MacroScope

This week’s evaporation of confidence in the euro zone’s biggest government debt market — Italy’s 1.6 trillion euros of bonds and bills and the world’s third biggest — has opened a Pandora’s Box that may now force  investors to consider the possibility of a mega sovereign debt default or writedown and, or maybe as a result of,  a euro zone collapse.

Given the dynamics and politics of the euro zone, this is a chicken-or-egg situation where it’s not clear which would necessarily come first. Greece has already shown it’s possible for a “voluntary” creditor writedown of  the country’s debts to the tune of 50 percent without — immediately at least — a euro exit. On the other hand, leaving the euro and absorbing a maxi devaluation of a newly-minted domestic currency would instantly render most country’s euro-denominated debts unpayable in full.

But if a mega government default is now a realistic risk, the numbers on the “ifs” and “buts” are being crunched.

Mark Schofield and Jamie Searle, strategists at U.S. investment bank Citi,  on Thursday attempted to figure out “fair value” for Italian government borrowing rates in the light of the week’s dramatic events that saw 10-year yields on the bonds briefly top the “make-or-break level of 7% . Their conclusion was that Italian debt crunch was likely to get get a lot worse before it got better, absent a “significant and sizeable” political intervention.  By this, they are referring to the only scenario that they see would trigger a near-term turnaround — open-ended ECB buying on a scale far greater than currently being seen.  However, they reckoned they still seems unlikely, for now.

What’s left of the 440 bilion euro bailout fund is not big enough to rescue Italy — where more than 300 billion euros needs to be found next year alone to pay interest costs and replace maturing debt. And with the recently-agreed, leveraged-up version of that EFSF unlikely to be finalised until next monthat the earliest, the Italian market is left in limbo.

The reigning narrative of Europe’s financial turmoil is that profligate European states, agglomerated all too offensively by a swine-referenced acronym, are forcing the continent’s wealthy, prudent northern countries to come to their rescue. Not so, according to two policy experts who spoke this week at a conference on the euro zone crisis at the University of Austin’s Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs.

They argue that labor reforms in Germany prevented the wages of manufacturing workers from rising after monetary union had been completed, making the country more competitive at the expense of its southern peers. Joerg Bibow, a professor of economics at Skidmore College, gives his view of events:

Germany’s wage trends have been the most important cause of the euro zone crisis. Those wage trends created an asymmetric shock that destabilized Europe.

No, that is not a typo in the headline. Greece has long been the focal point of Europe’s crisis. It was the first country to reveal some cracks in a monetary union that lacks a fiscal authority to back it. Indeed, Greek politics were dominating the headlines on Friday, with news that the prime minister had survived a confidence vote in parliament restoring a momentary sense of calm to a still very dramatic situation.

However, Greece’s actual debt load is only large relative to its own small and struggling economy. In the larger context of the euro zone, the actual amount of debt being haggled over is rather puny. Matias Vernengo, a professor of economics at the University of Utah, explains:

When you look at the size of Greece’s debt, which is slightly more than $500 billion, that corresponds more or less to 3 percent of euro zone GDP. It’s a very small amount of debt. The peculiarity of the crisis is that it’s political. It has an economic basis, an imbalance that it’s unable to solve but which is technically simple to solve.

After a hopeful couple of weeks and the ”euphoria” caused by an agreement to tackle the euro zone debt crisis, financial markets got a reality check from Italy’s sale of 7.94 billion euros of government bonds. The debt met lower demand than at previous auctions, forcing the country to pay the highest premium since joining the single currency to sell 10-year debt.

The results suggest markets did not think the euro zone rescue deal — which includes an agreement on the write-down of Greek debt, recapitalisation of European banks and leveraging of the euro zone rescue fund – went far enough to restore investor appetite for Italian debt.

Italian yields rose as high as 6.03 percent near levels not seen since early August, when the European Central Bank first began purchasing Italian and Spanish bonds in the secondary market to bring funding costs down to more affordable levels. Brian Barry, analyst at Evolution Securities, says that move alone speaks volumes:

So much for Germany being insulated from the euro zone’s troubled periphery. German credit default swaps are already beginning to price in the country’s worst nightmare: that it will have to pay a hefty bill for a deepening euro zone debt crisis.

The cost of insuring 5-year German debt against default rose more than 50 percent over the past month to a record high of 118 basis points.  French CDS rose  around 11 percent over the same period to 189 basis points, according to Markit data. The rise indicates investors are beginning to associate greater risk to holding German debt, even as the triple-A rated bond continues to benefit from safe-haven flows. German Bund futures saw their biggest quarterly rise between July and September since the launch of the euro.

The problem is Germany, the largest sovereign contributor to bailout funds already agreed for Greece, Portugal and Ireland, is expected to pay a high price for any solution to the debt crisis or, given its banks’ high exposure to peripheral debt, for any failure to resolve it.

Greece is in the danger zone. Even as the country’s finance minister sought to reassure his euro zone counterparts at a meeting in Poland, Greek credit default swaps were pricing in a more than 90 percent chance of default, according to Reuters calculations of Markit data. Economists in a Reuters poll see a 65 percent chance of that happening, probably within a year.

