Expert Zone
Straight from the Specialists
The U.S. must move cautiously on Taliban reconciliation
(The views expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not represent those of Reuters)
The Obama Administration is seeking to negotiate with the Taliban as it continues a drawdown of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Following recent setbacks for the U.S. mission in Afghanistan — including nationwide protests sparked by the accidental burning of Korans and a U.S. staff sergeant’s shooting rampage that killed 17 Afghan civilians — the Taliban suspended negotiations with the U.S. Some observers had touted the Taliban’s earlier willingness to open a political office in Qatar as a major breakthrough for a political process.
However, the Taliban has not renounced terrorism or its support for al-Qaeda. Moreover, the Taliban leadership is seeking to exclude the Karzai government from the talks, which indicates that it is likely merely interested in having comrades released from prison, and is seeking to make a backdoor deal with the U.S. that allows them to regain power.
The building blocks for peace and stability in Afghanistan are not yet in place. The military gains made against the Taliban over the past 18 months are still fragile. While it may make sense for the Administration to keep doors open for negotiations with the Taliban, it would be unwise for the U.S. to make major concessions before the Taliban has renounced international terrorism and demonstrated willingness to compromise politically.
The U.S. misread the intentions of Taliban leaders and underestimated the strength of their bonds with al-Qaeda when it sought to engage them before 9/11. Similarly, U.S. over-anxiousness to negotiate with the Taliban now could jeopardize U.S. counterterrorism objectives and lead to greater instability throughout the region. There are alternative strategies to negotiating with the Taliban, which involve continuing support for anti-Taliban elements in Afghanistan, including through financial, diplomatic, and military support even after 2014. The U.S. should focus its attention on developing these strategies as it draws down combat forces over the next two years, rather than invest significant resources into negotiations with the Taliban, which remain a long shot.
ADMINISTRATION OPENS DOOR TO TALIBAN TALKS
Over a year ago, on February 18, 2011, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton offered the Taliban a clear-cut choice:
U.S.-Pakistan reset: Still need to deal with terrorist sanctuaries
(The views expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not represent those of Reuters)
A Pakistan parliamentary committee has released its recommendations for “resetting” the parameters of U.S.-Pakistan relations. U.S.-Pakistan ties have been severely strained since the November 26, 2011, NATO attack that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers along the border with Afghanistan.
Since then, there have been no high-level U.S. visits to Pakistan, and NATO supply routes running through Pakistani territory have been shut down. The Pakistani parliament’s efforts to reframe the relationship could be helpful in restoring ties, as long as the U.S. brings its own terms to the table.
Starting point for U.S.-Pakistan negotiations The recommendations from the parliamentary commission include calling for the U.S. to end drone strikes on Pakistani territory; to apologise for the November 26, 2011, NATO strike; to start paying fees for the transit of NATO shipments for the war in Afghanistan; to refrain from “hot pursuit” operations by U.S. forces from Afghanistan into Pakistani territory; and to increase transparency of the activities of foreign security contractors. The parliament will now debate the commission’s recommendations and eventually vote on a resolution on U.S.-Pakistan ties, possibly within the next week.
The most contentious demand from the U.S. perspective is the call to end drone strikes. The drone missile campaign in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has proven to be one of Washington’s most effective tools in fighting global terrorism. An increase in the tempo of drone strikes in this region from mid-2009 to 2011 led to the crippling of al Qaeda. The U.S. media have reported that documents found at Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad showed bin Laden was worried about the devastating impact of the drone campaign on his organisation.
The three-month cooling-off period between the U.S. and Pakistan has had some benefits for both sides. It has provided space for de-escalation of the negative rhetoric surrounding relations in both the Pakistani and U.S. media. The lack of high-level U.S. visits to Pakistan, in particular, has meant that U.S. visitors did not become lightning rods for the Pakistani media to generate anti-American stories. U.S. civilian aid also has continued to flow to Pakistan during this period, demonstrating U.S. commitment to Pakistani economic development even in the face of deteriorating security relations. There seems to be growing recognition within Pakistan that U.S. aid is helpful to the country and not merely a way for the U.S. to buy influence.
