Opinion

James Saft

Britain eats (leverages) its young

Nov 22, 2011 16:31 EST

James Saft is a Reuters columnist. The opinions expressed are his own.

Four years, several failed banks and at least one global recession later, Britain has finally discovered what its young people need: 19-1 leverage.

Britain has announced a new housing initiative, the centerpiece of which is a plan to entice first-time buyers into buying newly-built properties with as little as 5 percent down.

Under the plan both builders and the government would contribute funds to partially indemnify lenders against what I am betting are the inevitable losses. Borrowers, who are almost by definition younger and less well off, will still bear all losses, but will be rewarded with the chance to take out the kind of loan which has proven time and again to be a bad idea.

This is utterly wrongheaded — the best possible thing that can happen for first-time buyers, and arguably for most Britons, is for housing prices to fall to a level commensurate with earnings.

Why are houses in Britain so difficult to afford? Partly because of problems with supply, issues that the housing plan takes some steps, almost certainly insufficient ones, to address. And also because Britons, first out of necessity and then in the fever of greed, borrowed so much money in order to wedge themselves into what little housing was available that they drove prices up to unaffordable levels.

Again, as in Europe and the U.S., we have governments which, when confronted with problems that are fundamentally about debt, decide that piling yet more debt on top is the answer. Like the European Financial Stability Facility, which has proved utterly ineffective in supporting Italian debt, this plan too will fail, but not before many people will be tempted into taking on houses and debts they ought not to risk.

Prime Minister David Cameron himself pointed out that in some places in Britain a police officer married to a nurse would not be able to buy a first home. Exactly, and the solution to that issue is not allowing young civil servants to take on more debt but rather concentrating on policies which will bring prices back into balance with household cash flows.

As it stands, most lenders in Britain require a down payment of about 20 percent, a far higher amount than required in the boom years, but historically not a particularly high figure. That’s right and prudent. People who have only been able to scratch together 5 percent of the purchase price too often prove to be not in a position to carry through on the commitment.

BRITAIN’S DEBT MOUNTAIN

To be sure, first-time buyers purchasing new houses helps to create jobs but this is a stimulative policy that depends on putting people in harm’s way for a supposedly greater good. Some borrowers will naively assume that it must be safe to borrow so disproportionately to their means simply because it is being done as part of a government program. They, however, are not the prime beneficiaries here. Instead, it is the building industry, and to a certain extent existing home owners and the banks which hold their mortgages.

It is not, after all, as if you can construct an argument that Britain has too little debt. Despite the imposition of fiscal cutbacks, overall indebtedness continues to rise and is the highest among developed nations. According to data from consultants McKinsey obtained by the BBC, aggregate indebtedness — household, company, government and bank debts taken together — is now 492 percent of British GDP, slightly higher than a year ago.

So why then when faced with debt problems do so many governments seek to solve them by adding even more leverage? For one thing in a balance sheet recession — the type we are now experiencing — all sectors of the economy try to pay down debts at the same time, creating further downward pressure in growth and asset prices. Britain’s government is attempting to pay down its own sovereign debt right now, though they are perhaps finding that the economy is deteriorating at a rate that makes this impossible.

Ultimately this phenomenon calls into question the solvency of borrowers, be they individuals owning housing, banks owning mortgages or governments backstopping banks. It is tempting then to support the asset prices by adding a bit more leverage.

What’s really needed is either a sustained bout of salutary inflation — a polite default on the debt — or some kind of organized jubilee to rebase both asset prices and the debt which supports them.

While the Bank of England is mulling yet another round of quantitative easing, the current high rate of UK inflation should fall rapidly, and shows little sign of spreading to housing.

Britain, and especially its young nurses and police, would do well to keep their heads down, save their pennies and wait for housing to fall another 20 percent in real terms, as ultimately it must.

At the time of publication James Saft did not own any direct investments in securities mentioned in this article. He may be an owner indirectly as an investor in a fund. You can email him at jamessaft@jamessaft.com.

COMMENT

If we are about to have a bout of deflation would nurses be advised to save? Given that NS&I have shut up shop because they know they will inflate?

If there is a debt jubilee should they not buy a massive house?

Posted by pfi | Report as abusive

Housing raises US recession alert

Mar 24, 2011 12:35 EDT

James Saft is a Reuters columnist. The opinions expressed are his own.

If housing is the primary force behind the U.S. economic cycle, then the recession early warning bells just started ringing.

Sales of new single-family homes recorded a shocking fall in February, tumbling by 16.9 percent, to a seasonally adjusted 250,000 annual rate, hitting the lowest such figures since records began in 1963.

