Expert Zone
Straight from the Specialists
How stable is South Asia 14 years after Pokhran II?
(The views expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not represent those of Reuters)
On May 11, 1998, India carried out a nuclear test and became a de facto nuclear weapon power. A few weeks later, Pakistan followed suit and demonstrated its own nuclear weapon capability. The covert nuclear weapon status of the South Asian region had become unambiguous. India had crossed the nuclear Rubicon after it had first signalled its technological ability to do so in May 1974 — with what was described as a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE).
Today, it is moot if the South Asian region has become more or less secure and stable as far as its strategic profile is concerned. The fact that Pakistan tested its Hatf III ballistic missile on the eve of the 14th anniversary of India’s Pokhran II nuclear tests is a poignant reminder of the dynamic and opaque nature of the regional WMD environment.
It may be recalled that on April 19, India tested its 5,000 km Agni V missile, thereby enhancing its deterrent capability — and the commitment to a NFU (No First Use) doctrine. The latter is predicated on absorbing a nuclear attack — should the exigency arise due to deterrence failure — but the Indian response would be ‘massive’ and overwhelming.
However, the regional framework is not limited to the India-Pakistan dyad and includes China — which is part of the extended southern Asian grid. Sino-Pak WMD cooperation is abiding and has both muddied and rendered more complex the challenge for India. The response matrix for India is to address two visible tracks — the Sino-Indian dyad and the Indo-Pak one — against the context of a subterranean Sino-Pak axis and define sufficiency in the most appropriate and affordable manner.
India’s status quo character is accepted by its principal interlocutor — China — and there does not appear to be any heightened anxiety about each other’s WMD capability, or that either side would resort to WMD brinkmanship to redress contentious issues such as the long standing territorial and border dispute. India has not sought equivalence with China in the WMD domain and is currently defining its own perch of sufficiency and mutuality.
But the same cannot be said about how the Pakistani WMD arsenal is perceived and Rawalpindi’s own comprehension of its strategic capabilities. Pakistan’s deep and congenital insecurity apropos India goes back to October 1947 and the loss of East Pakistan in the 1971 war for Bangladesh is embedded in the Pakistani military psyche. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who became the PM after the war, provided the political support for the Pakistani ‘bomb’ and A.Q. Khan was one of his protégés who provided the purloined technical support.
Osama bin Laden’s ideology thriving a year after his death
(The views expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not represent those of Reuters)
One year after the elimination of al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden by U.S. special forces in the daring Abbottabad operation of May 2, 2011, it is evident that while the terror group has been considerably weakened, it has been consolidating over the last few months and the ideology that bin Laden espoused is thriving in the Af-Pak region.
The appointment of Farman Ali Shinwari, a resident of the Khyber tribal region, as the new chief of the al Qaeda in Pakistan on the eve of the first death anniversary of bin Laden is indicative of this consolidation.
Furthermore, the fact that Shinwari is deemed to be among the more computer savvy of his compatriots would suggest that the al Qaeda is likely to enhance its outreach through the use of computers and cyberspace.
It may be recalled that bin Laden was also deemed to be a computer-proficient leader and he used all available new technologies to increase his constituency and radicalise their thinking about Islam, its practice and the need to take recourse to violence through the terror mode.
Many of the intense exhortations by bin Laden to the extended al Qaeda fraternity were done through videos and CDs and it does appear that this outreach may receive greater impetus under the post-Laden leadership of the al Qaeda as it consolidates its brand institutionally.
More than the parent organisation, the affiliates who subscribe to the ideology of the al Qaeda have become more virulent and determined in their respective regional areas and from Af-Pak to Somalia, there are pockets where the al Qaeda and its adherents appear to be gaining in local power and influence with the existing state machinery either unable or unwilling to quarantine them and their ideologies.
Dear Mr Bhaskar
Please do not ruin your wonderful articles with mischievous rumors of any sort. I’m talking about the part on “farewell intercourse”. Had you shown only a little more diligence and patience in conducting your online research you would have discovered that it was a plain hoax and nowhere close to reality. Here, have this link:
http://www.christianpost.com/news/egypt- farewell-intercourse-law-a-hoax-by-mubar ak-supporters-74025/
Who spread it and what was their intention is something I’m not in a position to find out and so i’d practice restraint in this regard. And I would also advice you not to be rumor-monger!
