India is piling on the diplomatic pressure to convince the international community to lean on Pakistan to crack down on Islamist militants blamed by New Delhi for the Mumbai attacks.

According to the Times of India, “India has made it clear to the U.S. and Iran as well as Pakistan’s key allies, China and Saudi Arabia, that they need to do more to use their clout to pressure Pakistan into acting…” The Press Trust of India (PTI), quoted by The Hindu, said India had used a visit by Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal to Delhi to drive home the same message.

As discussed previously on this blog, in the immediate aftermath of the Mumbai attacks, India’s response was to look to the United States to put pressure on Pakistan. It also appears to have won some support from Russia, whose officials said publicly that the attacks were funded by Dawood Ibrahim, an underworld don who India says lives in Pakistan. China, Pakistan’s traditional ally, supported the United Nations Security Council in  blacklisting the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the charity accused of being a front for the Lashkar-e-Taiba.  China’s Foreign Minister has also telephoned his counterparts in India and Pakistan urging dialogue, according to Xinhua. 

And to complete the tour of the permanent members of the Security Council, Britain blamed Pakistan-based militants for the Mumbai attacks, while France has also called on Pakistan to take action.

That’s a fairly broad consensus in favour of diplomatic pressure. There certainly seem to be more players more visibly involved than in 2001/2002 when India and Pakistan came to the brink of war over an attack on the Indian parliament that India blamed on Pakistan-based militants. You might therefore be tempted to argue that the diplomatic approach is working — and as long as this stands a chance, the prospects of military escalation are slim.

So what is going wrong? Despite the flurry of diplomatic activity, the military tensions are rising.  Pakistan has cancelled army leave and redeployed troops.  The Washington Post said thousands of troops were being redeployed from the Afghan border to the border with India.

Are the two countries’ armies simply making sure they are prepared, just in case the diplomatic efforts fail? Or is there more going on behind-the-scenes?

For Pakistan-watchers, I recommend reading this op-ed in the Daily Times calling on Pakistan to rethink its relationship with China, traditionally revered as an all-weather friend which will remain reliable even as other allies — like the United States — come and go.

“China has positioned itself for a leading role in global affairs, and will not sacrifice this advantage for the sake of any emotional connection with another state,” writes Shahzad Chaudhry. “As a mature society, the Chinese are realistic enough to realise the advantages and disadvantages of their linkages. Like the Chinese, Pakistanis need to discard their emotions and objectively review and redefine their linkages in view of their own national interests and the new global realities.”

I’ve been puzzling over China’s approach to Pakistan for a while, most recently in this post about China’s decision to support a United Nations Security Council ban on the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the Pakistani charity accused of being a front for the Laskhar-e-Taiba.  Since that followed a refusal by China to bail out Pakistan’s economy – forcing the government to turn to the IMF — I’d begun to wonder whether the “all weather” formula no longer applied.

So it’s interesting to read about the relationship from a Pakistani perspective.  China’s support, writes Chaudhry, had always come at a price, and was counted in numerous, mostly defence-related, projects. ”The large Chinese corporate presence in Pakistan enjoys a reverence beyond any in comparison. But it should not be forgotten that China has always acted on its own interests. Consider that the South Asian region is changing rapidly, with India not only emerging as the most prominent political and economic entity, but also huge market of great interest to China. In addition, China has to consider the American presence in Afghanistan and the Islamist militancy in Xinjiang,” he writes.

(more…)

Chinese naval ships may soon be steaming into the Gulf of  Aden to join a growing fleet of international warships fighting  Somali pirates.

A first probably for a navy that has long confined itself to its own waters, the move is certain to stir interest in the strategic community stretching from New Delhi to Washington.

Chinese state media on Wednesday quoted Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei as telling a UN Security Council meeting that Beijing  was considering sending naval ships on escort duty in the troubled waters.

On the face of it, as Beijing would argue, too much should not be read into its naval deployment off the Somali waters. Theirs will be one of a number of navies patrolling the region such as
the United States, India, Greece, Saudi Arabia, France, Russia, Britain and Pakistan.

Besides, Chinese vessels have been attacked by the pirates in recent months giving them as much justification for escort duty as anyone else operating there. The latest was on Tuesday when a Chinese fishing vessel was seized in the Gulf of Aden, along with three other ships including a yacht.

But China’s military has been the subject of relentless scrutiny and any move it makes will be closely watched especially in regional capitals such as Tokyo and New Delhi. India, one of the biggest navies in the Indian Ocean boasting of an aircraft carrier group, has long looked over its shoulder watching for signs of a creeping Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

If nothing else, its role in helping Pakistan build its Gwadar port on the Baluchistan coast  is a matter of concern for Indian navy planners who worry that the deep water port is a key element of China’s “String of Pearls” strategy of  extending its influence from the South China Sea through the Indian Ocean and on to the Arabian Gulf through  a chain of outposts.