New home sales are down 28 percent compared to a year ago and the inventory of unsold new homes is now equal to 8.9 months of sales.

Even more amazingly, in a nation with more than 110 million households, there were just 19,000 single family home sales for the month on a raw unadjusted basis.

Put simply, far from being an engine of growth after several years of contraction, investment in housing looks to be a drag on the economy in 2011.

“We continue to believe that this dip in housing will translate into a double dip on the overall U.S. economy, further rolling forward any stimulus-exit plans set by the Fed, and setting the stage for an announcement of QE3 in July,” said said Douglas Borthwick of Faros Trading. “Jobs and housing remain the focus for the Fed, and both areas continue to face severe difficulties.”

The problems lie not just with new homes. The overall picture is of a housing market slouching its way into a double-dip slump.

Sales of existing homes also fell last month, by a less precipitous 9.6 percent, down 2.8 percent from a year ago.

Prices of existing homes, unsurprisingly, are falling as well, down 0.3 percent in January nationwide, according to the FHFA, the third straight monthly fall.

The number of properties in foreclosure hit a record 2.2 million in January, according to Lender Processing Services, while something on the order of one-in-five homeowners with a mortgage are in negative equity, with mortgage debt exceeding the value of the house. In Florida 20 percent of dwellings stand empty, a statistic implying not just a few quarters of slump in building but several years.

This matters to the economy in two important ways. Firstly, housing activity, from building to buying to outfitting, is one of the prime drivers of the economic cycle. Secondly, if a slump is deep and protracted the bad debts it will produce will once again threaten to capsize the banking system.

NINE OUT OF ELEVEN IS NOT BAD

At a paper delivered at the central banking conference in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in 2007 entitled “Housing IS the business cycle”, UCLA professor Edward Leamer argued that residential investment plays a key role in US recessions. He demonstrated that 8 out of 10 postwar recessions were foreshadowed by serious and sustained problems with housing, at least as of 2007.

Counting the most recent recession we can now call that 9 out of 11, with a good shot shortly at 10 out of 12.

“Of the components of GDP, residential investment offers by far the best early warning sign of an oncoming recession,” Leamer wrote.

“After a surge of building there has to be a time-out… before building can get back to normal, and before this channel through which monetary policy affects the real economy is operative again. The Fed can stimulate now, or later, but not both.”

Of course the Fed, as has been its way since the Greenspan era, has tried to eat the same cake repeatedly, but the recent run of data shows that the housing market is not responding.

Efforts at foreclosure mitigation have been a failure as well, with a small success rate and a high probability of re-default.

You could argue that efforts to prop up the housing market, from loan modification to tax incentives, have only served to lengthen the time that the fall of house prices takes, prolonging at the same time the “time-out” in construction and allied activity.

It will also be interesting to see just how well the banking system weathers a second fall in house prices. Much of their portfolios of loans and loan-derived securities are being carried on bank books at what may turn out to be optimistic levels.

If another wave of defaults comes, the truth of cash flows may well expose those marks for the fantasies they are. In this light the U.S. Treasury Department’s decision this week to allow many large banks to raise or recommence dividends may prove to be a mistake.

To be sure, U.S. manufacturing is doing well, and demand from emerging markets, particularly for natural resources and other commodities, will help to counteract the drag that housing will have on the economy.

Perhaps the scariest aspect is this: another housing bailout is probably politically impossible. This time the chips really will fall where they may.

(At the time of publication James Saft did not own any direct investments in securities mentioned in this article. He may be an owner indirectly as an investor in a fund.)

COMMENT

Mr Saft cautiously says “If housing is the primary force…”, housing is, in fact THE “prime drivers of the economic cycle”. As such, I have no illusions that we are not setting up conditions for a double dip. Not just in housing, but for a long chain of co-dependent economic sectors.
My confidence comes from a long and continuing series of policy mistakes propagated by our government’s policy choices. It does not have to be this way.
In our recent past when Reagan gave the S&L industry a blank check, the fallout was later dealt with by the Resolution Trust Corp. A “rip-the-band-aid-off” solution rarely mentioned today. Why? Well, it acknowledged financial indstry insolvency!
Today, the government is dictated to by the very industries that caused the crisis. That industry advocates hyper-inflation as a cover for their insolvency. You gotta admit that it is working out pretty good for them, in the short run.
However, even a super-accommodating Federal Reserve is pushing on a string. So much for monetary policy solutions.
Over in the Congress we have promises not to stimulate via fiscal policies. This is a “too big of a deficit already” mantra that locks in 1930’s style outcomes.
The upshot of this policy quagmire is that tax revenue has tanked, unemployment statistics are gerrymandered, interest rates are less than inflation, housing will continue it’s collapse and growth is going down the stagflation road again.
When we hire a Supreme Court willing to give corporations citizen status and leaders who only get re-elected by pandering to the powerful we get the kind of government we deserve.