Islam already has such a tarnished image that if people try to spread rumors about such insane “legislations”, people tend to give no second thoughts to them and start babbling them right away.
I agree that a lot needs to be done by the muslim societies all around the world to deal with the myriad problems that mire the everyday lives of millions of people living out there, the role of the non-muslim societies, in trying to give them a positive environment of trust and support, can not be undermined.
Talking about the regions where militancy is wide-spread and is only increasing with every passing day, the international society needs to understand that making efforts to bring about economic developments and removing despotic and dictatorial governments is the only way to bring the entire masses of the muslim population to a “peaceful mainstream”.
Just as the non-muslim world thinks of the muslim world as a threat to their existence, the insecure muslim world thinks of the rest of the world as a threat to their existence and this cold war is not going to end if the leaders from both the sides are not going the extra-mile of sorting out their own internal differences and making the best of efforts to build mutual trust and confidence followed with creating trade links.
The U.S. must move cautiously on Taliban reconciliation
(The views expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not represent those of Reuters)
The Obama Administration is seeking to negotiate with the Taliban as it continues a drawdown of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Following recent setbacks for the U.S. mission in Afghanistan — including nationwide protests sparked by the accidental burning of Korans and a U.S. staff sergeant’s shooting rampage that killed 17 Afghan civilians — the Taliban suspended negotiations with the U.S. Some observers had touted the Taliban’s earlier willingness to open a political office in Qatar as a major breakthrough for a political process.
However, the Taliban has not renounced terrorism or its support for al-Qaeda. Moreover, the Taliban leadership is seeking to exclude the Karzai government from the talks, which indicates that it is likely merely interested in having comrades released from prison, and is seeking to make a backdoor deal with the U.S. that allows them to regain power.
The building blocks for peace and stability in Afghanistan are not yet in place. The military gains made against the Taliban over the past 18 months are still fragile. While it may make sense for the Administration to keep doors open for negotiations with the Taliban, it would be unwise for the U.S. to make major concessions before the Taliban has renounced international terrorism and demonstrated willingness to compromise politically.
The U.S. misread the intentions of Taliban leaders and underestimated the strength of their bonds with al-Qaeda when it sought to engage them before 9/11. Similarly, U.S. over-anxiousness to negotiate with the Taliban now could jeopardize U.S. counterterrorism objectives and lead to greater instability throughout the region. There are alternative strategies to negotiating with the Taliban, which involve continuing support for anti-Taliban elements in Afghanistan, including through financial, diplomatic, and military support even after 2014. The U.S. should focus its attention on developing these strategies as it draws down combat forces over the next two years, rather than invest significant resources into negotiations with the Taliban, which remain a long shot.
ADMINISTRATION OPENS DOOR TO TALIBAN TALKS
Over a year ago, on February 18, 2011, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton offered the Taliban a clear-cut choice:
The hunt for Hafiz Saeed
(The views expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not represent those of Reuters)
The $10 million bounty placed on Hafiz Saeed by the Americans may have been barely noticed in most capital cities but it definitely had an impact in New Delhi and caused a furore in Islamabad. India and Pakistan are the two countries most concerned with Saeed’s health and activities, although for different reasons.
There is no debate among those who fight insurgencies that targeting their leadership pays disproportionate dividends. With such organisations having no democratic culture, it is the personality of the leader or an individual that guides the organisation’s approach. Eliminating such leaders can create a fair degree of disorientation till the new leadership asserts itself. During this process, there is also the possibility of power struggles, break-ups and feuds leading to fragmentation and polarization within the organisation.
Sustained targeting of the leadership deters the emergence of new leaders, with contenders acutely aware of the possible costs. It also has an immediate impact on the leaders’ movement and media interaction, thereby restricting their influence. Of course, media interactions can be organised in secret locations but they cannot be too safe en masse.
Saeed, suspected of masterminding the 2008 Mumbai attack, did taunt the U.S. in a press conference and challenged the Americans to attack him, knowing that the crowded streets of Karachi provide a shield against a drone attack. But he remains vulnerable to those who could be tempted by the $10 million bounty. Notwithstanding the allegiance to the perverted radical philosophy that the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) or its ilk promote, money is an important motivator for many in the cadres.
