reached with its euro zone partners in the early hours of Monday morning makes the best of an extremely bad job – both for the small Mediterranean island and its rescuers.

It establishes three important principles. First, there will be no losses for insured deposits. Last week’s aborted deal foolishly involved taxing them at 6.75 percent. Second, uninsured creditors rather than taxpayers will pay the entire cost of bailing out Cyprus’ two troubled banks – Cyprus Popular Bank (CPB) and Bank of Cyprus (BOC). Third, Cyprus’ oversized banking sector, which depended heavily on somewhat dubious Russian cash, will be slimmed down.

Cyprus must avoid capital controls

Hugo Dixon
Mar 24, 2013 16:31 UTC

Imposing capital controls would be a historic mistake for Cyprus and the euro zone – even worse than the crass idea of taxing uninsured deposits. Non-cash transactions would be limited, while withdrawals from cash machines would be rationed.

This would be equivalent to Argentina’s “corralito”, which lasted a year in 2001/2002. If capital controls are imposed, it will be almost impossible to lift them because people will stampede for the exits once they are removed. But such heavy-handed rationing of limited cash would clobber an economy which is already heading for a slump.

Some people will say that Cyprus has already endured a week of capital controls because of the extended bank holiday since last weekend’s botched bailout. But officially imposed indefinite capital controls – blessed by the euro zone and the International Monetary Fund – would be far worse.

Cyprus will pay dearly for its sins

Hugo Dixon
Mar 22, 2013 11:07 UTC

Cyprus will pay dearly for its sins. The Mediterranean island has committed many follies over the years – and is still making mistakes.

The Cypriots seem congenitally inclined to overestimate their negotiating position. In recent years, their first big folly was to reject in 2004 the United Nations plan for uniting their island. That irritated their European Union partners, meant that Cyprus still has a weak strategic position vis-à-vis Turkey and leaves a jagged scar across the island.

The last Communist government was also criminal in its failure to act as the crisis in Greece threatened to swamp Cyprus. If it had been willing to restructure the banks, the Cypriot economy would now be in a lot better shape. It was also much easier to do a deal with Germany then than now, when Angela Merkel is only months away from an election.

All Cyprus plan Bs look dreadful

Hugo Dixon
Mar 20, 2013 10:49 UTC

The Cypriots have an expression: eninboro allo. It means: I cannot take any more of it.

There was jubilation last night outside the small Mediterranean island’s parliament when every single MP either voted against a plan to tax depositors or abstained. The message was that people of Cyprus had had enough and weren’t going to let the big bullies, led by Germany, boss them around.

The plan to tax insured deposits was a dreadful mistake – I have described it as legalised bank robbery. But the deposit tax was part of an unpalatable but available 10 billion euro bailout, agreed with the euro zone. That plan A is now at risk. As Cypriots contemplate possible plan Bs, their jubilation may start to fade: all of them are also dreadful.

Cyprus deposit grab sets bad precedent

Hugo Dixon
Mar 18, 2013 09:07 UTC

Cyprus’ deposit grab sets a bad precedent. Money had to be found to prevent its financial system collapsing. But imposing a 6.75 percent tax on insured deposits – or even the 3 percent being discussed on Monday morning – is a type of legalised bank robbery. Cyprus should instead impose a bigger tax on uninsured deposits and not touch small savers.

Confiscating savers’ money will knock confidence in the banks. Trust in the government will also take a hit, since Nicosia had theoretically guaranteed all deposits up to 100,000 euros. Small savers should be encouraged not penalised. They are the quiet heroes of the financial system, who squirrel away their savings, not those who drag it down by engaging in borrowing binges.

Nicosia has not technically broken its promise to guarantee small deposits. That’s because it is not the banks which are failing to repay savers – something which would have triggered the insurance scheme. Instead, it is the government itself which is grabbing a slice of deposits. The pill is also being sugared by giving savers shares in the banks and some of the hoped-for revenues from a possible natural gas bonanza as compensation. That said, the mechanism is still an effective breach of promise.

Markets too sanguine about Italy

Hugo Dixon
Mar 11, 2013 10:12 UTC

The markets are too sanguine about Italy. The country’s politics and economics are messed up – and there are no easy solutions. And while Rome does have the European Central Bank as a backstop, it may have to get to the brink before using it.

Investors had jitters after last month’s election result, pushing 10-year bond yields up to 4.9 percent from 4.6 percent. But by last Friday they had fallen back to 4.7 percent. Investors have convinced themselves that some political solution will be cobbled together; that, if one isn’t, it doesn’t really matter; and that, if the worst comes to the worst, the ECB will pick up the pieces by buying the country’s bonds.

Mario Draghi, the ECB president, gave some support for the latter two ideas last week. He downplayed the risks to Italy’s fiscal position by arguing that much of the country’s belt-tightening was on “automatic pilot”. He also made clear that the ECB’s bond buying plan was still available for countries that followed the rules.

Spain probably won’t catch Italian flu

Hugo Dixon
Mar 4, 2013 10:17 UTC

One knee-jerk reaction to Italy’s shock election was to worry about contagion to Spain. As Rome’s bond yields shot up last Tuesday, Madrid’s were dragged up in sympathy. These are the two troubled big beasts of the euro zone periphery and an explosion in either of them could destroy the single currency.

But Spain, where I spent part of last week, probably won’t catch Italian flu. True, the risk of Madrid being thrown off its reform path has risen since Italy’s inconclusive election. But Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy doesn’t have to face the voters for nearly three years. What’s more, the Italian vote may make euro zone policymakers less keen on austerity and so give Spain a better chance of returning to growth.

Indeed, investors have already started having second thoughts. By Friday, Madrid’s 10-year bond yield had fallen back to 5.1 percent from 5.4 percent on Tuesday. The spread between Spanish and Italian yields has shrunk to 0.3 percentage points. There’s even a chance that Madrid could enjoy lower borrowing costs than Rome in the coming weeks if Italy’s political paralysis shows no sign of resolution.