Pakistan: Now or Never?

from Afghan Journal:

In the U.S.-Pakistan fight, India an anxious spectator

Pakistan and the United States are in the middle of such a public and bruising fight that Islamabad's other pet hate, India, has receded into the background.  A Pakistani banker friend, only half in jest, said his country had bigger fish to fry than to worry about India, now that it had locked horns with the superpower.

But more seriously, India itself has kept a low profile, resisting the temptation to twist the knife deeper into its neighbour when it faces the risk of isolation. Much of what Pakistan stands accused of, including the main charge of  using violent extremism as an instrument of foreign policy, is an echo of what New Delhi has been blaming Pakistan for, for two decades now.  Even the language that America's military officials led by Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, and diplomats  have employed such as "proxy wars" , "cross border raids"   or terrorism central to describe Pakistan is a throwback to the 1990s and later when India and Pakistan were dueling over  Kashmir.

"What  Mullen has said with regard to the role of certain forces in Pakistan, is also something which is nothing new to us. In fact when we were the first to flag this issue earlier, the world didn't believe us," the Press Trust of India quoted Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as telling reporters on board his plane on the way home from the UN General Assembly meeting in New York. 

But the tone and tenor of the Indian response to Pakistan's predicament, including on the Hindu right, has been remarkably restrained. This, as former Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran wrote in The Indian Express on Thursday, is hardly the time to gloat over Pakistan's situation.

If anything, India and Pakistan this week agreed to overhaul trade ties that everyone recognizes can strengthen the peace constituency in both countries as they develop stakes in each other's economies. Pakistan is moving towards granting India Most Favoured Nation status -- the very word used to be anathema to the Pakistani right even if it doesn't really mean a great deal -- while India may lift a veto on lifting all tariffs on Pakistan textile exports to Europe as a step toward helping the neighbour climb out of a deep economic downturn.

Actually this might be a time for India to deepen engagement with its neighbour  in other areas too, Saran argues, saying Pakistan's western borders were so hot that it had a greater stake in stabilising ties with India than before, even if it was purely tactical.  Pakistan's "meddling" in Kashmir, where cross-border violence is already down to its lowest level,  may become even less,  he says.  Given the heat over the security establishment's links to the Haqqani network, it may even tell other militant groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba, blamed for the 2008 Mumbai attacks, to further lower their profile.

Pakistan’s China Syndrome

At the height of Pakistan’s crisis in relations with the United States, Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani reminded his Chinese guest of the words he had used to describe its relationship with China. ”Pak-China friendship is higher than mountains, deeper than oceans, stronger than steel and sweeter than honey.”  In a press release issued by the prime minister’s office during a visit to Islamabad by Chinese Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu, Gilani also promised China that “‘your friends are our friends, your enemies are our enemies and your security is our security.”

It was language designed to show that even after Admiral Mike Mullen’s assertion that the Afghan militant Haqqani network was effectively a   proxy of the Pakistan army, China – Pakistan’s “all weather friend” – stood at its side. The Pakistan media enthusiastically played up Meng’s visit, jumping on a relatively small offer of financial help and a dreamed-of defence pact with China to build up hopes of Chinese support.

Faced with such hyperbole, I flipped across to the website of the People’s Daily to see what it had to say about Pakistan.  At the time I looked, there was no mention of Pakistan. It did however give prominence to a story about China and India holding a strategic dialogue to build economic ties.

The comparison is instructive in so many ways.

First of all Pakistan is not the centre of the world even though those of us who cover it tend to think it is. And China is a big country, setting itself on a trajectory to outstrip the United States. It pays far less attention to India than India does to China, let alone becoming as obsessed with Pakistan’s problems as Pakistan is with casting China in the role of saviour.

Secondly, Pakistan has consistently over-estimated the support it is likely to get from China for decades.  As far back as its 1965 war with India – launched in a failed bid to wrest control of Kashmir – it misjudged China’s willingness to intervene on its behalf.  At the time, Pakistan-China relations were riding high. China had just inflicted a humiliating defeat on India in a 1962 border war. Pakistan had then – in Indian eyes – added insult to injury by reaching a provisional border agreement with China and agreeing to build the strategic Karakoram Highway to link it properly to India’s enemy. Yet during the 1965 war, Pakistan’s expectations of Chinese help were proved disastrously wrong.

At the time of the 1971 war with India – a crisis bigger than the one faced by Pakistan today – China gave no military support when Pakistan was split in two with Indian backing to carve out the new country of Bangladesh. The United States gave little  real help, either, beyond deploying the 7th Fleet to the Bay of Bengal - something that is bitterly remembered by Pakistan – but somehow China’s own record was forgotten.

The “end game” is in Pakistan

The United States has turned on Pakistan with such dizzying speed over the past few weeks that it is difficult to keep pace. Yet what is clear after Admiral Mike Mullen’s extraordinarily blunt statement that the Haqqani militant network is a “veritable arm” of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency is that it now has the Pakistan army very firmly in its sights.

