President Barack Obama, in a January New Republic interview, was asked bluntly if the United States should actively intervene in Syria’s civil war. He thoughtfully explained his reservations. Several concerned Syria, but the last one pointed to larger ethical issues. “And how do I weigh,” Obama asked, “tens of thousands who’ve been killed in Syria versus the tens of thousands who are currently being killed in the Congo?”

With this comment, Obama cut to the heart of an age-old dilemma about humanitarian military intervention — whether it is worth addressing some conflicts when you know that others continue to simmer, or boil over, at the same time?

This was the case in the 1970s when wars in the Horn of Africa, Uganda, Cambodia and elsewhere killed many hundreds of thousands. It was true in the 1980s when conflict intensified in places like Afghanistan, Angola and Central America. And in the 1990s when the Balkans and Rwanda and parts of West Africa blew up, while Sudan, Somalia and other wars continued.

But for all the terrible headlines today, Obama enjoys advantages that leaders in previous eras did not have. There are fewer wars in the world; more international consensus on what to do about them, and more capable U.S. forces that can help in the task even as other nations generally provide many of the peacekeeping troops. These conditions free Obama to make decisions about the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as Syria, on their respective merits — rather than remain paralyzed by broader philosophical conundrums.

While neither decision should be made lightly, there is a case for more assertive U.S. action in both Congo and Syria. These are now probably the world’s two worst wars that Washington is doing little to address.

Take Congo. First, it is not the case that the nation’s leaders or its insurgents are ordering tens of thousands directly killed on the same time scale as in Syria. What has been happening in eastern Congo for two decades is a breakdown of the state, caused by sporadic fighting among various domestic and foreign militias.

The killing has indeed been horrible — including some of the worst sexual violence in the world, with rape used as a tactical weapon. But most of the deaths have been caused by malnutrition and poor healthcare, resulting from the lack of any real state. The war is killing huge numbers of people, to be sure, but largely indirectly — by preventing government from properly caring for its citizens — something Congo can barely do in peaceful regions.

There is now a U.N. peacekeeping mission in Congo, roughly 20,000 troops. This is a small force for a country the size of the United States east of the Mississippi, even if the force is concentrated in the rugged east.

Second, that force is underequipped and largely made up of African and South Asian peacekeepers. It does not have nearly the number of helicopters or other capabilities to ensure mobility that could compensate for its small size. Even modest additions to this force could help a great deal, with little risk of escalation.

The United States has spent a decade handling far more violent insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. For this, Washington created formations such as “advise and assist brigades,” each roughly 1,500 to 2,500 troops. By the end of 2013, most of these and other units are due to be back in the United States. We have already cut our overseas troop strength in the two wars by almost two-thirds, from its peak five years ago (the peak was some 200,000 troops including 22 combat brigade teams). We could consider deploying one or two of these advise and assist brigades into eastern Congo, as part of the U.N. mission. This could make a big difference to the capacity of the foreign force and in the development of the Congolese army.

Meanwhile, in Syria, while Obama is right to fear a slippery slope to more demanding operations, the most likely scenario for U.S. troops resembles what the North Atlantic Treaty Organization did in Bosnia in the 1990s. First, we arm the weaker side. Then we support it with air strikes. Finally, we help negotiate a peace accord allowing some degree of autonomy for the various sectarian groups within a weak federal structure.

This approach might not work. Even if it fails, however, it is unlikely to lead to the kind of large-scale invasion that we carried out in Iraq or Afghanistan.

In Syria, such an operation would only make sense if it were a combined Arab League-NATO mission, in which U.S. forces were just a small fraction. Using the Bosnia precedent, and allowing for a population four times its size, up to 200,000 foreign troops could be needed in a post-war stabilization effort – if only for a time. But if their focus were on policing ceasefire lines, the number might be cut in half, with the U.S. share perhaps 20,000.

Such scenarios may be unappealing to the president (as they are to me) — especially after a decade of war and a half decade of economic crisis. But the alternative of watching the slaughter in both countries go unchecked, while hoping that the insurgency somehow wins without much support in Syria, is fast becoming no alternative at all.

