Opinion

Mark Leonard

Syria and the politicization of British foreign policy

Mark Leonard
Aug 30, 2013 19:39 UTC

Syria’s population — at the heart of so many proxy battles for influence — last night found itself drawn into a different kind of conflict — this time over the future of British politics. After the British Parliament’s vote against action in Syria, the former Liberal Democrat leader, Lord Ashdown, tweeted that Britain is a “hugely diminished country” this morning: “In 50 years trying to serve my country I have never felt so depressed/ashamed.” But is he right to see this vote as a retreat into isolationism? I think it is rather a step into a more modern diplomacy, one where politics do not end at the water’s edge.

Once the dust settled on the vote, David Cameron’s closest ally, Chancellor George Osborne, said there will be a lot of “soul-searching” about Britain’s role in the world. There is talk about the shadow of Iraq, pacifism and anti-Americanism as a result of an unholy alliance between conservative little-Englanders and pacifists of the left. But though these tendencies were both represented in the lobbies of the House of Commons, they still represent a minority of the political spectrum. It is worth remembering that the Labour leader Ed Miliband did not argue against military action in principle, and even made a point of saying he could support intervention without a U.N. Security Council resolution.

The main reason that the Syrian campaign was voted down yesterday is not that Britain wants to retreat from the world — but that the case David Cameron put forward was incoherent, and the political management of the government was faulty. As my colleagues at the European Council on Foreign Relations Anthony Dworkin, Daniel Levy and Julien Barnes-Dacey argued in a thoughtful paper last night, the rush to intervene punitively leaves many unanswered questions about the purpose and consequences of military action. In making the case for British action, Cameron tried to separate the case of chemical weapons from the wider situation: “this is not even about the Syria conflict” he said, “it’s about the use of chemical weapons.”

But the action he was proposing was explicitly not about securing and controlling the chemical weapons (an operation that would require no-fly zones, missile strikes and thousands of special operations forces) and the strikes were being planned before the evidence from the United Nations inspectors was even presented. If Britain and the U.S. were serious about moving towards a political solution on Syria, rather than pushing for precipitate military strikes, they would be working to expand the mandate of the U.N. inspectors to promote options for chemical-weapon oversight in Syria as well as the broader diplomatic effort. Given the positions that Russia, China and Iran have taken against chemical weapons they would find it much harder to oppose such measures.

With the unprecedented parliamentary rejection of a major foreign policy initiative, Britain has indeed crossed a watershed in foreign policy making, but the question is not about whether the UK engages with the world. It is about how its foreign policy is made. The former German foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, shocked the world when he declaimed to Rumsfeld in 2003: “”My generation learned you must make a case, and excuse me, I am not convinced….That is my problem, I cannot go to the public and say, ‘these are the reasons’, because I don’t believe in them.” But his political rather than diplomatic style which was so surprising in 2003 is on the way to becoming the new normal in 2013, as last night’s debate shows.

Do democracies have the guts for diplomacy on Syria?

Mark Leonard
Jun 3, 2013 20:58 UTC

People used to ask whether democracies had the makeup for war. But when it comes to Syria, it seems that it is diplomacy rather than warfare that is most difficult for Western onlookers to digest. As the carnage, dislocation and suffering grow, Western leaders seem more comfortable talking about limited military intervention than embracing the morally awkward choices they would need to make to achieve a political settlement. The problem is that the logic of diplomacy and the logic of democracy seem increasingly at odds.

In the glaring light of a democratic age, governments are expected to deliver moral clarity, rapid action and ambitious objectives while dealing with friends and isolating enemies. But in the private world of diplomacy, officials deal in shades of gray. They play for time rather than precipitating action, they set limited objectives and they often engage their enemies. The iconic diplomat George F. Kennan wrote in an essay called “Morality and Foreign Policy” that, “the primary obligation of a government is to the interests of the national society it represents, not to the moral impulses that elements of that society may experience.”

Although Secretary of State John Kerry has calmed the drums of war and reached out to his Russian counterpart to develop a peace process, much of his subsequent rhetoric ‑ from calling for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s departure to supporting the lifting of the European arms embargo ‑ seems to be more motivated by the moral-politik of democratic politics than the realpolitik of diplomacy.

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