There is a rather large body of evidence demonstrating that the Bush and Obama Administrations have favored large banks in an unseemly way. The same is true for the Congress and other big business insiders like Big Pharma, the Defense Industry and Health Insurance companies.
Witness these posts from the last month alone:
- The less optimistic view of Treasury’s handling of the crisis – Nov 2009
- Healthcare insurance industry insider: “We win” – Dec 2009
- Why is Barney Frank allowing lobbyists to gut financial reform? – Dec 2009
- Bank lobbying e-mail: Quid Pro Quo to kill mortgage modification bill – Dec 2009
- Obama and the Fat Cat bankers – Dec 2009
- U.S. forfeiting billions in future taxes to let Citi repay TARP – Dec 2009
- Gasparino: No woodshed for the fat cats, just a lovefest – Dec 2009
- The phony Senate health care reform bill – Dec 2009
- On releasing Citi from TARP and banking by accounting subterfuge – Dec 2009
- Blodget: Obama suffers because “taxpayer always finishes last” –Dec 2009
I could provide you with a far longer list of posts from the January to April period when the Citi and BofA bailouts were conducted and the alphabet soup of liquidity programs began which Bank of America and Citi were prepared to game.
I said in March it’s the writedowns, stupid. When accounting rules were formally changed to reflect the de-facto accounting policies favoring banks, I knew the big banks were on easy street and The Fake Recovery had begun. So, by April, I said Wells profit forecast is a clear bullish sign. Don’t even get me started on the stress tests. They were a sham from the start and were merely a means of recapitalizing the banks via inflated equity valuations. They were neither tests nor stressful, as Bill Black has demonstrated.
More recently, posts by Yves Smith and Bruce Krasting confirmed my long-held suspicions that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would be used as a nationalization of America’s mortgage problems via a back door bailout of banks.
The evidence, therefore, tends to demonstrate that we have witnessed an orchestrated campaign by the Bush and Obama Administrations to recapitalize too big to fail institutions by hook or by crook, bypassing Congressional approval if necessary. And when it comes to healthcare, both Congress and the White House have bent over backwards to keep the lobbyists onside. As I see it, our government has favored special interests in the past year of Obama’s tenure to our detriment. … Personally, I don’t buy the line that Obama is a liberal. I consider him more a corporatist (i.e someone who coddles big business).
Politics and policy from inside Washington
Interesting analysis from Deutsche Bank, especially the last part which I put in bold (via Econbrowser):
Based in part on CBO estimates, we expect the combined positive effects on the level of real GDP of the tax cuts, transfers, and spending increases in the ARRA package to peak around the middle of next year and then to begin to diminish. Translating these level effects into impacts on the annual rate of growth of GDP yields a boost of 1 to 2 percentage points to GDP growth through mid-2010. That growth effect then drops to zero and eventually turns negative during the second half of the year, subtracting about a percentage point from growth during 2011. This is a key reason why we see growth receding somewhat in 2011 relative to 2010. We have not assumed that a major portion of the Bush tax cuts will be allowed to expire at the end of 2010, but that does pose a downside risk to the forecast.
Me: And here is all that in chart form:
Paul Krugman makes his case for the New Normal:
1) Earlier recessions were preceded by sharp rises in interest rates, as the Fed tried to choke off inflation. This produced a housing slump, with a lot of pent-up demand; when the Fed decided that we had suffered enough, it relented, and both housing and the economy sprang back.
2) But later recessions took place in a low-inflation environment, in which booms died natural deaths from overextended credit and overbuilding. Getting the economy growing fast enough to bring unemployment down after these recessions was therefore much harder, since the usual channel of monetary policy — housing — lacked any pent-up demand.
3) So what about our current situation? It’s just like the two previous “postmodern” recessions, only more so, since the bubble before the slump was in housing itself. This suggests a long period of jobless growth; so does the international evidence on the aftermath of financial crises.
That said, there’s been a lot of optimism out there lately, reflected in the steepening yield curve. I’d like to think that’s right. But Ed McKelvey at Goldman (no link) has a new report titled “Recovery more Ho-Hum than Ho-ho-ho”, in which he acknowledges that growth will be good this quarter, but presents evidence that it’s all a temporary inventory bounce.
The great Andrew Biggs makes a great point about the Medicare advisory commission in the Senate healthcare bill, a cost-control measure that Peter Orszag calls one of the most potent in the bill:
The new board is empowered to impose cost reductions if Medicare cost growth exceeds the growth of Gross Domestic Product plus 1 percent. Congress must accept these reductions or come up with equivalent cuts of their own.