In fact, given the likely requirements of each mission, we can as part of multilateral coalitions that intervene in both Congo and Syria at once. It is probably not Obama’s preference for his second term — nor is it what most Americans would want, to be sure. But we can make a big difference by addressing the world’s two worst humanitarian crises with limited numbers of U.S. forces.

Obama has an opportunity here to revalidate the Nobel Committee’s decision to award him its peace prize four years ago. It’s also an opportunity to show that the 2011 Libya mission, of which the president is justifiably proud, was not a one-off. Now, with his new Cabinet, Obama should seriously explore his options in both these tragic wars.

PHOTO (Top): Jane Kanyere is consoled by a neighbor after her son, Moise Kasereka, a teacher, was killed in fighting in the town of Kiwanja, in eastern Congo, November 6, 2008. REUTERS/Stringer

PHOTO( Insert) A refugee from the Democratic Republic of Congo reacts to camera as she arrives at the Nyakabande refugee transit camp in Kisoro town 521km (312 miles) southwest of Uganda capital Kampala, May 15, 2012. REUTERS/James Akena

PHOTO (Insert): Destruction and debris in Al-Suwayqa neighborhood of the old city of Aleppo after forces loyal to Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad captured the area from the Free Syrian Army February 25, 2013. REUTERS/George Ourfalian 

The question is worth asking simply because of the job’s importance and its significance for U.S. national security. It is also relevant given Clinton’s unprecedented role in our national life over the last two decades.

She is probably the most politically powerful woman in U.S. history — at least in terms of positions held. She has come closer to being elected president than any other woman. She may well try again, and her record as secretary may be the best way to judge her candidacy for the highest job in the land. So how has she done?

My bottom line is this: Clinton has been a very good secretary – if more solid than spectacular. Pick your cliché or sports metaphor – she is more work horse than show horse, more an indefatigable marathoner (despite the setback last month) than a sprinter.

For someone who almost won the presidency before becoming a subordinate to her rival in his Cabinet, and who was already among the world’s most famous women before taking the job, this is a remarkable testament to her work ethic, her humility and her selflessness. It does not necessarily place her in the top tier of U.S. secretaries of state of all time – but even if not, she is certainly in the very next level.

No assessment of Clinton, of course, can be considered complete now. The issues she labored on hardest are works in progress. It will not be possible to gauge her contribution until we see more about where a number of key issues — concerning China, Russia, Iran and Syria – as well as broader matters – like the fight against global poverty and nuclear weapons proliferation – wind up in a few years’ time.

But some provisional conclusions are now clear, beginning with her relationship with President Barack Obama. Here, Clinton must be given outstanding marks.

She understood that she was a part of Obama’s administration, not a co-president. Where Obama had strong views or made overall decisions on the nation’s priorities, she did not complain, leak countervailing views, wind up in publicized spats or even allow any space to emerge between them.

There are some issues worth having major disagreements over. But, in general, a secretary of state is carrying out the foreign policy developed throughout an administration. It is the president’s job to determine what that policy should be, and no good can come of public disagreements, since they distract from an administration’s efforts to pursue a clear strategy. Clinton got this much better than most other people in the same situation.

Clinton’s work ethic was also remarkable. She will not overtake Condoleezza Rice’s travel record during a four-year stint as the nation’s top diplomat. But virtually all the people around her have been impressed by her level of preparedness. I know assistant secretaries of state who were stunned, even in Clinton’s fourth year in office, at her willingness to stay up until 3 a.m., mastering, for example, the complexities of an opposition political movement in a mid-sized foreign country. The assistant secretaries themselves admitted they mostly just wanted to go to sleep.

I once had the chance to meet with her in a small group at midnight in Qatar to discuss Gaza. Stories like this are legion.

This work ethic leads to another, even more important, point — Clinton did not make many mistakes as secretary. The reason was her thoroughness and preparedness.

Foreign policy priorities, of course, can always be debated. I do not mean to suggest Clinton always had the most imaginative or creative idea, or the most effective strategy.

But she rarely made gaffes. She did not embarrass allies by failing to understand their constraints and concerns when trying to forge a common position. She did not needlessly antagonize neutrals or enemies by letting words slip that later needed to be retracted. She did not have to backtrack on statements or positions that she took initially, but later recognized to be unwise.

