Opinion

Compass

To build a coalition against Islamic State, U.S. must try a little humility

Nader Mousavizadeh
Sep 25, 2014 05:00 UTC

U.S. President Barack Obama chairs the U.N. Security Council summit in New York

When President Barack Obama assumed the presidency of the United Nations Security Council Wednesday, he summoned the full weight of U.S. power to a cause with seeming universal appeal: defeating the barbarism of Islamic State — or, as Obama calls the militant group, Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (ISIL).

Much of the world, however, will question how Washington can hope to achieve this without launching a wider political agenda for accountable government in the failing states of the Arab world.

They seek U.S. recognition of the diversity of legitimate interests represented today in the Security Council chamber — and of the wider diffusion of power and capital that defines this age. In short, they look for an American president who can see the world through a genuine pluralist prism.

What they hear, however, is talk of yet another global expeditionary mission driven largely by U.S. foreign and domestic politics. More than a failure of will, intelligence or even strategy, the Obama administration’s foreign policy seems marked by a failure of imagination. This will doom the White House’s attempts to forge a sustainable global alliance.

U.S. President Obama meets in New York with representatives of Arab nations that contributed in air strikes against Islamic State targets in SyriaWhat makes this failure so tragic is the lost opportunity to rethink the design of global partnerships in the midst of an expanding archipelago of diverging power, values and interests. Yet the interests of the key powers are actually more aligned than they appear to be on issues ranging from Syria to the wider Middle East, from Ukraine to East Asia.

Uncertainty is not going away

Nader Mousavizadeh
Nov 8, 2012 17:51 UTC

This week, within the space of 48 hours, the United States elected its next president and the Chinese Communist Party will convene in Beijing to begin the formal handover of power to the next generation of its leadership. To many, this pivotal transition point for the world’s two largest economies holds out the promise of deliverance from the specter that’s been haunting decision-making ever since the collapse of Lehman Brothers four years ago: the specter of “uncertainty.” If there is a phrase that CEOs, politicians and investors use more often to explain everything from poor performance to halting growth to lack of investment and a reluctance to boost hiring, it might just be its near-cousin, “volatility.”

The reality, however, is that the long-awaited, much-desired “certainty” is a mirage. Uncertainty and volatility, in economics and politics, are now as permanent to the macro landscape as competition, resource scarcity, disruptive technology and the race for talent. Leave aside the false nostalgia for a certainty of outlook that never quite was – or, rather, for a kind of uncertainty that only seemed to surprise on the upside during the years of the great moderation. Ignore as well the fact that uncertainty and volatility too often are used as synonyms for the structural challenge of the long period of deleveraging still facing major Western economies. No election in the United States, and no leadership change in China – however orderly, pro-growth, or politically decisive they may be – can reverse the structural shift towards uncertainty in the global macro environment.

It is a shift that is defined not just by a range of geopolitical tail risks as diverse as they are potentially consequential: a war between Israel and Iran over Tehran’s suspected nuclear weapons program; the deepening radicalization of nuclear-weapons-armed Pakistan at every level of its pulverized society; the rising tide of nationalism in East Asia threatening conflicts across multiple boundaries; the danger of far more paralyzing cyber-attacks on state and private sector organizations; the as-yet-to-drop second shoe of the Arab Awakening in the Gulf states (including Saudi Arabia) pivotal to global energy markets.

China’s war of the oligarchs

Nader Mousavizadeh
Apr 23, 2012 19:30 UTC

The death of an Englishman in Chongqing has acquired all the intrigue of a John le Carré novel with none of its charms. Despite the occasionally romantic descriptions of the disgraced leader Bo Xilai as a charismatic man of the people challenging the prerogatives of Beijing’s bureaucratic leadership, this is a story without heroes, in which no one’s hands are clean. For all the elements of murder, mystery and missing fortunes occupying the Western press, in China today the focus of the country’s political and economic leaders is on the cascading power struggle that is in progress and what it holds for the future management of the world’s second-largest economy.

A year of leadership change that should have been defined by a smooth, almost seamless transition is instead shaping up to be a turning point in the direction – and ownership – of the political economy of China. Two years of plotting, positioning and maneuvering on the part of tens of thousands of party officials have been thrown into disarray by Bo’s fall, with few now confident of where their allies and masters will find themselves at the conclusion of this upheaval. Combine this with the unresolved elite debate about the cause of China’s economic miracle – the process of reform and liberalization, on the one hand; or, on the other, the still-powerful grip of the state on the means of production – and what you have are all the elements of a perfect storm for the Chinese Communist Party.

Beneath the past month’s surface impression of a resilient party able to manage with speed – and unprecedented candor – the exit of one of its princelings, two visions of China’s future are battling it out more fiercely than ever, in Beijing and throughout the provincial capitals. On one side is a movement, often but inaccurately described as “neo-Maoist,” led by Bo Xilai’s faction and dedicated to maintaining the dominance of the party in the service of the masses left behind by the rapid growth in the major cities. On the other, closely identified with outgoing Premier Wen Jiabao, is the faction dedicated to accelerating economic and political reform designed to ensure long-term sustainable growth. What they share, rhetorically, is a commitment to addressing rapidly widening income inequality. What the factions share, equally, is a reputation for corruption and family privilege of immense proportions at their leadership levels.

How we got to the archipelago world

Nader Mousavizadeh
Jul 25, 2011 11:29 UTC

By Nader Mousavizadeh
The opinions expressed are his own.

Ten years after the attacks of September 11th, the brief moment of global solidarity that followed when we were “all Americans,” in the words of Le Monde, seems as improbable as it is distant. Barring a global catastrophe, the world is unlikely to unite again as it did on that day – and not just because of the conduct and course of the wars of 9/11 in Afghanistan and Iraq. A deeper – and more radical – shift is at work in the politics of the global economy. A fragmentation of power, capital and ideas is creating a new map of the world – with lasting implications for investors and policymakers alike.

The evidence is everywhere. Europe beginning to roll back key aspects of the free market even as it manages yet another bail-out of Greece; the failure of the Copenhagen climate change negotiations; a Doha trade round dead in all but name; the emergence of new global governance structures, such as G-20; the flows of macro-finance investments between emerging markets combining state and business interests; China’s “going out” strategy upending traditional vectors of global capital and influence; an Arab Awakening as much defined by its diversity as its aspiration for accountability and legitimate government; the resurgence of nationalist, populist movements across rich and poor parts of the world; a proliferation of hybrid economic and political systems defying old categories of left and right, liberal and authoritarian.

Conventional thinking holds that all this is a threat to an otherwise well-ordered global order – or that it reflects a zero-sum shift from West to East, U.S. to China, democracies to dictatorships.  For large parts of the world, of course, the existing global order seemed less well-ordered than designed to perpetuate – by any means necessary – dated power structures of the mid-20th century.  Equally, to see this merely as reflecting an all-embracing power shift to the East (as observers both Eastern and Western do) ignores the fact that pivotal powers such as Turkey, Brazil, Indonesia and Nigeria are charting distinct paths aimed above all at economic independence and national power – beyond ideological labels.

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