The strategic message of the deployment in the Gulf of Aden is not lost on Chinese experts either. The state-run China Daily quoted a Chinese military strategist as saying it would be a good opportunity for the navy to get into the thick of action in waters far away from home.

“Apart from fighting pirates, another key goal is to register the presence of the Chinese navy,” Prof Li Jie, a naval researcher, told the paper.

Is that partly what this is burst of activity in the region is about? Are navies flexing their muscles, stepping out of their comfort zones, running up alongside unlikely partners? Imagine Iranian and U.S. naval vessels operating in the same waters against the same enemy?

According to Pakistani newspaper the Daily Times, Pakistan’s decision to crack down on the Jammat-ud-Dawa, the charity linked to the Laskhar-e-Taiba, came as the result of pressure from China. Jammat-ud-Dawa was blacklisted by a UN Security Council committee this week.

The Daily Times noted that earlier attempts to target the Jamaat-ud-Dawa at the Security Council had been vetoed by China. “It is the Chinese “message” that has changed our mind. The Chinese did not veto the banning of Dawa on Wednesday, and they had reportedly told Islamabad as much beforehand, compelling our permanent representative at the UN to assert that Pakistan would accept the ban if it came,” the newspaper said. “One subliminal message was also given to Chief Minister Punjab, Mr Shehbaz Sharif, during his recent visit to China, and the message was that Pakistan had to seek peace with India or face change of policy in Beijing. Once again, it is our friend China whose advice has been well taken…”

This is intriguing, all the more so given how much attention has has been focused on what the United States has been doing to lean on Pakistan to curb militant groups blamed by India for the attacks on Mumbai.  So what has been going on? Has China, with its growing economic power, become a pivotal player in global diplomacy even as the United States continues to hog the limelight?

We’ve always known that China has had a major role in South Asia. But in the past it was a seen as the ultimate all-weather ally of Pakistan, to be used if necessary against India, with which it has vied for influence in Asia and against which it fought a border war in 1962.  Is this call for peace an example of it taking on a U.S.-style role of regional policeman, as I discussed in a post back in June about India, Pakistan and China?

The Times of India quotes Shashi Tharoor as saying that there was a feeling in China that its opposition to India on the issue of terrorism would “no longer be compatible with its being seen as a responsible player in the system”. (more…)

India has asked the United Nations Security Council to blacklist the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the Pakistani charity which it says is a front for the militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba, blamed by New Delhi for the attacks on Mumbai. But how far is India prepared to go in engaging the Security Council, given that it has resisted for decades UN invention over Kashmir?

Indian newspapers have suggested that India invoke UN Security Council Resolution 1373, passed after the 9/11 attacks on the United States, and requiring member countries to take steps to curb terrorism.  The latest of these calls came from N. Ram, Editor-in-Chief of Indian newspaper The Hindu, who said India must respond to the Mumbai attacks “in an intelligent and peaceful way”.  

So is India preparing to break a long-standing taboo about United Nations intervention?  It first turned to the United Nations in 1948, after India and Pakistan began their first war over Kashmir. The Security Council mandated a ceasefire and India’s then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru also promised a plebiscite in the former kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir (comprising land now held by India, Pakistan and China) to allow the people to decide whether they wanted to join India or Pakistan.

Since then the UN Resolutions have become one of the major bones of contention in the tortuous relationship between India and Pakistan. Until relatively recently, Pakistan insisted that India make good its pledge to hold a plebiscite, while India insisted this had been superseded by the Simla accord following the 1971 war, in which the two countries agreed to resolve all their disputes bilaterally.

Before anyone leaps to judgment on this, I’d recommend reading the exact wording of the UN Security Council Resolutions. Here is the PDF link to the April 1948 resolution, which makes clear that Pakistan must withdraw fighters first from its side of Jammu and Kashmir, followed by a progressive withdrawal of Indian troops, to allow a plebiscite to take place.  It also says that the choice for the people of Jammu and Kashmir was whether to join India or Pakistan; independence — at least as far as the Resolution goes — was not an option.

For those who comment regularly on this blog, I’m aware this is a two-paragraph simplification and am happy to follow up in the comments section. But for the purposes of the present day, what are people saying?

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India and China are holding joint troop exercises this weekend in southern India.  As exercises between nations go nowadays these games named “Hand-in Hand 2008″ are fairly low level and limited in scope. Certainly not on the scale of the naval, air and ground exercises that India and the United States have embarked upon in recent years.

