Expert Zone
Straight from the Specialists
The U.S. must move cautiously on Taliban reconciliation
(The views expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not represent those of Reuters)
The Obama Administration is seeking to negotiate with the Taliban as it continues a drawdown of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Following recent setbacks for the U.S. mission in Afghanistan — including nationwide protests sparked by the accidental burning of Korans and a U.S. staff sergeant’s shooting rampage that killed 17 Afghan civilians — the Taliban suspended negotiations with the U.S. Some observers had touted the Taliban’s earlier willingness to open a political office in Qatar as a major breakthrough for a political process.
However, the Taliban has not renounced terrorism or its support for al-Qaeda. Moreover, the Taliban leadership is seeking to exclude the Karzai government from the talks, which indicates that it is likely merely interested in having comrades released from prison, and is seeking to make a backdoor deal with the U.S. that allows them to regain power.
The building blocks for peace and stability in Afghanistan are not yet in place. The military gains made against the Taliban over the past 18 months are still fragile. While it may make sense for the Administration to keep doors open for negotiations with the Taliban, it would be unwise for the U.S. to make major concessions before the Taliban has renounced international terrorism and demonstrated willingness to compromise politically.
The U.S. misread the intentions of Taliban leaders and underestimated the strength of their bonds with al-Qaeda when it sought to engage them before 9/11. Similarly, U.S. over-anxiousness to negotiate with the Taliban now could jeopardize U.S. counterterrorism objectives and lead to greater instability throughout the region. There are alternative strategies to negotiating with the Taliban, which involve continuing support for anti-Taliban elements in Afghanistan, including through financial, diplomatic, and military support even after 2014. The U.S. should focus its attention on developing these strategies as it draws down combat forces over the next two years, rather than invest significant resources into negotiations with the Taliban, which remain a long shot.
ADMINISTRATION OPENS DOOR TO TALIBAN TALKS
Over a year ago, on February 18, 2011, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton offered the Taliban a clear-cut choice:
Afghanistan: Negotiating while withdrawing is poor strategy
(The views expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not represent those of Reuters)
In the wake of a U.S. Army staff sergeant’s murdering 16 Afghan civilians (mostly women and children), U.S. officials are contemplating the pace and scope of the U.S. troop drawdown from the country. At the same time, they are seeking a negotiated settlement with the Taliban leadership. U.S. and NATO Commander in Afghanistan General John Allen said yesterday that he did not foresee an accelerated drawdown of U.S. troops because of the shooting incident, but it is almost inevitable that this terrible tragedy will lead Americans to question the viability of the U.S. mission there.
The first goal of the U.S. Administration should be to demonstrate that it values Afghan lives and will pursue swift justice against the perpetrator of the heinous murders. This will help calm the situation and reassure Afghans the incident is an extreme aberration that will not reoccur.
The U.S. must not base its Afghan strategy around this one terrible incident. As tempting as it may be to view the current troubles in Afghanistan as an excuse to cut and run, U.S. leaders must recognise that such a decision would be irresponsible and lead to greater dangers for the U.S. and the Afghans. Instead, the U.S. and Afghan authorities must double down on their efforts to improve the partnership and show unity of purpose.
It is no secret that there are differences between the U.S. political and military leadership over the pace and scope of withdrawals. It is likely that President Obama’s political advisers will use the recent shooting rampage and the Koran burnings to bolster their calls for speeding up the drawdown of U.S. troops. But U.S. military commanders on the ground reportedly would like to keep most of the 68,000 troops that will be in place as of September 2012 until military gains are consolidated. Racing for the exits before the mission is accomplished will only create more chaos in the country that will redound to the insurgents’ benefit.
While U.S. policymakers are reeling from events in Afghanistan over the last month, the Taliban probably cannot believe their stroke of luck. Making concessions to the Taliban at this juncture would only embolden them and give average Afghans the impression that the Taliban’s return to power is all but inevitable. There are alternatives to negotiating with the Taliban that the U.S. can pursue, which would better ensure that Afghanistan does not return to serving as an international terrorist safe haven.
At this stage of the conflict, the Administration’s time and energy would be better spent on supporting anti-Taliban elements and concluding a Strategic Partnership Agreement with the Karzai administration that ensures the U.S. will be able to maintain a robust military presence post-2014 to conduct training and counterterrorism missions. This is a far more promising strategy than engaging in long-shot negotiations with the Taliban, which will likely succeed only in giving increased political legitimacy to them and their extremist ideology.