But here’s the problem: Medicare’s baseline level of growth is right around GDP plus 1 percent. In the past, the Medicare trustees made their “GDP plus 1” cost growth assumption explicit; currently, they use a more sophisticated model of healthcare cost growth that nevertheless mimics the effects of GDP plus 1. (See pages 178–180 of the 2009 Trustees Report.) CBO’s projected rate of “excess cost growth” is slightly higher than the trustees’, but this plays out mostly in the longer term, by which time we’re long since broke.
In other words, the Medicare advisory commission—despite all the controversy over “rationing care”—isn’t tasked with much more than limiting Medicare cost growth to a rate baseline which some experts have calculated will generate over $62 trillion in deficits over 75 years. Even if Medicare cost growth were held to GDP plus 1 percent, total costs through the 2030s would cut by only around 5 percent.
The WSJ nicely sums up 2008:
To prevent crumbling housing and credit markets from sinking the broad economy, the Bush and Obama administrations and the Federal Reserve spent, lent and invested more than $2 trillion on one initiative after another. If you owned a credit card or a money-market fund, had a savings account, bought a Dodge pickup or even a hunting rifle, or borrowed to buy a home or finance a small business, odds are good that the U.S. stood behind you or the firm that served you.
Washington pumped $245 billion into nearly 700 banks and insurance companies and guaranteed almost $350 billion of bank debt. It made short-term loans of more than $300 billion to blue-chip companies. It propped up life insurers and money-market funds.
It bailed out two of the three U.S. auto makers. It lent billions trying to jump-start commercial-real-estate, small-business and credit-card lending. In two February stimulus bills enacted a year apart, the government committed $955 billion to rouse the economy. Today the U.S. government, directly or indirectly, underwrites nine of every 10 new residential mortgages, nearly twice the percentage before the crisis. Just last week, the Treasury said it would cover an unlimited amount of losses at mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac through 2012.
But voters don’t seem to be buying the idea that the government saved the economy. This from pollster Rasmussen (note the last sentence):
The number who believe that the stimulus plan has hurt the economy rose from 28% in September, to 31% in October, and 34% in November before jumping to 38% this month. The week after the president signed the bill, 34% said it would help the economy, while 32% said it would hurt.
The Political Class has a much different view than the rest of the county. Ninety percent (90%) of the Political Class believes the stimulus plan helped the economy and not a single Political Class respondent says it has hurt. (See more on the Political Class). The underlying reason for skepticism about the stimulus plan is that 50% of voters believe increasing government spending is bad for the economy. Just 28% believe that increased government spending helps the economy.
Me: Americans rightly think the economy is in terrible shape. The argument that the economy would be worse if not for government is a hard one to make for Team Obama … especially since government played a critical role in creating the housing and financial crises. Making all this worse is a 2010 economy that may be a muddle at best — so-so growth, unemployment still above 9 percent, rising interest rates and moribund housing.
So the Treasury Department announces unlimited support for Fannie Mae Freddie Mac for the next thee years. I think Wall Street Pit raises a very provocative point on this might all relate to the 2010 election:
In an attempt to limit the damage the economy does to their majority in the 2010 elections, the administration is likely to go all in on mortgage modifications that require principal reduction. They can only take so much skin off of the banks in this effort and the last thing they want is to put the financial system back in another crunch. That leave Fannie and Freddie as the vehicles to bail out homeowners that so far have resisted efforts to “save” them. It makes perfect sense that the Treasury’s announcement of unlimited support would be followed by a big, new homeowner bailout program.
Business Insider also touches on this:
Revisions to the flagging Homeowner Affordable Housing Program (HAMP). Any changes will likely increase near term bailout costs to Fannie and Freddie if HAMP’s current reliance on interest reduction is replaced in part by principal reduction. The losses associated with a modification of a loan using an interest rate reduction are spread out over time while a modification using principal reduction results in taking a more immediate loss.
As does Calculated Risk:
There is a possibility that the Treasury is planning on introducing a principal reduction component to HAMP in January, and this could lead to significantly larger losses for Fannie and Freddie (just speculation on my part). There has been no announcement yet, and even if this is proposed it might only apply to Fannie and Freddie related loans, and not private MBS (the number of Fannie/Freddie loans compared to private MBS varies significantly by servicer).