MacroScope

The words “European bailout” normally conjure up images of inefficient public sectors, bloated pensions, corrupt governments. But market analyst John Hussman, in a recent research note cited here by Barry Ritholtz, says the reality is a bit more complicated:

The attempt to rescue distressed European debt by imposing heavy austerity on European people is largely driven by the desire to rescue bank bondholders from losses. Had banks not taken on spectacular amounts of leverage (encouraged by a misguided regulatory environment that required zero capital to be held against sovereign debt), European budget imbalances would have bit far sooner, and would have provoked corrective action years ago.

In other words, even if state actors mishandled government finances, Wall Street was, at the very least, an all-too-willing enabler.

Prime U.S. money funds further reduced their holdings of euro zone bank paper in December, although the pace of movement slowed while investors continued to hedge against any bank failures, J.P. Morgan Securities said on Wednesday.  The slower movement out of euro zone bank paper was the result of money funds having already strongly reduced their holdings, J.P. Morgan said in a note to clients.

Euro zone bank paper continued to roll off in December from prime money fund portfolios but has seen some slowing as nearly 70 percent of these exposures have been eliminated from prime fund portfolios over the course of the past year. In spite of continued reductions in euro zone bank exposures, prime fund assets under management were basically flat for the second consecutive month reflecting some level of investor comfort in the level of risk in price fund portfolios as much of the cash that left euro zone bank paper has been reinvested in non-European banks and other high-quality products.

The prime money funds had small net outflows of $2.6 billion in December after net inflows of $4 billion in November, according to J.P. Morgan.

Wall Street firms are begging the U.S. Treasury to take their cash, at least judging by the latest auction of short-term Treasury bills. Treasury sold $30 billion of four-week bills at a “high rate” (pause for laugther) of 0.000% on Wednesday, a mix of strong demand for year-end portfolio shuffling but also a reflection of ongoing fears of a credit crunch emanating from Europe.

It was the fourth straight sale in as many weeks that brought a high rate of zero. The zero percent rate means buyers of the debt will receive no interest at all, sacrificing any return simply to hold cash in the safest of investments.

A rise in repo financing costs is “a sign the year-end demand for short, safe assets has begun,” said Roseanne Briggen, our New York-based colleage at IFR Markets, a unit of ThomsonReuters.

"Will no one rid me of this turbulent central banker?"  Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban may not have voiced this sentiment but since he took power last year he is likely to have thought it more than once.  Increasingly, the spat between Orban's government and central bank governor Andras Simor brings to memory the quarrel England's Henry II had with his Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Becket, over the rights and privileges of the Church almost 900 years ago. Simor stands accused of undermining economic growth by holding interest rates too high and resisting government demands for monetary stimulus.  The government's efforts to sideline Simor are viewed as infringing on the central bank's independence.

So far, attacks on Simor have ranged from alleging he has undisclosed overseas income to stripping him of his power to appoint some central bank board members. But  the government's latest plan could be the last straw -- proposed legislation that would effectively demote Simor or at least seriously dilute his influence. Simor says the government is trying to engineer a total takeover at the central bank.  "The new law brings the final elimination of the central bank's independence dangerously close," he said last week.  
 
The move is ill-timed however, coming exactly at a time when Hungary is trying to persuade the IMF and the European Union to give it billions of euros in aid. The lenders have expressed concern about the law and declined to proceed with the loan talks.  But the government says it will not bow to external pressure and plans to put the law to vote on Friday. That has sparked general indignation - Societe Generale analyst Benoit Anne calls the spat extremely damaging to investor confidence in Hungary. "I just hope the IMF will not let this go," he writes.

Central banks and governments often fail to see eye to eye. But in Hungary, the government's attacks on Simor, a respected figure in central banking and investment circles,  is hastening the downfall of the already fragile economy. For one, if IMF funds fail to come through, Hungary will need to find 4.7 billion euros next year just to repay maturing hard currency debt. That could be tough at a time when lots of borrowers -- developed and emerging -- will be competing for scarce funds.  Central European governments alone will be looking to raise 16 billion euros on bond markets, data from ING shows. So Orban will have to tone down his rhetoric if he is to avoid plunging his country into financial disaster.

Jason Lange contributed to this post.

Suddenly the shoe is on the other foot. The financial crisis of 2007-2008 had its roots in the U.S. banking system and then spread to Europe. Now, it’s Europe’s political debacle that threatens economic growth in the United States.

A recent raft of better U.S. economic data, including a steep drop in weekly jobless claims reported on Thursday, have pointed to a swifter recovery. But such signals seem a bit futile when there’s a risk of another major global financial meltdown lurking.