Gains seen for Taliban as post-ISAF era looms in Afghanistan
(The views expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not represent those of Reuters)
A fear embedded deep in the Pakistani security establishment’s psyche has always been that of a successful conventional military thrust by India from across its eastern borders. This is aggravated by their assessment that Pakistan lacks the geographical depth to absorb the onslaught; its logistics dumps being especially vulnerable on account of the inability to place them at an adequate depth. The answer, often articulated, is of a pliant regime in its western neighbour Afghanistan providing the strategic geographical depth that Pakistan needs.
With a state of flux anticipated in Afghanistan as a fallout of the International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF) impending withdrawal, an important imperative for Pakistan is to ensure Kabul is controlled by a regime amenable and dependent on Islamabad.
However, the chances of orchestrating such a situation remain improbable when viewed in the context of possible scenarios that could be encountered in Afghanistan.
In the first scenario, should the current dispensation in Afghanistan survive the onslaught of the Taliban, the possibility of the regime being a Pakistani surrogate is debatable.
Given the backdrop of their sharp differences and Pakistan continually backing the Afghan Taliban in its attacks on the Kabul regime, even if an understanding is reached, it is unlikely to be durable enough to sustain the illusion of strategic depth. The fact of India enjoying a far more reliable status in Kabul negates the concept further. In fact, a sound Indo-Afghan relationship only initiates another complementary threat perception in Pakistan, that of being sandwiched between two inimical states sharing a proximate relationship.
Even in a situation where the Taliban is able to subjugate Kabul with Pakistani help, the Taliban is unlikely to be as malleable as it was when it ruled Kabul before the U.S. forces evicted them. Notwithstanding the support they have received from the Pakistani Army and ISI, they would want to have greater autonomy. It’s better organised today, and with threat levels reducing on ISAF’s withdrawal, will not be as dependent on Pakistan, as it is now.
It’s been a decade since Operation Enduring Freedom and the fall of the Taliban. But the question is the so called “Freedom”, come at a cost that the afghan populace did not sign on for. Over the last three or four years, winning hearts and minds has been the soul operational goal of the ISAF. So now the question is have they been successful? With declaration of strategic withdrawal of the ISAF, the eyes of the world are back on this troubled country. The ousted Taliban from a fully fledged national army had been reduced to a guerrilla force, but they have made sure that there terror has remained intact and with the help of the Haqqani network and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i Islami created an insurgency situation that the worlds so called strongest army has had a difficult time handling. Circa 2012 will mark the start of the struggle for control of the country, namely “Taliban Emirate vs. United Front”. At this point of time the boons and banes of any foreign power pondering on citing with sides will adversely affect the countries future. There a majorly two outcomes that I can foresee , the first being that the Opium trade has enough profits for the Taliban to exploit and conquer and ultimately mend its ties with a fellow Terrorist state, Pakistan. The second outcome is the so called International brotherhood pouring in enough international aid to make sure the Northern Frontier and the current democratic Islamic Republic of Afghanistan government remain in power and the country enters in new bilateral ties with not only India but also other democratic states and with the signing of the INDO – AGHAN strategic partnership agreement between the countries, maybe the later scenario is gaining some momentum.
(The views expressed in this comment are my own and do not represent those of Reuters or the Author)
Rabbani assassination and Pakistani defiance crush prospects for Afghan peace
(The views expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not represent those of Reuters)
The assassination of former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was in charge of the High Peace Council pursuing reconciliation talks with the Taliban, is a clarifying moment for Afghans who had hoped Rabbani’s efforts would bring peace to the war-ravaged country.
The assassination is a body blow to the political reconciliation process and will reinforce resistance among the country’s ethnic minority leaders to the very idea of seeking political accommodation with the Taliban.
Rabbani’s assassination on Tuesday is eerily similar to that of Northern Alliance commander Ahmed Shah Massoud 10 years ago in both how it was conducted and the impact it will have on political dynamics within Afghanistan. It is likely to strengthen ethnic divisions in the country and embolden hardline Taliban elements that are unwilling to compromise politically and retain close links to al-Qaeda.
And just as Massoud’s assassins had tricked him into thinking he was being interviewed by journalists, Rabbani’s killers had fooled him into thinking he was meeting with a Taliban intermediary interested in talking peace.
The killing of Rabbani follows a string of assassinations of key political figures, mainly in the southern province of Kandahar, where the Taliban made their debut in 1994. During the month of July, several important Afghan leaders lost their lives: Ahmad Wali Karzai, head of the Provincial Council of Kandahar Province; Mawlawi Hekmatullah Hekmat, head of the Religious Council of Kandahar; Jan Mohammed Khan, senior advisor to President Hamid Karzai; and Ghulam Haider Hamidi, the mayor of Kandahar City.
