MuniLand

Are raters accurate?

By Cate Long
August 12, 2011

Credit markets are about taking risk to earn more return.

A way to think of this on a personal level is if you loan $1,000 to a steady, well-employed neighbor, you are likely to get it back because they have cash flow to repay the loan. Since the steady neighbor could likely borrow from many others, you can’t command a high interest rate. But if your chronically-broke, unemployed, woman-chasing neighbor wants to borrow $1,000 from you to fix his motorcycle, you could demand a higher interest rate to compensate for the risk. Maybe you’re the only one willing to loan to the risky neighbor.

The risk is that the broke neighbor might take your loan, fix his bike and ride off into the sunset and you may not get the money back. Bond markets call this type of borrower “speculative grade” because you are speculating that you will get your money back. The steady, settled neighbor would be called “investment grade” because you are investing your money with high likelihood of being repaid.

If you have a good sum of money to lend out, but not too much time, you probably would have to have some group investigate your neighbors and give you some feedback on their ability and willingness to pay. In the fixed-income markets this is what credit rating agencies do. They are very powerful because they have collected decades of data on issuers and their borrowing and repayment habits. It’s this process of monitoring and evaluating the creditworthiness of borrowers that makes raters central gatekeepers for bond markets. They are always watching the neighbors so you are relieved of the trouble.

Here is the policy at Standard & Poor’s for their process: General Description of the Credit Rating Process (as of 25 March 2011).

There are thousands of banks, corporations, state and local governments who borrow in the  financial markets, and investors want credit rating agencies to tell them how much specific risk there is in bonds and issuers. Investors use this rating information, along with market prices, to buy securities and monitor their portfolio. The idea that investors would start to do this credit analysis themselves is naive at best. Only the very largest financial firms have the expertise and resources to do this.

I know that I am unusual in my defense of raters. I am optimistic because we have the laws in place to require raters to monitor and disclose conflicts of interests and make their level of accuracy public.  I said in a post yesterday that a lot of fuss arose because the role of raters in financial markets, their practices and how they were regulated is so little understood. It is a complex area for those who don’t participate in bond markets but I think I can clear away a little of the smoke. Here is what I wrote to Congress in January, 2008.

Our regulatory framework embodies the expectation that NRSROs ["Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations"] will consistently and accurately judge the relative creditworthiness of issuers and securities.

But how does the law monitor whether raters (NRSROs)  ”consistently and accurately judge  creditworthiness?” A federal law called the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 takes the approach of radical transparency for the raters.  The SEC’s rules that implemented the law require that raters publish the default statistics for their ratings. Default statistics give us an opportunity to see how accurate rating agencies have been over a period of years.

Major rating agencies assign hundreds of thousands of ratings. The law requires that they separate out default stats for these ratings into distinct classes of bonds including municipal, sovereign, corporate and structured finance. The data must be provided for 1-, 3- and 10-year periods and made public on the website of the rating agency.

In muniland you often here people say that muni bonds rarely default. According to the data that is true. Here is the 2010 default data from Standard & Poor’s for municipal bonds that the law requires be made public:

 

Standard & Poor’s One-, Three-, and 10-Year Default Rates By Rating Modifier for Public Finance (%) 2010

Rating Year 1 Year 3 Year 10
AAA 10.0 0.00 0.00 0.00
AA+ 9.5 0.00 0.00 0.00
AA 9.0 0.00 0.08 0.00
AA- 8.5 0.00 0.00 0.11
A+ 8.0 0.00 0.00 0.08
A 7.5 0.00 0.04 0.07
A- 7.0 0.00 0.00 0.00
BBB+ 6.5 0.00 0.00 0.00
BBB
6.0 0.00 0.13 0.14
BBB- 5.5 0.24 1.32 0.98
BB+ 5.0 0.00 5.88 0.00
BB 4.0 0.00 0.00 1.18
BB- 3.5 0.00 0.00 0.00
B+ 3.0 0.00 16.67 0.00
B 2.5 6.67 0.00 4.00
B- 2.0 0.00 0.00 0.00
CCC 1.5 33.33 66.67 50.00
© Multiple-Markets 2011

U.S. Public Finance Defaults and Rating Transition Data: 2010 Update (2 March 2011) Table 22, page 49 “One-, Three-, and 10-Year USPF Obligor Default Rates By Rating Modifier (%)”

You can see from this data that S&P municipal bond ratings have had almost no defaults until you reach the BBB- level. The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 requires that we have access to this data. Pretty revealing, eh? One caveat though: default data for ratings is backward-looking. If we enter a multi-year recession or depression that would present a macro environment that exceeds the conditions that this default data was generated from.  In that case, all bets are off. But generally you can see that muniland is a quiet backwater. The law allows us to see that. I’ll be writing more about credit rating regulation. It’s the heart of a stable financial system.

For the curious here is the default data for sovereign ratings from S&P: 2010 Sovereign rating default report

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Thu Aug 11, 2011 5:55pm EDT

(Reuters) In the wake of the 2007-2009 economic recession, investors in the $3.7 trillion U.S. municipal bond market have been rattled by predictions of possible bankruptcies.

Still, municipal bankruptcies have been rare and experts say they will remain the option of last resort for struggling towns, cities and counties.

There have been only 624 municipal bankruptcies since 1937. The biggest U.S. municipal bankruptcy so far occurred in Orange County, California, in 1994.

The following is a list of U.S. municipalities that have either filed for municipal bankruptcy under Chapter 9 of the U.S. bankruptcy code since 2008 or stand on the brink of fiscal disaster.

JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMA

The county — home to Alabama’s largest city, Birmingham — is in talks with its creditors to defuse a $3.14 billion bond debt crisis and avoid what would be the largest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history.

Jefferson County ran into debt trouble in the mid-2000s when it refinanced an upgrade in its sewer system with auction rate bonds and bond swaps. Interest on the deals spiraled in 2008 when bond insurers downgraded the county’s debt.

HARRISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA

Pennsylvania’s state capital, a city of 50,000 about 100 miles west of Philadelphia, has been flirting with bankruptcy as it struggles to pay off $300 million in debt incurred through a financing scheme used to fund a revamp of its trash-burning plant.

In July, the city council rejected a rescue plan put forward by a state-appointed advisor that called on the city to sell the incinerator, renegotiate labor deals, cut jobs, and sell or lease its parking garage.

VALLEJO, CALIFORNIA

The former navy town, near San Francisco, filed for bankruptcy on May 23, 2008, after failing to address steep city personnel costs and sliding revenues from a housing slump.

This July, the city won court approval for its financial plan to exit bankruptcy protection.

CENTRAL FALLS, RHODE ISLAND

The smallest city in the smallest U.S. state filed for bankruptcy on August 1, 2011 after failing to win concessions from public-sector retirees and others to address an $80 million unfunded pension and retiree health benefit liability that is nearly quadruple its annual budget of $17 million.

(Reporting by Edith Honan in New York; Matthew Bigg in Atlanta and Jim Christie in San Francisco; Editing by Kenneth Barry)

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/1 1/us-muni-bankruptcy-idUSTRE77A6OE201108 11?feedType=RSS&feedName=domesticNews

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