India’s response, though very positive, does bring into sharp focus a gaping shortfall in the capabilities of the Indian intelligence agencies. The activities of the LeT and the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (Saeed had raised the former while the latter is but a front organisation for the LeT) are focussed primarily against India. Their prime objective concerns Jammu and Kashmir. It’s only very recently that the LeT has developed the wherewithal to be a threat to western powers, especially their interests in Afghanistan.
With pinpoint targeting and the elimination of leaders being accepted as force multipliers in the war against terror, there has been reason all along for India to develop such capabilities and display it to effect, for it to serve as a deterrent.
Pakistan cannot apprehend and hand over Hafiz Saeed to either India or United States for these reasons:
1. Saeed was a key figure in the former years of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), an organization created in 1990 by Pakistan’s spy agency ISI.
The military establishment in Pakistan, after losing three wars with India, realized that it was not possible to win a conventional war, decided to engage in asymmetrical warfare, employing terrorism as an instrument of state. Saeed, who lost 17 family members during 1947 Partition, was the perfect person to lead the LeT.
2. Saeed is a paid employee of the Pakistan government.
Saeed continues to run Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), a political arm of LeT, as its ‘amir’ (or head). This explains the attempt by the Pakistan government to portray Saeed as a rehabilitated extremist by extolling his role in the de-radicalization program reportedly performed on a ‘pro bono’ basis.
3. Saeed is a hero in Pakistan.
As mastermind of the attack on the Indian parliament in 2001 and Mumbai massacres in 2008, Saeed is an acclaimed soldier of Islam to the masses in Pakistan for his role in the death of over 170 Hindus who are considered to be ‘kafirs’ (non-believers); there are many in Pakistan who believe killing a Hindu is a moral duty. It is not politically possible for the Pakistan government to detain Saeed – the Pakistani masses are willing to protect him – just as they sheltered and protected bin Laden for over 10 years.
4. Saeed is privy to vital information on operatives of LeT in Pakistan and abroad as former head of LeT; he is too vital to the ISI.
If apprehended, Saeed can provide a plethora of information such as LeT and al-Qaeda links among Pakistani expatriates in United States and Europe – information that can prevent future terrorist attacks, such as the one attempted by Faisal Shahzad in Times Square in May 2010.
However, Saeed, like bin Laden, is venerated in Pakistan – nobody can touch him.
There was a $25 million bounty on bin Laden’s head; there were no takers while bin Laden was in Pakistan. Saeed is supremely confident that there are no takers for the $10 million dollars bounty on his head.
U.S.-Pakistan reset: Still need to deal with terrorist sanctuaries
(The views expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not represent those of Reuters)
A Pakistan parliamentary committee has released its recommendations for “resetting” the parameters of U.S.-Pakistan relations. U.S.-Pakistan ties have been severely strained since the November 26, 2011, NATO attack that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers along the border with Afghanistan.
Since then, there have been no high-level U.S. visits to Pakistan, and NATO supply routes running through Pakistani territory have been shut down. The Pakistani parliament’s efforts to reframe the relationship could be helpful in restoring ties, as long as the U.S. brings its own terms to the table.
Starting point for U.S.-Pakistan negotiations The recommendations from the parliamentary commission include calling for the U.S. to end drone strikes on Pakistani territory; to apologise for the November 26, 2011, NATO strike; to start paying fees for the transit of NATO shipments for the war in Afghanistan; to refrain from “hot pursuit” operations by U.S. forces from Afghanistan into Pakistani territory; and to increase transparency of the activities of foreign security contractors. The parliament will now debate the commission’s recommendations and eventually vote on a resolution on U.S.-Pakistan ties, possibly within the next week.
The most contentious demand from the U.S. perspective is the call to end drone strikes. The drone missile campaign in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has proven to be one of Washington’s most effective tools in fighting global terrorism. An increase in the tempo of drone strikes in this region from mid-2009 to 2011 led to the crippling of al Qaeda. The U.S. media have reported that documents found at Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad showed bin Laden was worried about the devastating impact of the drone campaign on his organisation.
The three-month cooling-off period between the U.S. and Pakistan has had some benefits for both sides. It has provided space for de-escalation of the negative rhetoric surrounding relations in both the Pakistani and U.S. media. The lack of high-level U.S. visits to Pakistan, in particular, has meant that U.S. visitors did not become lightning rods for the Pakistani media to generate anti-American stories. U.S. civilian aid also has continued to flow to Pakistan during this period, demonstrating U.S. commitment to Pakistani economic development even in the face of deteriorating security relations. There seems to be growing recognition within Pakistan that U.S. aid is helpful to the country and not merely a way for the U.S. to buy influence.