Such fears recently sent jitters across financial markets, prompting some words of comfort from German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy that they are determined to keep Greece in the euro zone. But speculation is growing that Greece will default, and that it will be a messy ordeal. Here are some of the potential dangers if it occurs:

* Greece may be seen as setting a precedent for Portugal and Ireland, analysts said. Yields on peripheral euro zone debt could surge rapidly, making funding costs increasingly unsustainable as yields on Italian and Spanish 10-year bonds surge back towards 7 percent. The ECB could have to intervene more aggressively in the secondary bond market to the detriment of its balance sheet.

It’s been a rough week for the euro zone and Italy is feeling the pain.

Despite regular purchases of Italian bonds by the European Central Bank since August — a policy aimed at keeping funding costs affordable — yields on benchmark 10-year Italian government bonds rose as high as 5.6 percent this week. Before the ECB started intervening in the secondary market, yields surged above 6 percent. Beyond 7 percent, funding costs are perceived to be unsustainable.

This raises questions over the effectiveness of ECB policy – doubts heightened  by the shock news that the central bank’s chief economist Juergen Stark would leave the institution early because of disagreements over the bank’s bond-buying policy.

The news highlights the rift inside the central bank over the handling of the worsening debt crisis. It drew a dramatic close  to a week of uncertainty: a debt swap meant to help Greece avoid default hung in balance;  a row over collateral for Greek bailout loans remained unresolved; and national parliaments had yet to ratify increased powers for the euro zone’s rescue fund.

The debt crises in the euro zone and United States are claiming some innocent bystanders. Investors fleeing for the safety of the Swiss franc have ratcheted up pressure on Hungary, where thousands of households have watched with horror as the  franc surges to successive record highs against their own forint currency. In the boom years before 2008,  mortgages and car loans in Swiss francs seemed like a good idea --after all the forint was strong and Swiss interest rates, unlike those in Hungary, were low.  But the forint then was worth 155-160 per franc. Now it is at a record low 260 -- and falling -- making it increasingly painful to keep up repayments. Swiss franc debt exposure amounts to almost a fifth of Hungary's GDP. And that is before counting loans taken out by companies and municipalities.

Hungarian families could get some relief in coming months via a government plan that caps the exchange rate for mortgage repayments at 180 forints until the end of 2014.  But the difference will have to be paid -- with interest -- from 2015.  Meanwhile, the issue threatens to bring down Hungary's banks which must pick up the cost in the meantime and will almost certaintly see a rise in bad loans --  no wonder shares in Hungary's biggest bank OTP are down 25 percent this month.  "(The franc rise) suggests a massive jump on banks' refinancing requirements going forward, " says Citi analyst  Luis Costa.

These overburdened banks will end up cutting lending to businesses, meaning a further hit to Hungary's already anaemic economic growth. ING analysts earlier this month advised clients to steer clear of Hungarian shares, "given the burden from (forint/franc) depreciation not only on loan-takers but also the implications this has for the domestic growth story."

Europe’s debt problems had thus far been largely contained to the so-called periphery, places like Greece, Ireland and Portugal. But increasingly, doubts are rising about countries once seen as insulated — Spain, Italy, even Belgium and France.

Bond markets are not painting a pretty picture. Ten-year Italian and Spanish yields are now firmly trading above 6 percent — 7 percent is considered the point of no return, the level above which funding costs become unsustainable.

The yield gap between 10-year Belgian and German bonds hit a fresh euro life-time high earlier, as did France’s equivalent. Belgium’s 10-year yield spread traded above 200 basis points – lower than around 370 basis points currently on the Italian equivalent but up sharply from readings in the double-digits seen last year.

By Robert H. Frank
The opinions expressed are his own.

Reuters invited leading economists to reply to Lawrence Summers’ op-ed on his reaction to the debt ceiling deal. We will be publishing the responses here. Below is Franks’s reply. Here are responses from Laura Tyson, Benn Steil, Russ Roberts, Donald Boudreaux and James Pethokoukis as well.

I'm in general agreement with Larry Summers' piece. If it had been my column to write, I'd have been more emphatic about how much more important the unemployment problem is than the deficit problem. Deficits need to be reduced, yes, but not in the midst of a deep downturn. If we could put just half of the people who are either unemployed or underemployed back to work, for example, national income would be larger by more than ten times the interest we're paying on the 2011 deficit. The extra income tax revenue alone would be enough to cover the interest on last year's debt.

I'd also have hit harder on the claim by ostensible deficit hawks that extra spending right now would impoverish our grandchildren. Some of the most vivid and easily understood counterexamples involve infrastructure maintenance. According to the Nevada Department of Transportation, repairing a damaged 10-mile stretch of Interstate 80 would cost $6 million if we did the work today. But if we postpone repairs, weather and traffic will continue to damage the roadbed. If we wait just two years, the cost of bringing that same stretch of road up to par rises to $30 million. There are thousands of similar projects crying out to be done.