MacroScope

It was Bill Clinton who, after the 2000 U.S. election was thrown into turmoil by Florida’s hanging chads, said the American people had spoken but it was going to take a little time to work out what they had said.
No such dilemma in Greece. A plague on both your houses was the message for the traditional ruling parties PASOK and New Democracy, a result that makes a stable government look a remote possibility and puts a very real question mark over its bailout programme.

Today, the largest party New Democracy will try to form a coalition. Given what they’ve said, the left-wing Left Coalition which leapfrogged PASOK into second place cannot be part of a government committed to the bailout terms so it looks like the two traditionally dominant parties — two seats short of an overall majority between them — must seek support from elsewhere or face fresh elections which could well give an even more fractured result. One thing worth noting is that even the resurgent anti-bailout parties mostly say they want to stay in the euro zone so maybe there’s soom room for negotiation.

The euro has dived to a three-month low, Bund futures have posted yet another record high and European shares are down so we’re right back in fear mode.

Two big questions flow from all that:
1. Could this vote, and socialist Francois Hollande’s victory in France, shift the growth/austerity debate?
2. Does Greece, even its possible euro exit, still have the power to spread damaging contagion to the rest of the euro zone?

On the growth front, the answer is only up to a point because Berlin and the European Central Bank — and the markets — won’t wear anything that will dilute debt-cutting programmes much, whatever the more friendly rhetoric suggests.
Italian premier Mario Monti, a man desperate for growth, talked to Hollande, Germany’s Angela Merkel and Britain’s David Cameron among others after the elections last night, presumably to push that agenda and the argument is gaining force.

We will return on Monday knowing whether the Greeks have elected a pro-bailout government and probably to find socialist Francois Hollande – the man leading the growth strategy charge – as the new French president. 

An Hollande victory could cause some jitters given his rhetoric about the world of finance. But we’ve looked at this pretty forensically and there may not be much to scare the horses. Yes he is making growth a priority (but even the IMF is saying that’s a good idea) yet his only fiscal shift is to aim to balance the budget a year later than incumbent Nicolas Sarkozy would. Contrary to some reports, he is not intent on ripping up the EU’s fiscal pact and of course the bond market will only allow so much leeway.

The heavyweight Economist magazine may have labelled socialist Hollande “dangerous” but the reality is likely to be that he will rule from the centre and his demands for a dash for growth — and a change to the ECB’s mandate to aid it — will be tempered. Spain has shown everybody that too much fiscal loosening will be pounced upon by the bond market and while there is a lot of talk about a growth strategy for Europe, what we’ve heard so far amounts to tinkering.

A week where every facet of the euro zone debt saga will come from all angles.

The major events are the French presidential run-off and Greek general elections on Sunday, May 6.
 
In the former case, a likely socialist Francois Hollande victory could cause some market jitters given his rhetoric about the world of finance. But we’ve looked at this pretty forensically and actually there may not be much to scare the horses. Yes he is making growth a priority (but even the IMF is saying that’s a good idea) yet his only fiscal shift is to aim to balance the budget a year later than Sarkozy would. And, contrary to some reports, he is not intent on ripping up the EU’s new fiscal rules. And of course, the bond market will only allow so much leeway.

If the two main Greek parties – PASOK and New Democracy – fail to win enough votes to govern together, they may have to turn to a fringe anti-bailout party which would put a big question mark over Athens’ ability to stick with the austerity terms demanded by its international lenders.

Even if fears about a hard Greek default or even euro exit result, the threat of contagion looks far smaller. With creditors already having taken a massive haircut, most non-Greek banks completely out or at least having written down anything they hold, a 500 billion euros rescue fund shortly in place and the IMF raising an extra $430 billion of its own, the power Greece has to start a domino effect in the euro zone is very much diminished.

Brace yourself for a blizzard of numbers.

EU finance ministers gathered in Copenhagen are poised to decide precisely how much firepower their new rescue fund – to be launched mid-year – will have. A draft communiqué suggests that as of mid-2013, presuming no new bailouts have been required in the interim, the combined lending ceiling of the future ESM and existing EFSF bailout funds will be set at 700 billion euros (500 billion pledged to the ESM plus the roughly 200 billion already committed to Greek, Irish and Portuguese rescue programmes).

Up to mid-2013, if 700 billion proves to be insufficient — i.e. someone else needs bailing out — euro zone leaders will be able to bolster it with the 240 billion euros as yet unused in the EFSF, according to the draft, although German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble said last night that 800 billion should be the absolute limit.

Sorry, there’s more. Because the ESM will not have its full 500 billion euros capacity on day one – it will build up over time – the real available figure for the next year is more like 640 billion euros.
Confused? You should be.

Will the euro zone finally act decisively?

Investors are hoping for something big from European leaders at the EU summit on Oct. 23 and of the Group of 20 on Nov. 3. But they also know the 17 nations of the euro have a habit of offering delayed, half-hearted rescues that have cost them credibility.

So there's been a lot of "urging" and "warning" in Brussels lately -- politicians and central bankers have all been demanding Europe act as international alarm grows that its sovereign debt problems may drag the world into recession. "Further delays are only aggravating the situation," said European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet on Tuesday in his last appearance at the European Parliament, before he hands over the post to Mario Draghi on Nov. 1.

A day earlier, Germany's Deputy Finance Minister, Joerg Asmussen, at the parliament to promote his candidacy to join the ECB's board, made his call, saying "cooperation has to be increased," across the euro members, divided as to who should pay to rescue the heavily indebted nations of southern Europe. "I want to see a solution for debt sustainability for Greece," Asmussen said. So do so many others, especially Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou, who in Brussels on Thursday said it was a "crucial element to make the necessary decisions concerning Greece."

By George Soros
The opinions expressed are his own.

The euro crisis is a direct consequence of the crash of 2008. When Lehman Brothers failed, the entire financial system started to collapse and had to be put on artificial life support. This took the form of substituting the sovereign credit of governments for the bank and other credit that had collapsed. At a memorable meeting of European finance ministers in November 2008, they guaranteed that no other financial institutions that are important to the workings of the financial system would be allowed to fail, and their example was followed by the United States.

Angela Merkel then declared that the guarantee should be exercised by each European state individually, not by the European Union or the eurozone acting as a whole. This sowed the seeds of the euro crisis because it revealed and activated a hidden weakness in the construction of the euro: the lack of a common treasury. The crisis itself erupted more than a year later, in 2010.

There is some similarity between the euro crisis and the subprime crisis that caused the crash of 2008. In each case a supposedly riskless asset—collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), based largely on mortgages, in 2008, and European government bonds now—lost some or all of their value.