Moreover, a parliamentary debate on ties could strengthen Pakistan’s democratic institutions, although the military will continue to have the final say on most security-related issues. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar has said the parliamentary debate would allow the Pakistani people to “take ownership” of the relationship, which could go a long way toward reducing anti-American sentiment in the country.
Afghanistan: Negotiating while withdrawing is poor strategy
(The views expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not represent those of Reuters)
In the wake of a U.S. Army staff sergeant’s murdering 16 Afghan civilians (mostly women and children), U.S. officials are contemplating the pace and scope of the U.S. troop drawdown from the country. At the same time, they are seeking a negotiated settlement with the Taliban leadership. U.S. and NATO Commander in Afghanistan General John Allen said yesterday that he did not foresee an accelerated drawdown of U.S. troops because of the shooting incident, but it is almost inevitable that this terrible tragedy will lead Americans to question the viability of the U.S. mission there.
The first goal of the U.S. Administration should be to demonstrate that it values Afghan lives and will pursue swift justice against the perpetrator of the heinous murders. This will help calm the situation and reassure Afghans the incident is an extreme aberration that will not reoccur.
The U.S. must not base its Afghan strategy around this one terrible incident. As tempting as it may be to view the current troubles in Afghanistan as an excuse to cut and run, U.S. leaders must recognise that such a decision would be irresponsible and lead to greater dangers for the U.S. and the Afghans. Instead, the U.S. and Afghan authorities must double down on their efforts to improve the partnership and show unity of purpose.
It is no secret that there are differences between the U.S. political and military leadership over the pace and scope of withdrawals. It is likely that President Obama’s political advisers will use the recent shooting rampage and the Koran burnings to bolster their calls for speeding up the drawdown of U.S. troops. But U.S. military commanders on the ground reportedly would like to keep most of the 68,000 troops that will be in place as of September 2012 until military gains are consolidated. Racing for the exits before the mission is accomplished will only create more chaos in the country that will redound to the insurgents’ benefit.
While U.S. policymakers are reeling from events in Afghanistan over the last month, the Taliban probably cannot believe their stroke of luck. Making concessions to the Taliban at this juncture would only embolden them and give average Afghans the impression that the Taliban’s return to power is all but inevitable. There are alternatives to negotiating with the Taliban that the U.S. can pursue, which would better ensure that Afghanistan does not return to serving as an international terrorist safe haven.
At this stage of the conflict, the Administration’s time and energy would be better spent on supporting anti-Taliban elements and concluding a Strategic Partnership Agreement with the Karzai administration that ensures the U.S. will be able to maintain a robust military presence post-2014 to conduct training and counterterrorism missions. This is a far more promising strategy than engaging in long-shot negotiations with the Taliban, which will likely succeed only in giving increased political legitimacy to them and their extremist ideology.
China’s rise and India’s obvious partner (the U.S.)
(The views expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not represent those of Reuters)
The release last week of an Indian think tank report entitled “Non-Alignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the 21st Century” has prompted robust discussion about Indian foreign policy in the age of a rising China.
Indian national security adviser Shiv Shankar Menon provided remarks at the report launch and apparently participated in some of the private discussions in preparation of the report.
U.S. strategic thinkers who are eager to improve ties with India will be disappointed by the report, as it provides few imperatives and recommendations for solidifying a U.S.-India strategic partnership for the 21st century. While the report acknowledges that the U.S. (and China) will be global power centers and that a robust American maritime presence in the Asia-Pacific will help delay the projection of Chinese naval power in the Indian Ocean, it also says that it would be “premature” to conclude that India would benefit from close ties with the U.S.