This is not to say that Clinton was an historic secretary of state. Even an admirer, such as myself, must acknowledge that few big problems were solved on her watch, few big victories achieved. There was no equivalent of success in the Cold War, or Henry A. Kissinger’s work on President Richard M. Nixon’s opening to China. There is not likely to be a Clinton Doctrine to rival George Kennan’s containment policy, or the various doctrines associated with Nixon, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan.

Signature issues that Clinton staked out a decade ago as important, when she was senator or first lady – global poverty or the plight of women around the world, for example – showed limited movement due to any idea of hers while secretary of state.

These conclusions were formed not only from personal observation but in conversation with many Democrats and Republicans, some friendly to her, some less so. Even critics often respect her a good deal. But what of her actions and achievements bear them out? Here is quick survey of key regions, noting not only what the Obama administration has done there to date but what Clinton’s contributions may have been.

Europe: Obama entered the White House after inspiring huge hopes across the Atlantic. Four years later, Europeans are generally still favorable toward his administration. This is largely due to Clinton.

To be sure, it was Obama’s vision of a more multilateral world, restoring classic diplomacy and greater attentiveness to the interests of others, that grabbed Europe’s attention in the first place. His biography, race and rhetorical skills had a lot to do with it. But once he was in office, Europeans wanted results. And these were delivered by Clinton.

She was the one who flew to see the Europeans (nearly 40 times). She was the one who worked with them to fashion tighter sanctions on Iran, or a new missile defense strategy that would antagonize Russia less and provide greater protection against ballistic missiles. Or a path forward in the war in Afghanistan. Obama was considered sound in his thinking, but often not the warmest or most personable. Clinton, helped by her key aides, such as Assistant Secretary for Europe Phil Gordon, made up for that in spades.

The Middle East: Alas here things have not gone great overall. U.S. popularity is back to Bush-era levels; there is no movement on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process; Syria is a mess. Even the 2011 overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, while still a success, has now been tainted by the Benghazi tragedy – for which Clinton bears at least some indirect responsibility. The goal of keeping U.S. forces in Iraq past 2011, as attempted by the administration, was not realized either. Iran continues a gradual march toward nuclear weapons capability.

Despite all this, there is reason to give Clinton credit for some policies that have ameliorated the situation. Iran sanctions have never been stronger. They provide at least a chance of helping diplomacy work. The Arab Spring brought hope, not only to Libya but to Tunisia and Egypt, where the administration was wise enough not to try to prop up aging autocrats like President Hosni Mubarak when it became evident two years ago that they could not survive.

It is the president, and not Clinton, who bears considerable responsibility for at least two mistakes in the region. Obama raised hopes that his presidency could lead to a better rapport with Iran — hopes dashed by the stolen 2009 Iranian elections. He also sought to get Israel to freeze settlement activity as a precondition for peace talks. That idea was reasonably motivated, but ineffective.

I must, however, acknowledge Clinton’s shortcomings in at least two policy debates. On Syria, we remain at a loss for what to do. The administration’s caution, while understandable, has become counterproductive in light of the tragedy there. A more forward-leaning U.S. support for the opposition looks warranted.

On Afghanistan, while the overall policy of more robust engagement and counterinsurgency was preferable to accepting a defeat by the Taliban, as could have happened, the Obama administration did not develop a strong partnership with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, or even signal long-term plans clearly. That uncertainty led to hedging behavior by Pakistan, which has at times condoned the insurgency, and to corruption by Karzai’s cronies, since our challenging relations with the Afghan leader made him less willing to discipline allies when we demanded it.

EAST ASIA: Here, Clinton may have made her greatest and most memorable contribution. Working with Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and others, she orchestrated the administration’s “rebalancing” or “pivot” toward Asia. This was a diplomatic achievement more than a military one. We added only limited forces to the region but got a lot of attention and mileage out of modest changes.

First, give credit to diplomacy. Clinton’s key interventions at various regional forums led the way – for example, by firmly and consistently opposing Chinese bullying of other countries. Beijing, increasingly assertive until the rebalancing, took notice. As did U.S. allies.