But this is a difficult time in South Asia following the attacks in Mumbai which New Delhi says were orchestrated from Pakistan and for which it is seeking decisive action. So, for China, - Pakistan’s all weather ally -  to be sending a bunch of  troops to India at this fraught moment is certainly worthy of note, if nothing else.

Obviously the exercises were long-planned and perhaps both sides didn’t want to send a negative signal by calling them off at this stage. Relations between India and China are themselves dogged by deep distrust long after they went to war in 1962 and every move forward or lack of it is closely watched by Indo-Sino watchers.

[Chinese and Indian soldiers at an exercise in 2007. Pic by Reuters/China Daily]

There is even an anti-terrorism element to the exercises. An Indian defence ministry statement said that troops taking part in Hand-in Hand 2008 will carry out tactical manoeuvres and drills interoperability training; and finally “culminating in a joint counter-terrorist operational exercise with simulated enemy.”

In India’s case elements in Pakistan can only be the simulated enemy, especially with the wounds from the Mumbai attacks still raw. The reverse holds true for large sections of Pakistan who have for long felt threatened by India, its bigger neighbour to the east.

But what of the Chinese? Who are they thinking of as the enemy when they go through the drills? Separatists in its Muslim-majority Xinjiang region or perhaps Tibetans who were the target of a clampdown following unrest this year?

A little Chinese riddle perhaps, these exercises at this time ?

Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari says he would be ready to commit to a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, in what would be a dramatic overturning of Pakistan’s nuclear policy. Pakistan has traditionally seen its nuclear weapons as neutralising Indian superiority in conventional warfare, and refused to follow India’s example of declaring a no first use policy after both countries conducted nuclear tests in 1998.

Zardari was speaking via satellite from Islamabad to a conference organised by the Hindustan Times when he was asked whether he was willing to make an assurance that Pakistan would not be the first to use nuclear weapons.

“Most certainly,” the newspaper quoted him as saying.  “I can assure you that Pakistan will not be the first country ever to use (nuclear weapons). I hope that things never come to a stage where we have to even think about using nuclear weapons (against India). Personally, I have always been against the very concept of nuclear weapons,” he said.

So what is the Pakistan Army going to make of that? It has always seen itself as the ultimate guarantor of Pakistan’s survival, and nuclear weapons are an essential part of the country’s arsenal should its very  existence come under threat.

And will Zardari’s suggestion turn out to come with conditions that would be unacceptable to India? According to the Hindustan Times, “Zardari mooted in the same breath some kind of regional cooperation for a non-nuclear South Asia”.  That does not look likely to find many immediate takers in India, given that its nuclear weapons were developed as much as a defence against China as against Pakistan, and that it has just reached a nuclear deal with the United States effectively giving it recognition as a nuclear-armed state.

Zardari’s late wife, Benazir Bhutto, had championed Pakistan’s nuclear programme, which was started by her father Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s – India tested its first nuclear device in 1974. Have times changed so much for Pakistan that Zardari is willing to turn his back on this? Or is he just looking for the right words to set the tone for improved ties with India?

(Reuters file photo of Pakistani missile test)

In what is being seen as one of the biggest projections of Indian naval power since India defeated Pakistan in the 1971 war, an Indian warship has sunk a pirate ship in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian navy is now looking at deploying more warships off Somalia.

In the Asia Times, former Indian diplomat M K Bhadrakumar writes of the possibility of a new Great Game unfolding for control of the sea route in the Indian Ocean.

Pakistan has historical reasons to be sensitive about this new development. It lost control of Bangladesh in 1971, in part because the Indian navy was able to prevent it from shipping supplies and men to what was then East Pakistan.  And it has traditionally been sensitive whenever India has shown signs of flexing its muscles in the broader region — its anxiety about growing Indian influence in Afghanistan being a case in point.

But this time there seems to have been very little reaction in Pakistan, whose navy is also involved in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.

India is looking to play a leading role in bringing together countries from the Indian Ocean region to work together to fight piracy, according to this story in the Times of India, working through the so-called Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). “The IONS includes countries as diverse as Oman, Mozambique, Yemen and Egypt to Australia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar,” the newspaper says. “If some countries can provide warships and aircraft, others can chip in with ports and refuelling facilities in the fight against pirates,” it quotes a senior official as saying.

That to me raises an intriguing question. Would Pakistan, which for so long has seen India as a regional bully, now be willing to accept Indian regional leadership in combating problems such as piracy, from which both countries suffer? And what would that mean for future relations between the two countries?

As underlined in this U.S. intelligence study released this week, the global context has changed drastically since the days when Pakistan sought to maintain military parity with India. The National Intelligence Council analysis “Global Trends 2025″ sees China and India joining the United States atop a multipolar world and competing for influence. (see full pdf document here).