Demonstrating distrust toward American intentions, the authors highlight that it would be risky for India to rely too heavily on the U.S. since an Indo-U.S. strategic partnership “could become a casualty of any tactical upswing in Sino-American ties.” The report says the American alliance system is in decline and that it is uncertain “how the U.S. might actually respond if China posed a threat to India’s interests.” The report further notes that another potential downside of focusing too much attention on building ties to the U.S. is that it could “prematurely antagonize China.”
Non-Alignment 2.0 spends considerable time addressing India’s competition with China and the threats New Delhi is likely to face from Beijing in years to come. The report states that the “challenge for Indian diplomacy will be to develop a diversified network of relations with several major powers to compel China to exercise restraint in its dealings with India, while simultaneously avoiding relationships that go beyond conveying a certain threat threshold in Chinese perceptions.”
The report recommends building up India’s naval capabilities to ensure it remains dominant in the Indian Ocean region, investing in infrastructure development in the border areas, and preparing for asymmetric responses to any possible Chinese aggression regarding their border disputes.
We shouldn’t be talking about Spiritual Wealth when countries are sharpening their tools and positioning themselves aggressively. India has to be self-reliant in weaponry, build infrastructure along the borders in a strategic way. Diplomacy and coercion have to go hand-in-hand to realize our objective of deterring neighbors.
US-India relationship basically depends on US-China relation.
A very disciplined approach is required by India to set the right perception for neighbors and for the world.
Jai Hind.
The limits of the Pakistan-China alliance
(The views expressed in this column are the authors’ own and do not represent those of Reuters)
By Lisa Curtis and Derek Scissors
In the wake of the U.S. raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound last May and deteriorating relations between Islamabad and Washington, Pakistani leaders have sought to play up their country’s relations with China, touting Beijing as an alternative partner to Washington. However, China’s concerns about the future stability and development of Pakistan will limit the extent to which China will bail Pakistan out of its current economic difficulties, and the degree to which China will seek to drive a wedge between Islamabad and Washington.
Chinese security interests in Pakistan are driven primarily by China’s desire to contain India. Beijing has built up Pakistan’s conventional military as well as nuclear and missile capabilities over the years to help keep India off balance and focused on threats emanating from Pakistan. China’s concrete economic and political interests in Pakistan itself are not that extensive. China’s economic commitment to Pakistan, for instance, is not especially impressive in size and has shown clear limits. China has shown little interest in propping up Pakistan’s economy and has not provided substantial economic aid, even during times of need.
In the past, U.S. officials have worried that pushing Pakistan too hard to crack down on terrorists could drive Islamabad more firmly into Beijing’s embrace. But China’s lukewarm response to Pakistan’s recent overtures demonstrates that there are limits to what Islamabad can expect from its “all-weather friend” — a term often used by Pakistani officials when referring to China. While China has an interest in maintaining strong security ties with Pakistan, the notion that Chinese ties could serve as a replacement for U.S. ties has been overstated by Pakistani officials. The U.S. has provided considerably higher amounts of economic and military aid to Pakistan over the past decade and also serves as a link to the rest of the Western nations, which otherwise would likely be inclined to sanction Pakistan for its nuclear and terrorism activities.
U.S. policymakers must recognise these limits to the benefits that Pakistan will receive from China. China is increasingly concerned about Islamist extremism and terrorism in Pakistan, and there may be room for Washington to seek Beijing’s cooperation in encouraging a more stable and prosperous Pakistan. The U.S. should make clear to China that adopting a more holistic approach to terrorism issues in Pakistan would help mitigate threats to both Washington and Beijing, since Islamabad’s support for some terrorist groups strengthens the ideological base, logistical capabilities, and financial support for all Islamist terrorist groups.
Long-standing security ties Pakistan and China have long-standing strategic ties, dating back five decades. China maintains a robust defence relationship with Pakistan and views a strong partnership with Pakistan as a useful way to contain Indian power in the region and divert Indian military force and strategic attention away from China. The China-Pakistan partnership serves both Chinese and Pakistani interests by presenting India with a potential two-front theater in the event of war with either country. Chinese officials also view a certain degree of India-Pakistan tension as advancing their own strategic interests, as such friction bogs India down in South Asia and interferes with New Delhi’s ability to assert its global ambitions and compete with China at the international level.