This approach alone is not a long-term strategy for handling the world’s fastest-growing power. But the growing perception of imminent U.S. decline, and distraction, was largely countered on Clinton’s watch. This has had a generally good effect on countries around the globe that had begun to doubt America’s ability to remain resolute and effective in the 21^st century.

Put it all together and you have one of the most solid track records of any modern secretary of state. But you do not yet have a historic legacy – a major bending of history.

Perhaps Clinton will be able to take much-deserved pride from her record as a public servant without such a signature achievement, and spend the rest of her career using her charisma, energy and public voice to work on those issues of greatest concern to her in a more indirect way.

Or, if I am right, perhaps this is one more reason that the lure of running for president in four years may prove irresistible. It would still be desirable, not only for the world but for her, if we could someday point to a Clinton Doctrine.

For all her hard work and achievements, such a doctrine does not yet exist. Yet she has been a remarkable public servant and public figure, who served the country well and helped keep it safe on her watch.

PHOTO (Top): Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivers a speech at Dublin City University in Ireland, December 6, 2012. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque

PHOTO (Insert 1): Secretary of State Hillary Clinton listens to President Barack Obama during a meeting of his Cabinet in Washington, November 28, 2012. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque

PHOTO (Insert 2): Secretary of State Hillary Clinton addresses a news conference during a NATO foreign ministers meeting at the Alliance headquarters in Brussels December 5, 2012. REUTERS/Francois Lenoir

PHOTO (Insert 3): Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Myanmar’s Opposition Leader Aung San Suu Kyi (R) sit together to hear President Barack Obama speak at the University of Yangon in Myanmar, November 19, 2012. REUTERS/Jason Reed

The accusations against Susan Rice, the United States ambassador to the United Nations and potential nominee for secretary of state, continue. They took a new turn on Monday as an Eritrean-American, Salem Solomon, wrote for the New York Times op-ed page about Rice’s supposed affections for a new generation of strongmen of Africa.

This article comes at an inopportune time, since Rice is now being hammered for all sorts of reasons — many of them specious. It feels more like piling on than fair-minded criticism. It is particularly unfortunate because partisanship is complicating efforts to determine whether Rice would be a strong choice as secretary of state.

I have written before about Rice, who is a friend and former colleague. I’m an admirer of her work, though this is not to suggest that she would necessarily be a better choice for secretary of state than Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.) or someone else. But she is a capable public servant and a serious candidate for the job. The recent criticisms — including the New York Times commentary — are often unfair.

Solomon asserts that Rice has been too close to autocratic rulers in six countries:  Ethiopia, Eritrea, Rwanda, Uganda, Ghana and South Africa. He uses this contention to conclude that she should not be secretary of state.

But leave aside the nuance in Rice’s various positions toward these countries over the years, as well as her tough stances toward the leadership of Sudan. Leave aside as well the fact that in many African countries, with their weak political systems, there are no great choices to support. Solomon’s argument, however, fails even before getting into such complexities.

Of the countries he mentions, for example, five have done well in recent years. They are five of the 17 African states now making major headway, as Steve Radelet of the Center for Global Development explains in his important 2010 book, “Emerging Africa.” Their economies are doing better, they are generally at peace internally and their governments, while flawed, are generally much improved compared with their own pasts or those of their neighbors.

It is true that other methods of assessing the performance of African states could lead to somewhat different conclusions. But Solomon makes no mention of these or any other methods. The slightest whiff of authoritarian behavior by one of these leaders is, for him, enough to condemn not only the governments in question but, by association, Rice. This is not serious.

Ironically, Solomon finishes his piece by arguing that if anything, Rice and the United States government in general have been too tough on his own government of Eritrea. Yet of the six he considered, that is the only country not listed as an emerging success by Radelet or other authors.

There is no doubt that we need some new approaches to specific African problems and challenges. Congo is a case in point, and it is true that Rwanda’s recent role there has been problematic.

So let the debate continue — on policy specifics. I know Rice well enough to be confident she will be listening for good ideas. If Solomon has any, he should offer them up.

But we have had enough of the ad hominem attacks.

PHOTO: U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice at a press conference after a global town hall at Twitter headquarters in San Francisco February 10, 2011. REUTERS/Stephen Lam