Mullen accused the ISI, which is effectively a wing of the Pakistan army, of supporting the Haqqani network in a truck bomb attack on a U.S. base in Afghanistan and an assault on the U.S. embassy in Kabul which led to a 20-hour siege. “We also have credible intelligence that they (the Haqqani network) were behind the June 28 attack against the Inter-Continental Hotel in Kabul and a host of other smaller but effective operations,” he said.

It was the most forthright assertion yet by the Americans that the Pakistani military is not merely turning a blind eye to militant groups based on its border with Afghanistan but actively encouraging them to attack American interests.  The Pakistan army says it is overstretched as it is tackling militant groups which target Pakistan without creating new enemies by attacking Afghan militants and denies it retains links with the Haqqani network.

Just one month ago in a report titled “Pakistan, the United States and the End Game in Afghanistan”  a group describing themselves as “the foreign policy elite” laid out what Pakistan wanted to happen in Afghanistan.  Among their suggestions were that both the Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Mohammed Omar and the Haqqani network be included in talks on a political settlement in Afghanistan.  The report was heavily criticised by those who saw it as  an attempt by Pakistan to maintain its old policy of “strategic depth” – using militant proxies to stamp its influence on Afghanistan and counter India.

It looks like the United States is having none of it. I dislike the expression “end-game” applied to either Afghanistan or Pakistan (or Britain for that matter) with its implication that the people living in those countries come to an end when outside powers lose interest.  But it is worth considering the expression just to show how much has changed. The so-called “end-game” is  now in Pakistan.

That is not to say there are not worsening problems in Afghanistan itself, especially with the assassination of peace council chairman Burhanuddin Rabbani “laying open again the fracture lines” of civil war, as Kate Clark wrote at the Afghanistan Analysts Network. Nor is to suggest that anyone disputes the need for a political settlement in Afghanistan. Nor indeed that American tactics and strategy in Afghanistan are not open to criticism – Pakistan repeatedly says it is being used as a scapegoat for U.S. failures in Afghanistan. And nor would it be fair to dismiss Pakistan’s own concerns that by going after the Haqqani network – with its links to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and other militant groups – it would face even greater violence on its own soil. Those  are all subjects which merit separate and serious discussion.

But it is to say that the particular end-game going on now is between the United States and the Pakistan army.  Look closely at the proposition being made by Washington.  According to Mullen’s testimony  Pakistan – and specifically its army – must give up support for the Afghan Taliban (the so-called Quetta shura Taliban) and the Haqqani network.  In return the United States will help Pakistan find “an increasing role for democratic, civilian institutions and civil society in determining Pakistan’s fate.”

After Kabul attack, pressure remains on Pakistan

That the situation is bad in Afghanistan is obvious. Quite how bad is open to debate following the 20-hour attack by insurgents on Kabul, though former Indian intelligence chief B. Raman put it rather succinctly on his Twitter feed @SORBONNE75. “If one considers totality of picture—anti-terror, anti-insurgency—- US far from prevailing in Afghanistan. US troops after 10 yrs in same position as Soviet troops after 8 yrs were in 1987—victory increasingly elusive.”

Yet as has been the case for years, the United States has few good options in Afghanistan. Pulling out altogether would not only leave Afghanistan dealing with a bitter civil war but could further destabilise Pakistan.  Staying runs the risk of testing the patience not just of western public opinion but also of Afghans, who as the Afghanistan Analysts Network said, could come to see foreign forces as part of the problem rather than part of the solution.  ”The possible perception among Afghan residents that the presence of foreigners is a catalyst for attacks may lead to a growing conclusion that the problems related to their presence far outweigh the benefits,” it said. In the meantime, talks with the Afghan Taliban in order to try to reach a political settlement  appear to be going nowhere and are unlikely to become any easier after the attack on Kabul.

Early indications are that the United States is determined to stay the course – U.S. ambassador to Kabul Ryan Crocker played down the attack - and concentrate on  negotiating an agreement allowing it to keep troops in Afghanistan well beyond the 2014 deadline it has set for handing over security to Afghan forces.

Crocker also blamed the Pakistan-based Haqqani network for the attack while  U.S. General John Allen, the head of coalition forces in Afghanistan, said the United States would continue to try to convince Pakistan to rein in the militant group.

In short, business as usual and indeed business as it has been for years, with the United States trying more or less to hold its ground in Afghanistan, while struggling to convince the Pakistan army to act against the militant proxies it once nurtured to counter India. That pressure is likely to be accompanied by a continued or intensified campaign of drone bomb attacks on militant targets in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan.

On the Pakistan side, there is as yet no obvious sign of a change of stance.  After a bitter fall-out following the raid by U.S. forces who found and killed Osama bin Laden on May 2, the United States and Pakistan have begun working together again – at least in targetting al Qaeda. The Pakistan army made a point of stressing “the intimate cooperation between Pakistan and United States intelligence agencies”  after the arrest in Quetta earlier this month of al Qaeda operative Younis al Mauritani.