Posted by MediocreFred | Report as abusive

Housing means QE is here to stay

Jan 6, 2011 12:45 EST

James Saft is a Reuters columnist. The opinions expressed are his own.

A very poor outlook for housing will hold the U.S. economy back in coming months, making it very unlikely that the Federal Reserve will be able to step back from their emergency room monetary measures.

A genuinely encouraging run of data and very strong asset markets has encouraged some to argue that the Fed’s policy will prove to have been too much for too long, but housing stands out as the one asset market that has failed to respond encouragingly to the adrenaline of quantitative easing.

The Fed acknowledged this in the minutes of their December monetary policy meeting, listing a litany of factors holding housing back and stating:

“The recovery remained subject to some downside risks, such as the possibility of a more extended period of weak activity and lower prices in the housing sector and potential financial and economic spillovers if the banking and sovereign debt problems in Europe were to worsen.”

While it is hard to see how the European difficulties will be resolved happily, it is virtually impossible to work out a road map for 2011 in which housing is anything other than a drag and a risk.

Put as simply as possible there is simply too much debt secured against U.S. residential real estate and the debt is being serviced by people with too little income to subsidize an asset worth less than the debt by choice.

S&P/Case-Shiller said at the end of December that its index of house prices fell for the third month running and is now in negative territory on a year’s view for the first time in nine months.

Those figures too predate a sizable rise in mortgage interest rates in the past several weeks. According to a survey by Bankrate.com, average rates for a 30-year fixed mortgage topped 5.0 percent at the end of 2010, up from about 4.25 in the spring and 4.40 percent as recently as November.

While the backup in mortgage rates is partly a function of economic optimism, it is also the fruit of a Fed policy designed to goose financial asset markets.

That’s made stocks more attractive and encouraged funds to flow out of bonds.

It is important to understand that housing was as weak as it was last year even with 40-year lows in mortgage rates because employment was weak, supply high, and a foreclosure pipeline that remains very strong.  These are all factors that have proved to be fairly unresponsive to policy, either monetary policy or programs to provide mortgage relief.

WILL DEFAULTS EASE?

Foreclosed properties are not just bad for housing because they represent supply, but because banks sell them quickly, often at prices well below recent comparable sales. That sets a precedent for the market, making sales at higher prices more difficult. It is also terribly depressing for homeowners carrying more debt on their houses than they are currently worth.

It is this group, many of whom are employed and able to make payments, who really represent a threat to prices in the coming year.

“Borrowers with good pay histories who aresubstantially underwater have shown that they, too, have a reasonable probability of transitioning to default,” mortgage analysts at Amherst Securities, led by Laurie Goodman, wrote in a recent report.

“Yet many bond investors, and a number of housing analysts, are focusing solely on non-performing loans; they ignore re-performing loans and seriously underwater borrowers. The market is underestimating the housing problem and potential losses to bondholders if further policy actions are not taken,” they said.

Amherst analyzed the non-conforming mortgage market, large or risky loans not made by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, and concluded that there is a large group of loans that now look good that may well turn sour.

One particular group is loans that had been non-performing but that have “cured,” returned to making payments. This accounts for about 15 percent of the non-conforming market, but the odds for these people are not good. After two years more than half will have re-defaulted, according to the study.

A potentially larger group is those who’ve always paid on time but who are servicing a mortgage that is bigger than their house is.

Looking at clean borrowers from a year ago whose mortgage was worth 120 percent of their house value, only about 77 percent remained current or paid the loan back in full.

Given declining home prices that argues for a continued gusher of foreclosures, foreclosures that will further weaken house prices and encourage yet more defaults.

Many of those defaults won’t be borne by the banking system, the risk having been transferred to the government, but they will suppress consumer sentiment and spending and probably mean that quantitative easing and very low rates will be with us for quite a while.

(At the time of publication James Saft did not own any direct investments in securities mentioned in this article. He may be an owner indirectly as an investor in a fund.)

COMMENT

I think the biggest economic mistake was the property market. The moment people considered their homes as merely assets and believed that property prices could only increase, then something came seriously amiss with the view of the housing market and the general economy.

Posted by TheCandyKing | Report as abusive
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