Moreover, a parliamentary debate on ties could strengthen Pakistan’s democratic institutions, although the military will continue to have the final say on most security-related issues. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar has said the parliamentary debate would allow the Pakistani people to “take ownership” of the relationship, which could go a long way toward reducing anti-American sentiment in the country.
Gains seen for Taliban as post-ISAF era looms in Afghanistan
(The views expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not represent those of Reuters)
A fear embedded deep in the Pakistani security establishment’s psyche has always been that of a successful conventional military thrust by India from across its eastern borders. This is aggravated by their assessment that Pakistan lacks the geographical depth to absorb the onslaught; its logistics dumps being especially vulnerable on account of the inability to place them at an adequate depth. The answer, often articulated, is of a pliant regime in its western neighbour Afghanistan providing the strategic geographical depth that Pakistan needs.
With a state of flux anticipated in Afghanistan as a fallout of the International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF) impending withdrawal, an important imperative for Pakistan is to ensure Kabul is controlled by a regime amenable and dependent on Islamabad.
However, the chances of orchestrating such a situation remain improbable when viewed in the context of possible scenarios that could be encountered in Afghanistan.
In the first scenario, should the current dispensation in Afghanistan survive the onslaught of the Taliban, the possibility of the regime being a Pakistani surrogate is debatable.
Given the backdrop of their sharp differences and Pakistan continually backing the Afghan Taliban in its attacks on the Kabul regime, even if an understanding is reached, it is unlikely to be durable enough to sustain the illusion of strategic depth. The fact of India enjoying a far more reliable status in Kabul negates the concept further. In fact, a sound Indo-Afghan relationship only initiates another complementary threat perception in Pakistan, that of being sandwiched between two inimical states sharing a proximate relationship.
Even in a situation where the Taliban is able to subjugate Kabul with Pakistani help, the Taliban is unlikely to be as malleable as it was when it ruled Kabul before the U.S. forces evicted them. Notwithstanding the support they have received from the Pakistani Army and ISI, they would want to have greater autonomy. It’s better organised today, and with threat levels reducing on ISAF’s withdrawal, will not be as dependent on Pakistan, as it is now.
It’s been a decade since Operation Enduring Freedom and the fall of the Taliban. But the question is the so called “Freedom”, come at a cost that the afghan populace did not sign on for. Over the last three or four years, winning hearts and minds has been the soul operational goal of the ISAF. So now the question is have they been successful? With declaration of strategic withdrawal of the ISAF, the eyes of the world are back on this troubled country. The ousted Taliban from a fully fledged national army had been reduced to a guerrilla force, but they have made sure that there terror has remained intact and with the help of the Haqqani network and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i Islami created an insurgency situation that the worlds so called strongest army has had a difficult time handling. Circa 2012 will mark the start of the struggle for control of the country, namely “Taliban Emirate vs. United Front”. At this point of time the boons and banes of any foreign power pondering on citing with sides will adversely affect the countries future. There a majorly two outcomes that I can foresee , the first being that the Opium trade has enough profits for the Taliban to exploit and conquer and ultimately mend its ties with a fellow Terrorist state, Pakistan. The second outcome is the so called International brotherhood pouring in enough international aid to make sure the Northern Frontier and the current democratic Islamic Republic of Afghanistan government remain in power and the country enters in new bilateral ties with not only India but also other democratic states and with the signing of the INDO – AGHAN strategic partnership agreement between the countries, maybe the later scenario is gaining some momentum.
(The views expressed in this comment are my own and do not represent those of Reuters or the Author)
The limits of the Pakistan-China alliance
(The views expressed in this column are the authors’ own and do not represent those of Reuters)
By Lisa Curtis and Derek Scissors
In the wake of the U.S. raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound last May and deteriorating relations between Islamabad and Washington, Pakistani leaders have sought to play up their country’s relations with China, touting Beijing as an alternative partner to Washington. However, China’s concerns about the future stability and development of Pakistan will limit the extent to which China will bail Pakistan out of its current economic difficulties, and the degree to which China will seek to drive a wedge between Islamabad and Washington.