Pakistan gets short shrift, presented primarily as a problem rather than the global player it sought to become when it matched India’s nuclear weapons programme with its own. “The future of Pakistan is a wildcard in considering the trajectory of neighbouring Afghanistan,” it says.  Then in a rather chilling line introduced without further explanation, it says “if Pakistan is unable to hold together until 2025, a broader coalescence of Pashtun tribes is likely to emerge and act together to erase the Durand Line (dividing Pakistan and Afghanistan), maximising Pashtun space at the expense of Punjabis in Pakistan and Tajiks and others in Afghanistan.”

When intelligence experts in your supposed ally raise questions about whether your country can hold together, maybe falling under the regional leadership of your supposed enemy does not look so bad? But then again, and to return to the “Great Game” unfolding in the Indian Ocean, the intelligence report also examines the risk of a naval arms race unfolding between India and China as both seek to protect vital energy supplies.

Choosing your friends in a multipolar world is going to become increasingly tricky. For Pakistan, it may turn out to be a matter of survival. Which way is it going to turn? Pakistan’s reaction to India’s role in combatting piracy in the Indian Ocean may provide important clues.

(Reuters photo:  Turkish frigate escorts ship carrying aid to Somalia/Ho New

Of all the reports I have read recently about what the United States should do about Pakistan, none so forcefully puts it in the context of its relationship with India as this latest study by the Center for American Progress (see the full pdf document here).

It’s worth reading not least because the think tank is expected to play an influential role in shaping the policies of President-elect Barack Obama. “Come January, perhaps none will be more piped into the executive branch than the 5-year-old Center for American Progress,” according to politico.com.

Add to that that the fact that under the Republican administration India shook off its association with Pakistan to become a strategic partner of the United States in its own right, and the report starts looking like a radical shift in policy. Under the administration of President George W. Bush, India worked to   “de-hyphenate” its relationship with Pakistan, while building a partnership with the United States that culminated in the U.S.-India nuclear deal. From the U.S. point of view, it won an ally that could be used to contain China.  Now it looks like the hyphen is making a comeback.

The idea that India needs to be involved in a regional solution to the problems posed by Pakistan and Afghanistan has been around for a while, and Obama himself has said that the United States should try to help resolve the Kashmir dispute. But this report is remarkably forthright in spelling out why.

“Afghanistan, India and Pakistan are inextricably linked, and U.S. policy must be formulated accordingly,” it says. “Any regional approach must address Pakistan’s security concerns with India, specifically related to Kashmir and Afghanistan.”

This argument is fundamental, since it holds that the cause of instability in Afghanistan is in Pakistan, and that Pakistan in turn will never fully turn its back on Islamist militants as long as it believes it might need them to counter India. (more…)

Pakistan has agreed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on a $7.6 billion emergency loan to stave off a balance of payments crisis. 

Shaukat Tarin, economic adviser to the prime minister, said the IMF had endorsed Pakistan’s own strategy to bring about structural adjustments. The agreement is expected to encourage other potential donors, who are gathering in Abu Dhabi on Monday for a “Friends of Pakistan” conference.

The government had long delayed announcing its plans to turn to the IMF for help and President Asif Ali Zardari said in September the country did not want to seek IMF assistance. Tarin said in October that going to the IMF was “Plan C” if other lenders failed to come through.  “If we want to go to the IMF, we can … but only as a backup,” he said.

The times are clearly changing and in the midst of a financial crisis that has swept away some of the world’s most august financial institutions, there is no shame in admitting a need for help.

For that matter, I can remember former IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus declaring confidently at one of the annual IMF meetings I covered in Washington in the mid 1990s that Keynsianism was dead. I challenged him at the time over his certainty, but wish I could ask the same question now that western economies are spending their way out of trouble like there’s no tomorrow.

But what will it mean for Pakistan that its new government, less than a year after elections that ushered in a new civilian democracy, has had to eat its words and turn to the IMF for help?

Does it bring to Pakistan the silver lining that it offered India, which when forced to accept an IMF bailout in the early 1990s began a programme of economic reforms?  As noted in an earlier post,  India as a result began dismantling decades of licence raj and never really looked back. 

And why did Pakistan’s closest allies, including the United States, Saudi Arabia and China, let it down by leaving it to turn to the IMF for help? As discussed in an earlier post, China, with $2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, was in a strong position to step in to head off what could turn into a deeply unpopular move.  Traditionally seen by Pakistan as its most reliable friend, China appears to have decided that an IMF programme was the best medicine.

A new beginning? Or another source of instability?