I expect China and US will both continue to court Pakistan in their own best interest because of Pakistan’s geostrategic importance. Having said that, it’s clear that Pak-China relations are growing while Pak-US relations are on the decline. Symptomatic of this shift is the fact that China has now replaced US as Pakistan’s biggest trading partner, while US has slipped to third place. If this trend continues, Pakistan’s regional ties will be far stronger than its ties to the West over the next few decades. The recent currency swap agreement between China and Pakistan is a part of this future shape of things to come.
U.S. should react strongly to Pakistan’s involvement in embassy attack
(The views expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not represent those of Reuters)
Credible U.S. press reports on Friday revealed that cell phones found on the attackers in the September 13 attack on the U.S. embassy in Kabul were linked to Pakistani intelligence officials.
The U.S. has long known that Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), works closely with the Haqqani insurgent network, which has been responsible for some of the fiercest attacks against U.S. and coalition soldiers in Afghanistan.
But if media reports on the cell phone links are accurate, this would be the first time the U.S. has a “smoking gun” on Pakistani involvement in a direct attack on U.S. civilian interests.
If Pakistani leaders maintain their defiance in light of the new information on the cell phone links of the attackers to Pakistani intelligence, the U.S. should begin to take punitive steps toward Islamabad that could presage a breakdown in U.S.-Pakistan diplomatic relations.
Attempts to salvage relationship prove fleeting
U.S.-Pakistan relations have been severely strained since the May 2 raid that killed Osama bin Laden. The Obama administration had advocated for maintaining diplomatic relations and aid programs to Pakistan amidst growing doubts on Capitol Hill about the merits of continuing the engagement. Members of Congress suspected that parts of the Pakistani security establishment had helped protect bin Laden and had grown increasingly frustrated with Pakistan’s resistance to cutting links to Afghan insurgents attacking U.S. and coalition forces. The administration’s argument for engagement seemed to be justified, however, when Pakistan recently signalled that it would welcome back some of the U.S. military trainers that had been kicked out of the country shortly after the bin Laden raid.
Pakistanis are training and sending Taliban into Afghanistan and the coalition cant enter Pakistan’s tribal areas in hot pursuit to take out the terror camps. There will always be an unlimited supply of disposable mujahiddin for the Pakistanis to use as proxy against the coalition, especially the Pashtuns on Pakistan’s side of the tribal areas who are the foot soldiers and cheap cannon fodder to fight and die against the coalition forces.
In this sense it is futile for the US just to be fighting in Afghanistan. As long as Pakistan is the source of all terrorists pouring into Afghanistan, US will just be doing a policing job in Afghanistan and not actually confronting the source of the problem.
The source of the problem lies in the Pakistan and the Pakistani military that takes US money and uses that very money to train the Taliban and kill US and British troops. There will be no victory in Afghanistan and no safety for US and Europe from terrorist attacks as long as Pakistan sponsors terror to the world.
Rabbani assassination and Pakistani defiance crush prospects for Afghan peace
(The views expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not represent those of Reuters)
The assassination of former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was in charge of the High Peace Council pursuing reconciliation talks with the Taliban, is a clarifying moment for Afghans who had hoped Rabbani’s efforts would bring peace to the war-ravaged country.
The assassination is a body blow to the political reconciliation process and will reinforce resistance among the country’s ethnic minority leaders to the very idea of seeking political accommodation with the Taliban.
Rabbani’s assassination on Tuesday is eerily similar to that of Northern Alliance commander Ahmed Shah Massoud 10 years ago in both how it was conducted and the impact it will have on political dynamics within Afghanistan. It is likely to strengthen ethnic divisions in the country and embolden hardline Taliban elements that are unwilling to compromise politically and retain close links to al-Qaeda.