But that cooperation does not yet stretch to Pakistan turning on its former militant allies. The army says it is fighting on too many fronts already and must give priority to tackling the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other groups which threaten Pakistan rather than launching yet another military operation to clear out areas like North Waziristan, where the Haqqani network is based.

Pakistan’s Afghan policy: is that depth strategic or senseless?

At a conference earlier this year, someone made an argument, convincingly I thought, against the use of the expression ”the end-game in Afghanistan”.  Afghanistan as a country and the people in it will not come to an end when western forces leave, and nor is their future a game.  I was reminded of that comment reading a report published at the end of last month called “Pakistan, the United States , and the End Game in Afghanistan; Perceptions of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Elite.” 

The report, produced jointly by the Jinnah Institute and the United States Institute of Peace, summarises in one place what has until now been largely the subject of background briefings about what Pakistan wants in Afghanistan. The report’s authors, who have also written a shorter summary of its findings, identify three main objectives which the “elite” considered necessary in Afghanistan:

“A degree of stability in Afghanistan: Project participants felt that Pakistan’s interests are best served by a relatively stable government in Kabul that is not hostile towards Pakistan. There was across the board realization among the participants that persistent instability in Afghanistan will have numerous and predictable consequences for Pakistan that it is ill-prepared to tackle.

“An inclusive government in Kabul: Pakistan prefers a negotiated configuration with adequate Pashtun representation that is recognized by all ethnic and political stakeholders in Afghanistan. Some of the opinion makers insisted that given the current situation, a sustainable arrangement would necessarily require the main Taliban factions – particularly Mullah Omar’s “Quetta Shura” Taliban and the Haqqani network – to be part of the new political arrangement.

“Limiting Indian presence to development activities: Pakistani foreign policy elite accept that India has a role to play in Afghanistan’s economic progress and prosperity. However, many participants perceived the present Indian engagement to be going beyond strictly development. They wish to see greater transparency on Indian actions and objectives.”

None of that is particularly new — arguably it has a slightly dated quality since much of the work on the report was done before U.S. forces found and killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad on May 2, souring relations and curbing Pakistan’s ability to influence the United States on its approach to Afghanistan. But it merits reading in full for its detailed description of Pakistan’s view of what it wants in Afghanistan – a view, the report’s critics say, heavily influenced by the Pakistan army.

It has also served the unintended purpose of renewing a debate in the Pakistani media about Pakistan’s policies on Afghanistan. To what extent does Pakistan need to try (unsuccessfully so far) to impose a Pakistan-friendly government in Kabul in order to secure its own interests? How far does it have the right to do so? And how far are its interests secured in any case through what some see as meddling in Afghanistan?

Taliban talks and Mullah Omar’s Eid message

Since reading Mullah Omar’s lengthy Eid message on his view of Afghanistan’s future, I have been trying to work out, without success, what it means for prospects of talks with the Taliban. It is a piece of evidence without context, available to anyone to bolster whatever argument they care to submit.

Pakistani writer Ahmed Rashid described the message from the Afghan Taliban leader as “the longest and by far the most forward-looking political message he has ever sent”.

“Mullah Omar does not rule out negotiations with the Americans or sharing power with the present Afghan government and he emphatically says that the Taliban have no interest in monopolizing power,” he wrote. “For the first time he admits that the Taliban have been negotiating with the Americans, but he insists these talks have been about the release of prisoners and are not a political dialogue.”

Mark Sedwill, Britain’s special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, said on Twitter of the message: ”Interesting shift of tone. But need Taliban to match words with action and commit to peace process.”

Mullah Omar’s message coincided with a lengthy AP story on talks between the United States and the Taliban which offered a half-full half-empty snapshot of where things stood -  these had evolved into substantive negotiations, it said, before Afghan officials scuttled them by leaking the name of the Taliban negotiator.

We have known for a while that the Americans were holding direct talks with the Taliban, and according to Rashid, by acknowledging this, ”Mullah Omar is sending a clear message to his fighters that future political talks are a possibility, while signaling to the Americans that he may eventually be prepared to broaden the scope of the dialogue and those already participating in it.”

Among the more conciliatory sections in Mullah Omar’s message is a call for “a real Islamic regime which is acceptable to all people of the country. All ethnicities will have participation in the regime … Since Afghanistan has vast arable land, rich mines and high potential of energy resources, therefore, we can make investments in these sectors in conditions of peace and stability … the policy of the Islamic Emirate is not aimed at monopolizing power. Since Afghanistan is the joint homeland of all Afghans, so all Afghans have right to perform their responsibility in the field of protection and running of the country. The future transformations and developments would not resemble the developments following the collapse of communism … strict measures will be taken to safeguard all national installations, government departments and the advancements that have been occurred in private sector. Professional cadres and national businessmen will be further encouraged, without any discrimination, to serve their religion and country.”