This latest assassination demonstrates the stakes involved in stabilising Afghanistan. The U.S. must be realistic about the threat that Taliban extremists and their al-Qaeda allies pose to U.S. interests in the region.
If NATO forces knew so much about the truck bomb, then why they did not arrest the truck and the bomber when it was travelling in Afghanistan? I do not understand why NATO fails to arrest these attackers once they are in Afghanistan?
Obama’s hasty Afghanistan withdrawal risks squandering gains
(The views expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not represent those of Reuters)
U.S. military commanders on the ground in Afghanistan had reportedly requested a slower pace of withdrawal to afford them the opportunity to consolidate recent gains against Taliban insurgents. President Obama has denied his military commanders flexibility to determine the pace and scope of withdrawal based on conditions on the ground, and instead appears to have based his decision largely around the U.S. domestic political calendar.
The plan for rapidly withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan also risks upending the major achievement of eliminating Osama bin Laden across the border in Pakistan.
Bin Laden’s death and an aggressive drone campaign in Pakistan’s tribal border areas have put al Qaeda on its back foot. The administration deserves credit for accomplishing this crucial objective, but it is short-sighted to use bin Laden’s death as justification for hastening the U.S. troop drawdown in Afghanistan.
Announcing rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces will likely bolster the morale of the Taliban and encourage them to stick with the fight. Since al Qaeda has not yet dissolved as an organisation and its relationship with the Taliban remains strong, reducing military pressure on the Taliban in Afghanistan could benefit al Qaeda and provide it a lifeline at a critical juncture in the fight against terrorism.
The withdrawal plan will signal to both our Afghan allies and enemy forces that the U.S. is more committed to withdrawing its forces than the long-term goal of stabilising the country. The U.S. made a grave error in turning its back on Afghanistan after the Soviets departed in 1989. President Obama’s speech will stoke fears that the U.S. is getting ready to repeat a similar mistake.
Obama’s announcement on rapid troop withdrawals from Afghanistan will further discourage Pakistan from cracking down on the Taliban leadership that finds sanctuary on its soil. The speech will reinforce Islamabad’s calculation that the U.S. is losing resolve in the fight in Afghanistan and thus encourage Pakistani military leaders to continue to hedge on support to the Taliban to protect their own national security interests.
Toward the end of his speech tonight, Obama obviously felt the need to pathetically claim, “We stand not for empire” — which is clearly an admission that he feels a need to emphasize and, without the slightest proof, reinforce this ridiculous claim that the US is not acting as a global Empire.
As Shakespeare famously wrote of the human nature of the guilty “(S)he protesteth too much”.
So tonight, the ever smooth Obama, seems clearly to be protesting too much about an issue that a fast increasing number of Americans beyond Chomsky, Bacevich, Berman, Parenti, Kolko, Chalmers Johnson, Korten, Hedges, Harvey, Hardt, Wolin, Zinn, et al have known for years. That our former country is now the seminal part of a disguised global corporate/financial/militarist Empire, which hides behind the facade of its bought and paid for Two-Party “Vichy” sham of democratic government.
Which means that today even the faux-Emperor himself seems to know that he has no clothes on, and that the global Empire that he fronts for is today becoming very naked to very many people here and abroad.
So, tonight’s speech by faux-Emperor/president, Obama, was very good news for all of us who know that our former and now captive country “stands precisely for Empire” — although “we” certainly do not!
Alan MacDonald
Sanford, Maine
Liberty & democracy
over
violent
empire
New America People’s Party 2012
After bin Laden: Do not retreat from Afghanistan
(The views expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not represent those of Reuters)
The killing of Osama bin Laden should strengthen U.S. resolve to stabilise Afghanistan and ensure that it does not return to serving as a safe haven for terrorists intent on attacking the U.S. homeland.
While the death of bin Laden marks a turning point in the fight against global terrorism, al-Qaeda and its affiliate organisations will not dissolve immediately.
U.S. troop withdrawals from Afghanistan beyond that which may be justified by conditions on the ground would squander the gain of eliminating bin Laden, who appears to have played a major role in directing attacks against the U.S. up until his death two weeks ago.
Instead, the U.S. should build on bin Laden’s death to advance its Afghanistan strategy by seeking to convince the Taliban leadership to finally break ties to al-Qaeda and join a legitimate peace process in Afghanistan.
AL-QAEDA VS THE TALIBAN
The Taliban’s initial public reaction to the killing of bin Laden shows no sign of compromise. Indeed, the Taliban said bin Laden’s death would provide new impetus for its “jihad against the invaders.”
