from The Great Debate:
The Muslim Brotherhood’s dangerous missteps
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood is well organized and popular. Its Freedom and Justice Party easily won a plurality of seats in the first post-Hosni Mubarak parliamentary elections, and the party is set to remain a dominant force in Egyptian politics for the foreseeable future. Important party members are touring Western capitals, including London and Washington, on a charm offensive.
The Brotherhood’s Islamist origins and ideology have caused much hand-wringing in the U.S. about the group’s commitment to democracy and liberalism. But the short-term risk of the Brotherhood’s rule for the U.S. isn’t its religious beliefs, which are not out of step with those of most Egyptians and which their need to maintain international reputability is likely to moderate. Rather, it’s the group’s political incompetence.
Foreign media are no longer enamored with revolutionary Egypt, but this is the most critical period in its transition since Hosni Mubarak’s ouster in February 2011, with the process of writing a new constitution and conducting a presidential campaign happening simultaneously. On both fronts the Muslim Brotherhood, already in a tense and fraying accord with the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), has shown an alarming political tone-deafness.
Yet the main risk of increasing Brotherhood-SCAF tensions is not, as commonly portrayed in the U.S., sustained military rule. Rather, the tensions belie a much tougher challenge: an Egypt in which the only power centers are the Brotherhood and/or SCAF, with all other groups alienated or disempowered. This is a negative outcome for both U.S. foreign policy and Egyptian stability – but it looks increasingly probable.
Back when SCAF and the Brotherhood were playing nice, Egypt’s military leaders decided that parliament – which the Brotherhood dominates – would elect a 100-member constituent assembly to write the document. All political parties and most political forces in Egypt, the Brotherhood and liberal groups included, could agree on more or less the same thing: a semi-presidential system, a compromise on the role of the military and Sharia as a principal source of legislation.
The Brotherhood-led, Islamist-dominated parliament could easily have crafted an assembly with only 30 or so Islamists, ceding the remaining seats to Coptic Christians, women, liberals, civil society activists and legal experts, and still have gotten the constitution it wanted. And by including a broader array of forces in shaping Egypt’s post-revolutionary political bedrock, the Brotherhood would have garnered increased trust and credibility from its opponents.
Egypt’s Internet gambit misfires. Surprised?
As China prepared to quell the Tienanmen Square protests in 1989, the government of Deng Xiaoping made a crucial tactical decision: It ordered western networks to shut down their satellite trucks, making sure the violent end to the revolution would not be televised.
As Egypt tried to contain nationwide protests this past weekend, the government of President Hosni Mubarak at first did nothing to stanch the endless real-time flow of street-level video showing angry, violent confrontations.
Instead, they turned off the Internet.
China’s ruthless approach handed the regime an enduring propaganda victory, of course. Even though hundreds of peaceful protesters were mercilessly mowed down when the military swept through Tienanmen Square, the most iconic image of the crackdown is downright peaceful: A tank commander refusing to challenge a single, unarmed civilian who would not yield.
On the other hand, for all the democratizing power the internet provides, Egypt’s decision to shut the internet door shortly after midnight Friday (along with much wireless service), while technically effective, was entirely ineffectual. And as for TV: It was only on Sunday that Cairo moved to silence Al Jazeera, which had been broadcasting non-stop, in what one hopes is not prelude to a Tienanmen Solution.
It all gets down to critical mass. Twitter and Facebook are peerless accelerants, but when you can look out of your window to see where the protesting is going on (to paraphrase veteran NBC correspondent Richard Engle) the power of the internet is dwarfed by pure people power.
Some valid points but having lived in both countries -some big differences. Communication in Egypt was much, much more open. Also many people get their TV and communications through direct satellite. Up to Italy quite easy to watch futball but also Greece, Turkey, Israel. In Egypt there are several mobile operators whom use switches and equipment networked off the European grid. Its fairly easy to bypass IP addresses and connect online through your phone. Family is all over the Gulf, Europe, etc flying in on a weekly basis.
The press has a lot of outlets and points of contact. If you want to leave Egypt as an Egyptian its easy.
In China – you are on your own and its hard to leave – sometimes its even hard to move in China. All the “competition” goes through the same bottlenecks, personal visits are much rarer. Its easy to shutdown entire channels.
China can do things Egypt could never do. Im not a big fan of Mubarek and its time for him to go – but give credit where its due. The Egyptian military didnt open up politics but it did a good job in wiring into the world and letting people talk. Its not easy to switch Egypt “off”.
The inability to use an appropriate preposition is itself an inability to function.