James Saft

James Saft is a Reuters columnist. The opinions expressed are his own.

HUNTSVILLE, Ala., Aug 30 – In an unintended irony for a continent with a great public transport infrastructure Europe’s debt rescue plans are turning into a train wreck. Consider that as Greek two-year interest rates stood at 45 percent on Monday, officials and interests in the euro zone descended into an unseemly mix of squabbling over assets, denying the undeniable and disagreeing about first principles. Even as weak as recent U.S. economic data has been, these fractures, which imply heightened risk of a bank-centered market crisis, are surely the main source of the recent extreme financial volatility.

Most interesting was the intervention by newly minted International Monetary Fund Managing Director Christine Lagarde on Saturday who warned “developments this summer have indicated we are in a dangerous new phase.”

Lagarde went on to say that Europe’s banks need “urgent recapitalization,” using public funds if necessary, and advised that one option would be to use the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF), or some other vehicle, to inject capital into banks directly.

Here we have the head of the IMF, a woman who was until recently the finance minister of France, more or less asserting that the bank stress tests are best disregarded and that people should have real doubts about the banks they do business with, invest in and lend to.

This is nothing that cannot be seen in market prices, of course, but it’s a bit as if U.S. Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner were to leave government service, set up as an equity analyst and come out with a “sell” rating on Bank of America.

Not helpful, even if perhaps true.

Lagarde said that Europe risks a liquidity crisis, though surely any crisis that comes as a result of people withdrawing credit from banks because they have not got enough capital has to be classed as a crisis of solvency.

Euro zone officials were quick to stamp on the idea, pointing out there were well known remedial steps being taken as a result of the stress tests, and that new banking regulations offered further protection. It is good that euro zone officials can agree that they’ve solved the bank capital problem, because very few others seem to agree.

On other issues, European officialdom is showing comical, if destructive, disagreement. Take Finland’s demand for collateral as part of its participation in the rescue of Greece. This demand immediately sparked a round of “me too” demands from other smaller euro zone players, states whose share of the package is about 10 percent. To an outsider, this looks suspiciously like a lack of faith in Greece and in their European partners. It has the feel not of a rescue of a sovereign state and euro zone partner, but of in-fighting among the creditors in a bankruptcy.

While Finland appears to have backed off from some of its demands, the situation hardly inspires confidence.

A LITTLE LOCAL DIFFICULTY

And of course even within countries there are deep political divisions over the right path. Germany is an excellent case in point; Chancellor Angela Merkel last week came out against Finland’s bilateral deal and euro zone common bonds, while maintaining that she would be able to push through approval by parliament of the expansion of the EFSF. Reports in German media indicate substantial opposition within Merkel’s somewhat shaky coalition, meaning she may be forced to seek votes from the opposition. Merkel has canceled a long-planned visit to Russia on Sept. 7, the day of the vote.

The ECB’s decision to buy Spanish and Italian debt on the open market, a thus far successful effort to cap interest rates for the two vulnerable states, has left it subject to strong criticism that it has overstepped its bounds and compromised its independence.

German President Christian Wulff last week inveighed against the ECB’s action and against the last-minute nature of recent policy-making.

“I regard the massive acquisition of the bonds of individual states via the European Central Bank as legally questionable,” he said, speaking at an economics conference in Lindau, Germany.

Wulff cited an article in the European Union’s fundamental treaty, which he said prohibits the ECB from buying bonds directly from governments.

“Decisions have to be made in parliament in a liberal democracy. That is where legitimacy lies,” he said. This is an interesting echo of the less well tempered criticism of Ben Bernanke by presidential hopeful Rick Perry, who said that further radical easing by the central bank would be “treacherous, almost treasonous.”

The truth, perhaps, is that Europe is a group in an impossible situation, just as the Fed is an institution in an untenable position. Groups of people in impossible situations tend only to act when forced, and only rarely are able to act in concert.

Expect an active and unsettling September.

At the time of publication James Saft did not own any direct investments in securities mentioned in this article. He may be an owner indirectly as an investor in a fund.

Looking to hedge against a spike in inflation? Equities may not be much help.

Neither, for that matter, will you do all that well over the longer haul with bonds, cash or even commodities, at least on the historical evidence. In short, when it comes to investing, inflation is a real drag.

It’s impossible to know if, much less when, the current very stimulative monetary policy in the developed world will spur inflation, but increasingly indicators are raising concerns. Emerging market economies show signs of overheating, while prices of food and many other commodities are surging.

The traditional view has been that equities are an effective hedge against inflation, in least over the long term, because companies will, all things being equal, eventually pass on inflation to their clients as higher prices.

That’s the theory, but the practice may prove to be much different, according to a study by IMF economists Alexander Attie and Shaun Roache, who examined the performance of a range of traditional asset classes in the aftermath of inflation shocks.

“Among traditional asset classes, inflation hedges are imperfect at best and unlikely to work at worst,” according to Attie and Roache.

First, the authors looked at returns in the 12 months after inflation shocks in the period after the 1973 end of the Bretton Woods system of fixed currencies. The results were not surprising; bonds got killed, equities did badly, as did cash, while commodities were an effective hedge. Real estate investment trusts (REITs) did about as badly as equities, somewhat undermining the argument for real estate during inflationary periods.

All well and good, but really only of use for the small number of daredevils who are willing to make big asset allocation shifts over a short period of time.

For most savers, not to mention pension funds and endowments, the more useful question is how do you hedge against inflation for the longer term?

The results for equities were not encouraging.

“Equity returns decline in the months following an inflation shock and do not experience a meaningful recovery thereafter, leaving them as the worst performing asset class in our sample,” according to the study.

