Should Congress raise the debt ceiling? And for what price?
Conservatives have many flavors of views on this, as can be seen at an online symposium over at National Review Online. Here are two of the more interesting takes:
1) Pass it quickly, with conditions. This is the Doug Holtz-Eakin plan:
Conservatives should attach to the debt limit annual caps on total spending for the next ten years equal to those in the House-passed budget. There are other viable contenders ranging from alternative spending limits (such as those proposed by Senator Corker) to a balanced-budget amendment that limits taxes and spending (such as that of Senators Hatch, Cornyn, and Toomey). But the House has already agreed to the levels in the budget. If it passes those caps quickly, the onus will be on the Senate to pass a debt-limit increase and on the president to sign it. If either balks, the battle shifts from raising the debt limit to whether there should be spending restraint.
2) First, make sure default is not an option. From Phil Kerpen:
To win the debt-ceiling showdown, the Republican House leadership must first do what all 47 Senate Republicans did when they voted for the Toomey-Vitter amendment … also known as the Full Faith and Credit Act and championed in the House by Tom McClintock (R., Calif.) and Scott Garrett (R., N.J.), would take away from the administration the discretion to default on Treasury bonds. It would require bondholders and Social Security recipients to be paid first in the event the debt ceiling is reached. There is more than enough revenue on a cash-flow basis to take any default risk off the table.
Passing this legislation in the House — even though the Democrats already have stopped it in the Senate — would help educate the public that default is not at stake. … By passing the Toomey-Vitter bill, the House can gain real leverage to demand that the administration make deep cuts in spending and fundamental reforms like the Medicaid block grants at the heart of the Ryan budget — or face the daunting prospect not of default, but of operating the government on a cash-flow basis.