Yet just what is the likely impact of the euro zone’s morass on the United States? Economists at Goldman Sachs ran some figures through their models, and the results were not pretty: overall, Europe’s crisis is likely to shave a full percentage point off U.S. economic growth.  In a world where economists have come to expect the “new normal” for U.S. growth to be around 2.5 percent, that could mean the difference between a decent recovery and one that is highly fragile and vulnerable to shocks.

With Southern Europe getting so much of the blame for the continent’s financial crisis, it is refreshing to see someone highlight the other side of the coin. That’s just what Joshua Rosner, managing director of Graham Fisher & Co., did in testimony on Thursday. Asked to discuss the potential risk to U.S. taxpayers of the ongoing political battle over a frayed monetary union, Fisher began his remarks by debunking the reigning narratives being used to describe the crisis:

To fully assess the risks to the United States and our proper role in the euro zone  crisis it must first be clear what the crisis is and is not. It is not a bailout of the populations of the weaker European economies such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Spain, Hungary or Belgium. After all, the populations of those countries are being forced to give up portions of their sovereignty in the name of austerity toward a fiscal union.

Rather, I would contend, it is a bailout of banks in the core countries of Europe, of their stockholders and creditors who, failing to gain sufficient access capital markets, would need to be recapitalized by their host country governments. It is a transfer of losses from banks and corporations onto the backs of ordinary people without requiring any recognition of losses by those banks whose risk management and lending practices created the problem. It is as much a tale of over lending as it is of over borrowing and, just as nobody should feel undue sympathy for those who miscalculated the amount of debt they could service, nobody should feel for those who miscalculated their lending risks.

This time it was going to be different. A make-or-break, comprehensive, grand, “bazooka” solution would draw a line under the euro zone debt crisis.

But the plan agreed by all EU states except Britain to pursue stricter budget rules and a stronger fiscal union did little to soothe bond markets. Ten-year Italian yields rose as far as 6.8 percent, prompting the European Central Bank to intervene in the secondary market, and German Bunds rose more than 100 ticks on the day.

Among the short-falls, the capacity of the euro zone’s bailout fund was capped and it was not granted a banking license. For now, this puts more pressure on the European Central Bank to help contain the crisis by stepping up bond-purchases. The bank however has repeatedly resisted a bigger crisis-fighting role and last week dampened expectations that it could ramp up a program which has tried to keep borrowing costs affordable. The legal basis of a new accord to enforce debt and deficit rules also still needs to be worked out.

“Sometimes it’s good to do these things in person,” U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said after meeting with German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble to discuss what to do about Europe’s debt crisis.

But it’s not easy pulling off a 72-hour, five-city blitz of European officials to proffer advice and some discreet prodding. It involves crossing the Atlantic Ocean twice and darting between Frankfurt, Berlin, Paris, Marseille and Milan, holding eight face-to-face meetings and three media sessions, as well as speaking with heads of state, finance ministers and central bankers.

Of course you need your own plane. Not a problem for the U.S. Treasury chief, who regularly has a blue-and-white military 737 at his disposal.

Any lingering illusion that the European crisis could be contained to so-called peripheral countries with high debt levels was shattered on Wednesday. German government bonds, which had thus far been seen as a safe-haven, slumped sharply after investors shunned the country’s auction of new 10-year debt.

Germany drew significantly less bids than the amount on offer for its Bunds, with investors deterred by very low yields. There is a growing view the euro zone powerhouse will pay a high price whatever the outcome of the regional debt crisis. If the crisis spirals out of control, some fear that it could reach a magnitude that would hit Germany as well by sending it into a deep recession. On the other hand, any solution to the crisis is likely to involve a higher fiscal bill for Germany.

Marc Ostwald at Monument Securities in London describe the auction as “a complete and utter disaster.” He continued:

The latest round of reports on the U.S. economy, while hardly the ringing endorsement of a robust recovery, have been a bit better overall. Jobless claims, while still high, have fallen to a seven-month low of 388,000. Industrial output, meanwhile, posted its largest increase since July as factory and mining production expanded strongly.

But investors are far too obsessed with the mess taking place in Europe to pay the modest improvements any mind. Even if Europe’s financial morass were not an ongoing cloud over the U.S. outlook, the incremental gains in U.S. economic activity remain far too modest to warrant any sort of optimism about a substantial decline in unemployment. Moreover, analysts are worried that the current political propensity in Washington for spending cuts rather than renewed stimulus poses another threat to growth.

Thomas Lam at OSK-DMG sums up the sentiment nicely:

Incoming data over the past month or so have been generally more spunky. […] The continued tightening in financial markets and depressed sentiment indicators still imply downside risks to growth in subsequent quarters. But the key driver to the 2012 outlook, at least for the early part of next year, is fiscal policy considerations.