“Our findings are consistent with evidence from a range of earlier studies and add further weight to the evidence against the theoretical arguments for equities as a real asset class providing inflation protection when inflation is rising.”

Over the 18 months after the shock, real returns were negative, though less negative than bonds, which get hammered by inflation. Equities improve a bit over the next couple of years, but even when looked at in the long run of more than five years an inflation shock makes for losses in real terms.

IN THE LONG RUN WE’RE ALL …
As for the other asset prices, inflation proves very difficult to hedge against even over the longer term. Take commodities, the star performer in the first 18 months after inflation bites; spot prices decline in the medium term and when you get above five years after the inflationary event you are looking at actual losses in spot prices. This might be because inflation hits demand, but also might be because high prices spur greater investment in efficiency, which over the long term also moderates demand.

While bonds get killed in the first couple of years after an inflation shock, after about three years returns improve, presumably partly because investors demand higher yields to make up for nasty recent experiences.

Cash returns do a bit better, but even cash, which can go where it likes in search of better returns as inflation increases, fails to serve as a perfect hedge over the longer term.

So, how to hedge against inflation? Inflation-protected bonds such as TIPS would work, but to be a hedge you have to buy and hold to maturity, as outside forces can easily distort returns through the life of a given bond.

Given that inflation is a portfolio killer, why then are equity markets booming? Well, in emerging markets where inflation is kicking in first they are not. In developed markets, investors seem to be placing a touching amount of faith in central bankers. After all, if the Federal Reserve and ECB don’t pull the plug on stimulus in time, inflation can easily get out of control.

Or perhaps equity markets are betting the central banks will fail to stoke growth and be forced to blow a larger asset market bubble as a consequence.

Or maybe everybody thinks they will be the genius who gets out in time.

(At the time of publication James Saft did not own any direct investments in securities mentioned in this article. He may be an owner indirectly as an investor in a fund. email: jamessaft@jamessaft.com)

Iceland’s remarkable return to growth shows once again that in this crisis the best policy is often the one that will make international partners most angry.

Having been reviled and chastised when it refused to make good the outsize debts of its banks, Iceland this week capped a striking turnaround when it announced that its economy expanded by 1.2 percent in real terms in the most recent quarter, its first such rise in two years.

This is in stark contrast to Ireland, whose pliability and inability as a member of the euro zone to act unilaterally leaves it with a still crashing economy which must service ever more debt by making ever deeper cuts to public spending.

Iceland, which sailed into the crisis in 2008 as essentially a small fishing fleet with a massive hedge fund attached, looked its predicament square in the eye and followed a set of policies seemingly designed to tick off both its friends and enemies, doing its small but mighty best to beggar its neighbors by letting its currency crash, imposing capital controls and, crucially,  refusing to make whole the global creditors of its three failed international banks.

While an International Monetary Fund and multilateral package was eventually agreed, and a deal with Britain and the Netherlands over debts from Icesave Bank are currently being hammered out, Iceland’s leaders, at least the current ones, seem convinced that making bank creditors share its pain was the right course.

“The difference is that in Iceland we allowed the banks to fail. These were private banks and we didn’t pump money into them in order to keep them going; the state should not shoulder the responsibility,” Iceland’s president, Olafur Grimsson, said last month, tweaking the nose of EU officials who are insisting that Ireland make good all senior creditor calls on its own distended banking system.

“Bondholders should not rely on the government stepping in and bailing them out,” Iceland Central Bank governor Mar Gudmundsson said last week. “They should do their due diligence.”

“I think the Irish are accepting that they were probably too fast in guaranteeing the whole liabilities of banks. Now this is turning out to be a big burden because the assets of these banks turned out to be much worse than they thought.”

Indeed. Though Iceland has a 6.3 percent budget deficit this year, it is on track to soon record a surplus, while Ireland’s deficit this year is 32 percent if the cost of bank bailouts is included. Similarly, Iceland’s unemployment rate has fallen by almost a quarter to 7.3 percent, as against more than 14 percent in Ireland.

LEARNING FROM MAHATHIR
It is all strangely reminiscent of Malaysian leader Mahathir Mohamad, who attracted international condemnation when in 1998 he rejected IMF measures, instead pegging the ringgit to the dollar and imposing widespread capital controls. Your correspondent was among those who stroked his chin and said that Malaysia would rue the day it cut itself off from international capital, but of course this proved to be far off the mark.

Malaysia recovered robustly, foreign capital eventually flowed and more to the point, the country and its Asian neighbors learned the importance of being able to self-insure against the vagaries of global capital flows, leaving them by and large better prepared for the most recent crisis than the rest of the world.

While Mahathir was a strongman acting against international and internal advice, Iceland’s mulishness has been a model of democracy. In a March referendum 93 percent of voters rejected a deal with Britain and the Netherlands to repay 3.9 billion euros of Icesave losses. Even more striking, and a contrast with a singular lack of prosecutions elsewhere, was the decision of Iceland’s parliament to refer to the legal system  criminal charges surrounding the crash against former Prime Minister Geir Haarde.

To be sure, Iceland may have succeeded in rejecting the international consensus precisely because it is so small — many argue that a default by Irish banks would cause another global banking crisis costing far more than 30 or 50 percent of Irish GDP.

Quite possibly it would, but that does not mean that the policy of pretending that banks are not insolvent and loans not underwater is wise. The tepid, halting and largely jobless recovery argues that it is not, that debts need to be properly purged before both borrowers and lenders can play their respective roles.

Regardless, the great victory of Icelandic stubbornness is not just in its recovery but in winning a fairer division of the burden than in Ireland, Greece, or for that matter, the U.S.

(At the time of publication James Saft did not own any direct investments in securities mentioned in this article. He may be an owner indirectly as an investor in a fund. email: jamessaft@jamessaft.com)