Chinese security interests in Pakistan are driven primarily by China’s desire to contain India. Beijing has built up Pakistan’s conventional military as well as nuclear and missile capabilities over the years to help keep India off balance and focused on threats emanating from Pakistan. China’s concrete economic and political interests in Pakistan itself are not that extensive. China’s economic commitment to Pakistan, for instance, is not especially impressive in size and has shown clear limits. China has shown little interest in propping up Pakistan’s economy and has not provided substantial economic aid, even during times of need.
In the past, U.S. officials have worried that pushing Pakistan too hard to crack down on terrorists could drive Islamabad more firmly into Beijing’s embrace. But China’s lukewarm response to Pakistan’s recent overtures demonstrates that there are limits to what Islamabad can expect from its “all-weather friend” — a term often used by Pakistani officials when referring to China. While China has an interest in maintaining strong security ties with Pakistan, the notion that Chinese ties could serve as a replacement for U.S. ties has been overstated by Pakistani officials. The U.S. has provided considerably higher amounts of economic and military aid to Pakistan over the past decade and also serves as a link to the rest of the Western nations, which otherwise would likely be inclined to sanction Pakistan for its nuclear and terrorism activities.
U.S. policymakers must recognise these limits to the benefits that Pakistan will receive from China. China is increasingly concerned about Islamist extremism and terrorism in Pakistan, and there may be room for Washington to seek Beijing’s cooperation in encouraging a more stable and prosperous Pakistan. The U.S. should make clear to China that adopting a more holistic approach to terrorism issues in Pakistan would help mitigate threats to both Washington and Beijing, since Islamabad’s support for some terrorist groups strengthens the ideological base, logistical capabilities, and financial support for all Islamist terrorist groups.
Long-standing security ties Pakistan and China have long-standing strategic ties, dating back five decades. China maintains a robust defence relationship with Pakistan and views a strong partnership with Pakistan as a useful way to contain Indian power in the region and divert Indian military force and strategic attention away from China. The China-Pakistan partnership serves both Chinese and Pakistani interests by presenting India with a potential two-front theater in the event of war with either country. Chinese officials also view a certain degree of India-Pakistan tension as advancing their own strategic interests, as such friction bogs India down in South Asia and interferes with New Delhi’s ability to assert its global ambitions and compete with China at the international level.
I expect China and US will both continue to court Pakistan in their own best interest because of Pakistan’s geostrategic importance. Having said that, it’s clear that Pak-China relations are growing while Pak-US relations are on the decline. Symptomatic of this shift is the fact that China has now replaced US as Pakistan’s biggest trading partner, while US has slipped to third place. If this trend continues, Pakistan’s regional ties will be far stronger than its ties to the West over the next few decades. The recent currency swap agreement between China and Pakistan is a part of this future shape of things to come.
U.S. should react strongly to Pakistan’s involvement in embassy attack
(The views expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not represent those of Reuters)
Credible U.S. press reports on Friday revealed that cell phones found on the attackers in the September 13 attack on the U.S. embassy in Kabul were linked to Pakistani intelligence officials.
The U.S. has long known that Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), works closely with the Haqqani insurgent network, which has been responsible for some of the fiercest attacks against U.S. and coalition soldiers in Afghanistan.
But if media reports on the cell phone links are accurate, this would be the first time the U.S. has a “smoking gun” on Pakistani involvement in a direct attack on U.S. civilian interests.
If Pakistani leaders maintain their defiance in light of the new information on the cell phone links of the attackers to Pakistani intelligence, the U.S. should begin to take punitive steps toward Islamabad that could presage a breakdown in U.S.-Pakistan diplomatic relations.
Attempts to salvage relationship prove fleeting
U.S.-Pakistan relations have been severely strained since the May 2 raid that killed Osama bin Laden. The Obama administration had advocated for maintaining diplomatic relations and aid programs to Pakistan amidst growing doubts on Capitol Hill about the merits of continuing the engagement. Members of Congress suspected that parts of the Pakistani security establishment had helped protect bin Laden and had grown increasingly frustrated with Pakistan’s resistance to cutting links to Afghan insurgents attacking U.S. and coalition forces. The administration’s argument for engagement seemed to be justified, however, when Pakistan recently signalled that it would welcome back some of the U.S. military trainers that had been kicked out of the country shortly after the bin Laden raid.
