Opinion

Reihan Salam

Instead of a divorce, the GOP needs primary reform

Reihan Salam
Oct 18, 2013 16:15 UTC

A few days ago, an older and wiser friend of mine and I had a lengthy conversation about divorce, that most cheerful of subjects. He noted that one of the surest signs of a marriage in trouble was that both parties were convinced that they had been forgiving of various betrayals and accommodating of various foibles, yet this generosity hadn’t been reciprocated. Naturally, this brought to mind the increasingly strained relationship between Tea Party conservatives and Republican regulars. What better way to describe how Ted Cruz must feel about John Boehner, the sellout, and how John Boehner must feel about Ted Cruz, the zealot?

Molly Ball of the Atlantic recounts the quasi-mutinous musings of various conservative luminaries, like Glenn Beck of TheBlaze, Erick Erickson of RedState.com, and Sean Hannity of Fox News, among others. As recently as 2010, the notion that the Tea Party movement would bolt from the GOP to establish a party of its own would have seemed absurd. But now, in the wake of a fiscal showdown that’s proven to be an utter fiasco for congressional Republicans, the idea of a bona fide divorce is gaining credence. Among the Tea Party faithful, there is a widespread conviction that the effort to defund Obamacare would have proven successful had Speaker Boehner and his anxious allies been tougher, and more willing to risk breaching the debt ceiling. Republican regulars, meanwhile, are largely convinced that the defund Obamacare effort was a hopeless indulgence that exacted a real political cost. At least one critic of the Tea Party movement, David Frum of the Daily Beast and CNN, has argued that Republicans would benefit if “the Sarah Palins and the Ted Cruzes who have done so much harm to their hopes over the past three election cycles” were to bolt.

This isn’t the first time libertarian-minded conservatives have contemplated a formal exit from the GOP. In the 1970s, William A. Rusher, the publisher of National Review and a staunch, Rockefeller-hating Goldwaterite, frequently made the case for a new conservative party, which he hoped would be led by Ronald Reagan. After Reagan’s narrow defeat in the 1976 contest for the Republican presidential nomination, however, the former California governor stood by his moderate rival Gerald Ford, and in doing so he dashed the hopes of Rusher and other third-party enthusiasts. The Libertarian Party, established in the early 1970s, has long been divided over whether to appeal to disaffected Republicans or hippies. In the 1980 presidential election, the Libertarians achieved great success by espousing a pacifist, left-leaning brand of “low-tax liberalism,” while in 1988 the party turned to Ron Paul, the libertarian populist who would later make waves as a Republican presidential candidate in 2008 and 2012. The 2012 Libertarian presidential nominee, former New Mexico Gov. Gary Johnson, an unpretentious Republican who combined familiar Tea Party bromides with a commitment to ending the War on Drugs, had some promise as an alternative to Mitt Romney, but in the end his candidacy proved to be a footnote, in part because the septuagenarian Paul stole his thunder. The Constitution Party, first established as the U.S. Taxpayers’ Party in 1991, is a vehicle for a hard-edged Christian conservative politics that has never found much success. And in 2000, Pat Buchanan tried to transform Ross Perot’s Reform Party into a nationalist conservative party in line with his own idiosyncratic, anti-trade populism.

Given that all of these efforts have failed, why would the Tea Party movement succeed in establishing itself as a real rival to the GOP? I doubt that it would. But it is true that the political landscape has changed in recent years. Over the past decade, formal party organizations have grown progressively weaker, to the point where they are hollowed-out shells often overshadowed by well-funded independent expenditure groups. This is despite the fact that broad-based party organizations have a number of advantages over non-party outfits, including greater accountability and autonomy. The Tea Party movement already operates as a kind of shadow party within the larger Republican universe, with independent expenditure groups, think tanks, and overlapping networks of intellectuals and activists serving as its foundation. Getting on the ballot would be difficult, as the Democratic-Republican duopoly in most states actively works to suppress political competition from minor parties, but it wouldn’t be impossible.

The obvious downside of a Tea Party exit for conservatives is that the U.S. relies almost exclusively on first-past-the-post elections, in which the candidate with the most votes wins the election. Countries that use various forms of proportional representation are far friendlier to minor parties, which is why Germany, Israel and New Zealand tend to have several parties represented in their national legislatures and not just two. Tea Party candidates in congressional races would presumably be splitting the right-of-center vote with GOP candidates, thus allowing Democrats to slip into office in areas that are now monolithically Republican. Moreover, Tea Party stalwarts have good reason to believe that they can eventually take over the national Republican Party. Why abandon it now when victory is within reach? Of course, the prospect of a Republican Party dominated by the Tea Party movement isn’t exactly heartening to mainstream conservatives who fear that Tea Party excesses will cement a generation-long Democratic majority.

How to fix the GOP’s discipline problem

Reihan Salam
Oct 4, 2013 20:28 UTC

As the government shutdown grinds on, the Republican leadership in the House is struggling to unite GOP lawmakers around a fiscal deal that Senate Democrats and the Obama administration would be willing to accept. Speaker John Boehner has reportedly said that he is willing to rely on Democratic votes if necessary to pass an increase in the debt ceiling. Yet he also insists that he will fight for spending cuts and entitlement reform in any debt ceiling bill, in a nod to conservative members who are convinced that he is eager to sell them out.

Whether or not Boehner succeeds, it is increasingly difficult to deny that the Republican negotiating position is being constrained if not dictated by a small minority of 30 or so members from safe seats who seem largely indifferent to leadership demands, or rather leadership requests. The result is that the much-derided Republican establishment is in a state of panic, sensing that GOP intransigence will lead the party to squander the political opportunity created by the president’s declining fortunes and the persistent unpopularity of Obamacare. How has party discipline broken down to this extent, and what, if anything, can Republicans do to restore it?

First, it is important to recognize that this chaotic confrontation wasn’t supposed to happen. At the start of the year, congressional Republicans seemed eager to return to regular order, in which, essentially, the House majority brokers with the Senate majority to pass legislation, which the president can then sign or veto. Yuval Levin, writing for National Review Online, argued that for the right, the central political problem with the endless succession of fiscal showdowns is that they inevitably made the president, as a unitary figure, look better than the often-fractious House Republican conference. Regular order, in contrast, would demand that Senate Democrats put up or shut up by codifying their commitments, not all of which are popular in hotly-contested states, in real legislation. House Republicans and Senate Democrats would be on a relatively level playing field, while the president would be relegated to the sidelines. But the regular order strategy didn’t come to fruition, both because Senate Democrats were reluctant to play along and because a determined minority of House Republicans couldn’t reconcile themselves to the fact that the ordinary legislative process left them with very little leverage.

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