Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are at last slipping into a form of obscurity. The U.S. mortgage giants will delist from the New York Stock Exchange under order of their watchdog. When they start trading in the penny stock market, investor attitudes may change — but the government fiction that the two are private companies almost certainly won’t.
The ostensible rationale for the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s directive to move them off the big markets is that Fannie’s stock has lately averaged less than the $1 minimum price required by the NYSE and that Freddie’s has fallen close to that level. With no obvious argument to reset their share prices, a delisting was inevitable.
Toyota’s Prius is sometimes known as the Pious. The pioneering but earnest electric car could do with an injection of supercar glamour from Tesla Motors’ Roadster, and vice versa from a practicality standpoint.
Combining the two companies’ electric vehicle nous ought to be bear future fruit. But with both Toyota’s recall-battered U.S. reputation and Tesla’s planned IPO in need of a boost, the partnership also helps with today’s concerns.
Hedge fund group GLG Partners got its New York stock market listing when Freedom Acquisition Holdings, a blank check company, bought a stake back in mid-2007. Then, Freedom’s stock traded at $10-plus. Now, UK-listed Man Group is buying GLG for $4.50 a share. Sure, Freedom’s initial owners got a pop — but longer term it’s another bounced blank check.
Special purpose acquisition companies, or SPACs, were all the rage in the liquidity-flush world that ended in 2008. The idea, akin to the one that spawned the doomed South Sea Company in the 18th century, was to float a shell company and raise capital from investors to make some sort of acquisition in the future — usually with few constraints.
Goldman Sachs’ days alone in the spotlight may be numbered. The U.S. government is looking into collateralized debt obligations involving Morgan Stanley and other Wall Street firms, according to the Wall Street Journal. If so, that could point towards a manageable, industry-wide endgame.
In the only deals mentioned by name — two in a series of synthetic CDOs named for former U.S. presidents — Morgan Stanley didn’t underwrite securities or market them to investors, the role in which, according to the Securities and Exchange Commission, Goldman transgressed.
Warren Buffett claims to love simple things like ice cream. But some 40,000 shareholders at Berkshire Hathaway’s annual powwow in Omaha this weekend may hear a lot about complex derivatives.
For someone who once called these instruments “financial weapons of mass destruction,” the Sage of Omaha has accumulated quite a portfolio. He has written puts on various equity indices and some credit default protection too, with a worst-case exposure of $63 billion. More realistically, the market value of Berkshire’s derivatives liabilities stood at around $9 billion at the end of last year.
Goldman Sachs will be in the dock on Tuesday. Not in court, but in front of a U.S. Senate committee, where seven current and former employees, including boss Lloyd Blankfein and the self-styled Fabulous Fabrice Tourre, will appear. The danger is that the hearing becomes consumed with grandstanding and headline-grabbing hectoring. For past missteps to be avoided, more thoughtful probing is called for. Here are three possible icebreakers.
1. Would you do the Abacus deal again? The Securities and Exchange Commission has sued Goldman and Tourre for securities fraud, a charge the firm vigorously disputes. The deal in question is a synthetic collateralized debt obligation sold in early 2007, one of a series called Abacus. This complex beast was created primarily to allow Paulson & Co, a now-famous hedge fund, to bet against U.S. subprime mortgages. In hindsight the whole structure looks sketchy. Even Blankfein, in written testimony prepared for Tuesday’s hearing, concedes that Goldman needs to strike a better balance between clients’ trading desires and “what the public believes is overly complex and risky.”
Warren Buffett has been uncharacteristically silent about Goldman Sachs. The lack of public comment is especially curious given his $5 billion investment in the firm and the possibility a board director leaked news of that deal to an alleged insider trader. Buffett may be wise to keep his counsel; the investment bank isn’t making itself easy to defend.
It was a different story in March. “You cannot find a better manager” than Lloyd Blankfein, the firm’s chief executive, Buffett told CNBC at the time.
Dr. No has finally stopped James Bond. Producers behind the British spy movie series have put the next film on hold because of financial woes at the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer studio. Presciently, the villain in the 2006 update of “Casino Royale” was a rogue trader who shed tears of blood; maybe the franchise can capitalize further on anti-Wall Street sentiment for the delayed 23rd installment in the series.
MGM’s troubles stem from a 2005 leveraged buyout that saddled it with too much debt. Its private equity owners — including TPG and Providence Equity Partners — have had the studio on the block since November. The uncertainty has led EON Productions to postpone the next 007 film indefinitely.
John Paulson “greatest trade ever” may be losing some of its luster. His hedge fund made some $15 billion betting against the U.S. subprime mortgage market. But one extremely profitable deal has led to a Securities and Exchange Commission fraud suit against Goldman Sachs. Paulson & Co isn’t charged, but the SEC’s portrayal isn’t favorable to the firm and could have wider repercussions.
Washington’s main securities regulator alleges that Goldman sold collateralized debt obligation securities in a deal where it failed to disclose to investors that Paulson had been influential in selecting the underlying residential mortgage bonds. The lawsuit also says buyers weren’t told Paulson was betting against them with credit default swaps — ultimately making the firm $1 billion. Goldman said the charges are “unfounded in law and fact.” Paulson didn’t immediately have any comment.
By Jeffrey Goldfarb and Richard Beales
The private equity industry looks poised to think bigger again. Buyout barons have spent almost three years twiddling their thumbs with pint-sized deals. The industry’s last 11-figure deal was Blackstone’s $27 billion purchase of Hilton in July 2007. And the acquisition of IMS Health in November is the only LBO to exceed $5 billion since the crisis hit. Yet there appears to be scope to double that in the not-so-distant future.
The money certainly has become available. In addition to dry powder held by the biggest private equity firms, banks are eager to lend again — even without demand from collateralized loan obligations to stoke the buyouts. Bubble accoutrements, including staple financing, covenant-lite loans and PIK toggle features, have re-emerged to make deals easier and more tempting for private equity firms. Interest rates also remain near historic lows and fixed-income investors have rediscovered an appetite for risk.