Pakistanis are training and sending Taliban into Afghanistan and the coalition cant enter Pakistan’s tribal areas in hot pursuit to take out the terror camps. There will always be an unlimited supply of disposable mujahiddin for the Pakistanis to use as proxy against the coalition, especially the Pashtuns on Pakistan’s side of the tribal areas who are the foot soldiers and cheap cannon fodder to fight and die against the coalition forces.
In this sense it is futile for the US just to be fighting in Afghanistan. As long as Pakistan is the source of all terrorists pouring into Afghanistan, US will just be doing a policing job in Afghanistan and not actually confronting the source of the problem.
The source of the problem lies in the Pakistan and the Pakistani military that takes US money and uses that very money to train the Taliban and kill US and British troops. There will be no victory in Afghanistan and no safety for US and Europe from terrorist attacks as long as Pakistan sponsors terror to the world.
Rabbani assassination and Pakistani defiance crush prospects for Afghan peace
(The views expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not represent those of Reuters)
The assassination of former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was in charge of the High Peace Council pursuing reconciliation talks with the Taliban, is a clarifying moment for Afghans who had hoped Rabbani’s efforts would bring peace to the war-ravaged country.
The assassination is a body blow to the political reconciliation process and will reinforce resistance among the country’s ethnic minority leaders to the very idea of seeking political accommodation with the Taliban.
Rabbani’s assassination on Tuesday is eerily similar to that of Northern Alliance commander Ahmed Shah Massoud 10 years ago in both how it was conducted and the impact it will have on political dynamics within Afghanistan. It is likely to strengthen ethnic divisions in the country and embolden hardline Taliban elements that are unwilling to compromise politically and retain close links to al-Qaeda.
And just as Massoud’s assassins had tricked him into thinking he was being interviewed by journalists, Rabbani’s killers had fooled him into thinking he was meeting with a Taliban intermediary interested in talking peace.
The killing of Rabbani follows a string of assassinations of key political figures, mainly in the southern province of Kandahar, where the Taliban made their debut in 1994. During the month of July, several important Afghan leaders lost their lives: Ahmad Wali Karzai, head of the Provincial Council of Kandahar Province; Mawlawi Hekmatullah Hekmat, head of the Religious Council of Kandahar; Jan Mohammed Khan, senior advisor to President Hamid Karzai; and Ghulam Haider Hamidi, the mayor of Kandahar City.
This latest assassination demonstrates the stakes involved in stabilising Afghanistan. The U.S. must be realistic about the threat that Taliban extremists and their al-Qaeda allies pose to U.S. interests in the region.
If NATO forces knew so much about the truck bomb, then why they did not arrest the truck and the bomber when it was travelling in Afghanistan? I do not understand why NATO fails to arrest these attackers once they are in Afghanistan?
News Flash: Pakistan is NOT a U.S. ally
(The views expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not represent those of Reuters)
U.S. media commentators acted with surprise about reports that Pakistani officials may have given the Chinese access to the downed helicopter left behind in Pakistan following the May 2 bin Laden raid.
What is more surprising is that some media outlets still refer to Pakistan as a U.S. “ally” in the fight against terrorism. Pakistan is neither an ally nor an enemy to the U.S.
Rather, Pakistan has entirely different security objectives from the U.S. in Afghanistan and in fighting terrorists more broadly. The sooner U.S. policymakers come to grips with this reality, the better chance we stand of achieving U.S. objectives in the region.
There was always a great deal of concern that the Pakistanis would allow the Chinese access to the downed helicopter. China has been Pakistan’s “all-weather” friend for the last 50 years, and Islamabad would likely relish an opportunity to help the Chinese by providing them information on sensitive U.S. military technology.
China, after all, was willing to break international rules for Pakistan by providing it ballistic missile technology and nuclear know-how during the 1980s – 1990s. More recently, China has agreed to provide Pakistan with two new civilian nuclear reactors, despite that such transfers would violate the rules of the Nuclear Supplier’s Group, an organisation China joined in 2004.
The Pakistanis had even hinted to the U.S. shortly after the bin Laden raid that that they would consider showing the Chinese the downed helicopter. So, if Pakistani officials did indeed give the Chinese access to the aircraft, it should hardly come as a surprise to anyone.
