Unstructured Finance

The burden of being SAC Capital’s “Portfolio Manager B”

Michael Steinberg, the SAC Capital Advisers portfolio manager who was arrested at the crack of dawn last Friday morning probably envies former Goldman Sachs trader Matthew Taylor’s rush-hour surrender to the Federal Bureau of Investigation on Wednesday.

While Steinberg was led away in handcuffs as a Wall Street Journal reporter took shaky video footage of the scene outside his door at 6am, Taylor sauntered into FBI headquarters in New York on his own, at 8:30am, having had plenty of time to collect his wits with a cup of hot coffee.

The difference between Steinberg’s dramatic arrest and Taylor’s quiet surrender highlights a theatrical strategy the FBI and prosecutors use for big cases. It does not bode well for the other potential targets in the high-profile insider trading investigation into Steven A. Cohen’s $15 billion hedge fund, which increasingly seems to be the primary focus of the government’s attempt to go after wrongful trading in the hedge fund industry.

And that, of course raises, the question of who might be next SAC Capital trader federal authorities will go after. No one except the FBI, prosecutors and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission knows for sure, but the case against Steinberg does raise some uncomfortable questions for Gabriel Plotkin, a portfolio manager at SAC’s unit Sigma Capital Management. Plotkin, while not named in the Steinberg case, is identified as “Portfolio Manager B,” according to sources familiar with the matter, in the SEC’s civil complaint.

According to the Steinberg SEC complaint, Steinberg “arranged to share Dell inside information with another portfolio manager at Sigma,” who is afterward referred to as “Portfolio Manager B.” The complaint goes on to say that as a result of trading by Steinberg and “Portfolio Manager B” SAC clocked $6.4 million in a combination of profits and loss avoidances.

UF Weekend Reads

It’s Libor all the time, just not for me.

Earlier I blogged about how the Libor scandal just isn’t getting me as worked up as it is for other journalists (see Joe Nocera’s column today in the NYT). It’s not that I don’t think allegations of market manipulation aren’t important. And this is nothing to take away from the groundbreaking reporting by my Reuters colleague Carrick Mollenkamp did on the matter back in 2008 while he was at the WSJ.

It’s just that in the scheme of things, the allegation that bankers may have conspired to keep Libor artificially low to make their institutions seem more solvent during the height of the financial crisis doesn’t chill me to the bone. Did anyone really believe those institutions were solvent during the crisis? Does anyone really believe banks with hundreds of billions of second-liens on their books and other poorly reserved loans are really solvent today?

We simply say the banks (except for maybe some in the euro zone) are solvent and whistle past the graveyard.

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