And just as Massoud’s assassins had tricked him into thinking he was being interviewed by journalists, Rabbani’s killers had fooled him into thinking he was meeting with a Taliban intermediary interested in talking peace.
The killing of Rabbani follows a string of assassinations of key political figures, mainly in the southern province of Kandahar, where the Taliban made their debut in 1994. During the month of July, several important Afghan leaders lost their lives: Ahmad Wali Karzai, head of the Provincial Council of Kandahar Province; Mawlawi Hekmatullah Hekmat, head of the Religious Council of Kandahar; Jan Mohammed Khan, senior advisor to President Hamid Karzai; and Ghulam Haider Hamidi, the mayor of Kandahar City.
This latest assassination demonstrates the stakes involved in stabilising Afghanistan. The U.S. must be realistic about the threat that Taliban extremists and their al-Qaeda allies pose to U.S. interests in the region.
If NATO forces knew so much about the truck bomb, then why they did not arrest the truck and the bomber when it was travelling in Afghanistan? I do not understand why NATO fails to arrest these attackers once they are in Afghanistan?
News Flash: Pakistan is NOT a U.S. ally
(The views expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not represent those of Reuters)
U.S. media commentators acted with surprise about reports that Pakistani officials may have given the Chinese access to the downed helicopter left behind in Pakistan following the May 2 bin Laden raid.
What is more surprising is that some media outlets still refer to Pakistan as a U.S. “ally” in the fight against terrorism. Pakistan is neither an ally nor an enemy to the U.S.
Rather, Pakistan has entirely different security objectives from the U.S. in Afghanistan and in fighting terrorists more broadly. The sooner U.S. policymakers come to grips with this reality, the better chance we stand of achieving U.S. objectives in the region.
There was always a great deal of concern that the Pakistanis would allow the Chinese access to the downed helicopter. China has been Pakistan’s “all-weather” friend for the last 50 years, and Islamabad would likely relish an opportunity to help the Chinese by providing them information on sensitive U.S. military technology.
China, after all, was willing to break international rules for Pakistan by providing it ballistic missile technology and nuclear know-how during the 1980s – 1990s. More recently, China has agreed to provide Pakistan with two new civilian nuclear reactors, despite that such transfers would violate the rules of the Nuclear Supplier’s Group, an organisation China joined in 2004.
The Pakistanis had even hinted to the U.S. shortly after the bin Laden raid that that they would consider showing the Chinese the downed helicopter. So, if Pakistani officials did indeed give the Chinese access to the aircraft, it should hardly come as a surprise to anyone.
In wake of Mumbai attacks, Pakistan could help save dialogue with India
(The views expressed in this column are the authors’ own and do not represent those of Reuters)
India’s financial capital, Mumbai, experienced yet another terrorist attack that initial estimates say killed at least 20.
Terrorists detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in three separate locations of the city almost simultaneously. The first two blasts occurred at around 6:55 p.m., one in a jewelry market and one in a business district in southern Mumbai. The third blast occurred around 7:05 p.m. in a crowded neighbourhood in central Mumbai.
This is the most significant terrorist attack in India since the three-day Mumbai shooting attacks in November 2008 that killed nearly 170. There was an attack on a German bakery in Pune, India, in February 2010 that killed nine. But since then, India had gone almost 18 months without experiencing a major terrorist attack.
It is too early to determine who is responsible for the attacks, but Indian authorities are pointing to the possibility of the Indian Mujahideen (IM), a homegrown outfit with links to the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT).
The strength of the links of these bombings to the LeT will determine how India responds. If investigators determine that LeT members played a crucial role in the planning and implementation of the attacks, the Indian leadership will be compelled to again break off recently resumed talks with Islamabad.
If, on the other hand, investigations show that the IM carried out these bombings largely on its own, there will be less pressure on Indian leaders to immediately withdraw from the Indo–Pakistani dialogue.
