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	<title>Comments on: Esperanto vs the middlemen: James Saft</title>
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		<title>By: richwell</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/james-saft/2012/03/22/esperanto-vs-the-middlemen-james-saft/comment-page-1/#comment-1089</link>
		<dc:creator>richwell</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 23 Mar 2012 07:57:49 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>As the important goal is thorough financial oversight, regulators need to be able to evaluate counterparty risk, and the product and participant codes mentioned could be very effective. This however involves a lot of proprietary information, so the only way for this to work is confidentiality of certain details - only for use of regulators. Otherwise, market players would be disincentivized to cooperate. 

If good oversight could eventually come out of Office of Financial Research database, that might well increase confidence, liquidity and functionality of bonds such as collateralized mortgage obligations, and end users could go back to worrying about conventional risk.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As the important goal is thorough financial oversight, regulators need to be able to evaluate counterparty risk, and the product and participant codes mentioned could be very effective. This however involves a lot of proprietary information, so the only way for this to work is confidentiality of certain details &#8211; only for use of regulators. Otherwise, market players would be disincentivized to cooperate. </p>
<p>If good oversight could eventually come out of Office of Financial Research database, that might well increase confidence, liquidity and functionality of bonds such as collateralized mortgage obligations, and end users could go back to worrying about conventional risk.</p>
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